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Abstract
This thesis troubles the deafening silence, surrounding South Asian Muslim
women’s (SAMW) experience, of the collateral damage from the ‘War on
Terror’ as prolonged adversity and harm. It identifies forms of adversity to
which SAMW are exposed and their resilience responses in the ‘War on
Terror’.
This thesis offers a radical critique, of adversity, resistance, and resilience
through the frames of temporality and hegemony. It exposes interrelated
tensions inherent in resilience as survival/ coping, or as transformation/
adaptation. Hegemony brings power and resistance, to the centre of the
concept in new ways; problematizing accepted notions of resilience as the
capacity to ‘bounce back’ to a former state of equilibrium. It identifies the past
in the present; in this frame the ‘War on Terror’, is a present day manifestation
of past patterns of ideological struggle with roots in empire.
Ethnographic research was undertaken with SAMW, in a neighbourhood in the
north of England, to gather information on SAMW’s experience of adversity,
resistance, and resilience to the effects of the ‘War on Terror’. The research
identified mechanisms in community, neighbourhood, and through state
institutions, that support SAMW’s resilience.
The findings, unequivocally identified links between SAMW’s fear of
assault/adversity and the ‘War on Terror’; as signified in 9/11. SAMW had little,
if any, recourse to material resources as insulators from adversity, and, civil
and civic institutions failed to offer SAMW adequate support. Social capital,
generated in relationships and social networks, insulated SAMW, and enabled
them to build hybrid ‘resistant identities’.
This thesis identifies new ways of thinking about the ‘War on Terror’, adversity
and resilience; it presents new knowledge to highlight the urgency for further
investigation into adversity and resilience in conditions of prolonged trauma.
The imperative is to address dislocations between SAMW and local and
national state institution
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1Part I
Through the lens of power – South Asian Muslim women’s
continuing struggle with adversity;
resistance and resilience
2Chapter One:
Introduction
1.1Introduction
‘……some Muslim women experience victimisations on multiple fronts:
they face violent anti-Muslim attacks at the hands of racist bigots, and
encounter gender discrimination from within their own communities…..it
is disheartening to hear the deafening silence on gender issues’ (Khan,
2013)
The quote above from Khan offers an unusually precise understanding of the
situation of Muslim women in Britain; it acknowledges Muslim women’s
vulnerability to gender and faith discrimination in society, and their unequal
power relations in Muslim communities. This thesis adds hatred and assault to
this list of indignities, as the ‘collateral damage’ inflicted on South Asian Muslim
women by the ‘War on Terror’ (Lambert, 2011). This thesis makes the case that
Khan’s (2013) ‘deafening silence’ is not new; it is historic. Its temporal dimension
places the present in a historic past that brings the past into the present. This
thesis breaks the silence surrounding South Asian Muslim women’s experiences
of adversity in offering a radical critique of adversity, resistance and resilience
under the lens of hegemony. Importantly, in highlighting Muslim women’s
experience of adversity, this thesis identifies the resistance and resilience
strategies adopted by South Asian Muslim women, and the challenges these
raise for the theory of resilience.
This thesis makes the case that periods’ of heightened anxiety exist, and have
existed for centuries, in the struggle for ideological supremacy (hegemony),
between Western ideology and Islam. From this reading the ‘War on Terror’ is a
present day manifestation of a well-established pattern replicating the rhetoric
and struggle for ideological hegemony evident from the time of empire (Jackson,
2005; Nechtman, 2006; Salter, 2002; Spalek, 2013). The discourse of colonial
domination was muted during the decades of the Cold War, but did not
disappear, it continued to resonate in discourses of the ‘Third World’ (Slater,
2002), to be resurrected in 1993, by Huntington in the ‘Clash of Civilizations’
3thesis.1 Huntington’s thesis was published just eight years before the al Qaeda
attack on mainland America on 11th September 2001 (9/11), giving prominence
to the notion of ‘cultural clash’ between the West and Islam. This is evident in
the American government response to 9/11, triggering the second2 ‘War on
Terror’. Scholars have argued that the ‘Clash’ thesis is neither straight forward
nor new; it is rooted in constructs of the ‘the two worlds thesis’3 (Salter, 2002:
129), based on imperial distinctions between the civilized West, and its
uncivilized periphery. The importance of the ‘Clash’ hypothesis, to this thesis, is
in its contribution to the hegemonic post-9/11 discursive practices adopted by
American and British governments (explored in detail in Chapter Three), with
the consent of the ‘subaltern’4 American public. In adopting hegemony as the
lens to explicate the implications of the ‘War on Terror’ for South Asian Muslim
women in Britain this thesis offers a distinctive intervention.
The outcome of 9/11 cannot be understated; it is viewed, in its most extreme
representation, as the Fourth World War encompassing all parts of the globe
(Rogers, 2008; Morris, 2012). It is rooted, this thesis argues, in an ongoing
temporal struggle for supremacy based on a constructed threat to Western
liberal democracy by Islam (Jackson, 2005; Slater, 2002). From the perspective
of American and British governments, the destruction of the World Trade Centre
and the attack on the Pentagon (9/11), were seen as enactments of the
cultural/ideological clash predicted by Huntington. However, scholars argue that
the leader of al Qaeda, Oslama Bin Laden, was not interested in disrupting
Western ideology or culture; the attacks were, in this frame, an ‘old fashioned’,
if more lethal, form of terrorism aimed at changing America’s policies in the
Middle East (Jackson, 2005). From the perspective of hegemony, the
interweaving of ideological threat into actual physical threat, indicates a
1 Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis is discussed in Chapter Three.
2 The first War on Terror was proclaimed in 1993 by the Reagan administration (see 3.3.1).
3 A colonial trope the ‘two world’ thesis held that the developed West was peaceful and the
developing non-West was a zone of conflict (Slater, 2002: 128, 129).
4 There are two points to be made here. Firstly, the term subaltern was coined by Gramsci to
describe a subordinate class whose consent is maintained to the ideology of the dominant
class without the use of force (Gramsci, 1971). Secondly, in this reading the American (and
British public can be read as a subaltern class in the larger political structure of government.
4‘hegemonizing’5 process on the part of American and British governments. It set
in train discourses of the superiority of one ideology (Western liberal
democracy), over another (Islam), (Jackson, 2011). In these representations
Islam, and by implication Muslims, are signified as uncivilized and barbaric
(Lambert, 2011; Slater, 2002). As will become evident, representations of South
Asian Muslim women are constituted by, and contingent upon, these signifiers.
Representations of Islam as a threat to Western liberal democracy have
continued since 2001, evidencing heightened anxiety, and the prolonged nature
of this period of ideological struggle. As recently as 2015, American presidential
candidate, Donald Trump, repeatedly articulated the view that Muslims hate
Americans, and the American way of life (Pilkington, 2015). Trump’s anxious
rhetoric represents, and thereby constitutes and positions, Muslims as a threat
to America. Trumps discursive practice, equating Islamic terrorism (criminal
activity) with being Muslim, laid the ground for a recent expression of pre-
emptive policy; a ban on Muslims’ travelling to America from seven majority
Muslim countries. Trump, as president, promised to keep America safe by
keeping Muslims out, in proposed legislation in January and March 2017.6 The
struggle for ideological supremacy was also present in Trump’s speech in
Warsaw, on 6th July 2017, in which Trump reiterated that Islam is to be feared
by the West because ‘radical Islam…reject[s] our values’ (CCN Politics, 2017).
There are two points to be made here, firstly, the rhetoric of Islam and Muslims
as a threat to Western values, reiterates historic discourses of Muslims as
‘barbarian’ and ‘other’ (Jackson, 2011; Slater, 2002). Secondly, the ‘Muslim ban’
fails to discriminate between individual Muslims who pose a criminal threat and
those who do not. Through the lens of hegemony, this tactic (by the dominant
group), can be seen to create conditions in which the American (and British)
publics, as subaltern groups, buy into, or accept, the ideology of Gramsci’s
‘superstructure’ (i.e. government). The use of pre-emptive policy by the UK
government is explicated in Chapter Three. In Gramsci’s conception of
5 The term ‘hegemonizing’ refers to the process by which groups come to accept the values of
the dominant group and embody its practices and rhetoric’s (James, 2006: 61).
6 In June 2017 the American Supreme Court allowed a revised and limited version of the
legislation to pass onto the American statute
5hegemony it is essential for the dominant group to win the ‘hearts and minds’7
of the populous.
This thesis, argues that the ‘War on Terror’ and counter-terrorism measures,
affect Muslim women negatively. That Muslim women’s capacity to cope with,
or overcome, these adversities has had little academic or political attention;
South Asian Muslim women’s resistance to the ‘collateral damage’ inflicted by
the ‘War on Terror’ (Lambert, 2011: 85,) is the focus of this thesis. There is
ample evidence that, since 9/11, Muslim women have been, and continue to be,
targets of Islamophobic attack/hate crime (Allen, 2011; Copsey, 2012; Hussain,
2012; Littler, 2015). The research conducted for this thesis found that, since
9/11, South Asian Muslim women experience high levels of fear for their safety.
Additionally, there is the potential8 anxiety caused by, or the fear of, ‘hard’
security measures, such as home searches (Nί Aolᾀin, 2014). Yet, as noted by 
Khan (2013), amidst the ‘noise’ of counter terrorism, there is a ‘deafening
silence’ surrounding the adverse effects of the ‘War on Terror’. This thesis
breaks this ‘deafening silence’ by identifying how the state and civil society failed
to support Muslim women’s resilience.
Gramsci’s interpretation of hegemony is the lens through which this interrogation
of resilience is conducted. In investigating resilience, through the lens of
hegemony, this thesis brings power and resistance to the centre of resilience
theory. It enables new ways of thinking, identifying problems in understanding
resilience; it questions whether, survival and/or transformation, in conditions of
prolonged harm is resilience. It questions whether forms of resilience that
manifest as resistance, causing further disruption in the system, can be termed
resilience. It raises questions about the ways in which resilience can be scaled
up, from the individual to the group, with reference to structures and group
processes. These questions move resilience between micro and macro
7 This deliberate reference to ‘winning the hearts and minds’ picks up on rhetoric in the UK
government’s 2007 Prevent.
8 ‘Potential’ is used to indicate the relative absence of published academic studies to evidence
harm resulting from ‘hard’ counter-terrorism. Chapter Three, 3.5.3 draws comparisons with
women’s experiences in Northern Ireland under emergency powers to suggest negative
effects as a result of emergency powers in counter-terrorism in Britain.
6contexts, from closely bonded local social networks to, national and
transnational ‘superstructures’. It incorporates, thinking related to social network
analysis, and, social capital9 to understand the mechanisms that support
collective resistance and resilience, in conditions of prolonged adversity. A
temporal lens questions the function of resilience: Is resilience about ‘coping’?
Is resilience about having a regulatory effect? Or, is resilience about resistance
that has a ‘transformative’ adaptive effect? These questions arise from locating
hegemony in resilience. This framing of resilience positions South Asian Muslim
women’s resistances as counter-hegemonic actions, as will be made clear in
this thesis. The findings from this thesis indicate, that South Asian Muslim
women’s resistance disrupts their position in systems within, and beyond, their
immediate communities. This thesis evidences the ripple effects of these
disruptions. This thesis argues that the mutually constitutive movement, of micro
to macro level disturbances, function to regulate micro level resistances in order
to retain macro level power structures.
In arguing that the ‘War on Terror’ has the hallmarks of a period of heightened
anxiety, in the struggle for ideological supremacy, this thesis makes explicit the
effects of macro events on micro communities, with specific reference to South
Asian Muslim women. This thesis argues that structural inequalities; political,
social and economic disadvantages, make the management of adversity more
complex. Chapter Five, (5.2), and Appendix 3 provide, neighbourhood and
national data, to evidence structural inequalities experienced by South Asian
Muslim women involved in the research conducted for this thesis. In
interrogating the apparently self-evident, but insufficiently studied, claim that the
‘War on Terror’ is experienced as adversity by Muslim women in Britain
(Huckerby, 2012; Nì Aolàni, 2013), this thesis joins South Asian, and other,
Muslim women in ‘breaking the silence’ noted by Khan 2013.
9 Social capital refers to the social (as opposed to material) assets realised by individuals
working together to achieve outcomes that are good for themselves and that also have wider
benefits for others.
71.2 The aims of this thesis
Premised on the claim, that the ‘War on Terror’ is experienced by South Asian
Muslim women as adversity, this thesis examines responses to this adversity.
The idea of prolonged adversity is particularly interrogated, in the frame of
resilience, where the ‘prolonged’ brings in the temporal dimension and
‘resilience’ brings in hegemony and power. Hegemony introduces the dynamic
of resistance, and its manifestations, such as hybridity.
The significance of temporality to the study of resilience
A key aim of this thesis is to trouble resilience as the ability of an affected object,
individual, group or system to ‘bounce back’ quickly, after
harm/trauma/disruption, to a former state of equilibrium. This thesis asks if, in
the process of adapting to prolonged adversity, changes are made to fundament
pre-trauma characteristics of the individual or group; if adaptation constitutes
resilience. This thesis argues that, under a temporal lens, adversity has a
complex temporality of the immediate, and enduring, as a mutually constitutive,
non-linear dynamic. For South Asian Muslim women in Britain, for example, this
thesis examines transformation and change (adaptation) in the ‘War on Terror’
in relation to fundamental pre-trauma/disturbance faith characteristics10.
Additionally, and importantly, this thesis argues that, under the lens of
hegemony resilience is enacted as/in a prolonged ‘war of position’11 by South
Asian Muslim women in Britain. In this frame resilience (by the subaltern group)
is defiance (resistance) to the hegemonizing processes of the dominant group
(the state and/or civil society) to win, and maintain, their consent for its
values/ideology. This reading of prolonged adversity is inherently political. This
political reading of resilience, removes the neutrality of resilience; it places it
firmly in the field of relations of power, domination and resistance.
10 Hardy’s (2015) definition is premised on the affected individual, group or system retaining pre-
trauma characteristics in the process of adaption in conditions of prolonged adversity.
11 For Gramsci, the classical model of revolution through military insurrection (war of
manoeuvre) has been supplanted within advanced capitalism by a cultural struggle of much
longer duration and complexity (war of position) (Egan, 2014).
8The significance of hegemony; identifying resistance and prolonged
struggle
A further aim of this thesis is to interrogate the ‘War on Terror’ through the lens
of hegemony. This thesis traces the history of ‘othering’ South Asian Muslim
women in Britain. In tracing resistance and resilience, and where women’
narratives are missing, this thesis shows how active resistance and silencing
embody the prolonged dynamic of hegemony. Hegemony locates the ‘War on
Terror’ as historic and continuous; from this perspective there is no equilibrium
for South Asian Muslim women in Britain to bounce back to. This thesis
understands the ‘War on Terror’ as rooted in an imperial past (Jackson, 2011;
Slater, 2002). Understood in this frame, the ‘War on Terror’, is part of a deeper,
and longer, process of ‘othering’ than its sixteen years of enactment. From this
perspective the struggle of South Asian Muslim women in Britain is a resistance
against a powerful historic tidal wave of adversity.
Hegemony enables the articulation of ‘othering’ in the lives of South Asian
Muslim women in Britain; the construction of how they are positioned and
represented. In this frame, representations of South Asian Muslim women in
Britain are constituted in, and contingent on, British imperial history; the past is
brought into the present. From this perspective subaltern status as ‘other’, is not
only a statement of hegemony, it is stitched into the daily lives of South Asian
Muslim women in Britain. ‘Othering’ is articulated, and rearticulated, every time
a visibly identifiable Muslim woman is assaulted, or spat at, or verbally abused
on the streets of Britain. Hegemony also holds the tension of voice and silence,
as noted by Khan in the beginning of this thesis, and, also here by Spivak:
…within the effaced itinerary of the subaltern subject, the track of sexual
difference is doubly effaced…[i]f in the colonial production, the subaltern
has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more
deeply in shadow (1998: 287)
Hegemony enables an articulation of the effects of dominant narratives on the
subordinate; effacing is itself, a powerful act of invisibilising the experience of
the subaltern. Through the temporal lens of the past, it is possible to see that
South Asian Muslim women in Britain, and their experiences, remain effaced in
the present, on the grounds of race and gender. The silence and/or invisibility of
9women, in imperial historiography, is echoed in the ‘deafening’ silence, that
‘shadows’ South Asian Muslim women’s experience in the present; in the ‘War
on Terror’.
In this thesis, temporality, and, hegemony provide the wider frames for
understanding adversity inflicted by the ‘War on Terror’ for South Asian Muslim
women in Britain. An empirical investigation was undertaken to bring these
South Asian Muslim women ‘out of the shadows’ (Spivak, 1988). This
investigation was conducted over eight months in a neighbourhood in the North
of England.
Aims of the field study
The aims of the field investigation were distinct from, but contributed to, the
overall aims of the thesis. Their purpose was to guide, but not direct, information
gathering. Whilst adversity and resilience are separated in these aims there was
no such separation in women’s testimonies.
The field investigation sought to understand adversity and resilience responses.
To gather evidence of the resources, network, and neighbourhood mechanisms
available to women, including the function of civic and civil society institutions to
support women’s capacity and opportunity to develop social capital, and, built
resilience. The aims of the investigation were to:
- gather women’s testimonies of experiences of harm/adversity pre and
post 9/11;
- identify the places, spaces and people women turned to at times of
hardship, such as family members, friends, faith and other social
networks;
- understand the situations in which forms of social capital were generated;
- identify neighbourhood resources, mechanisms, and wider community
networks, including generic community centres and women’s centres;
and
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- identify formal institutions and networks that were accessible to, and used
by, women, such as local councillors, local government officials, local
community leaders and neighbourhood police officers.
The field investigation also sought wider perspectives, through semi-structured
interviews, from civil society and representatives of the local state, who were
familiar with the study neighbourhood and its residents. These interviews sought
to identify the challenges and opportunities for residents in the study
neighbourhood. To do this the field investigation sought to:
- identify the extent to which, community leaders and representatives of
the local state engaged with, and understood, adversity experienced by
South Asian Muslim women in the study neighbourhood;
- understand the mechanisms used, by community leaders and
representatives of the state, to insulate South Asian Muslim women in the
study neighbourhood, from the harm/adversity of the ‘War on Terror’.
1.3 Focus on South Asian Muslim women in Britain
The field study specifically sought the experiences of Pakistani and Bangladeshi
South Asian Muslim women in Britain. The specificity of this ethnic selection
requires explanation, and contextualization in order, to locate the particularity of
these women’s’ experiences of prolonged adversity in the ‘War on Terror’ as
historic and continuous. It also requires explanation in terms of why Pakistani
and Bangladeshi women as opposed other Muslim women in Britain.
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India are generally recognised as
constituting South Asia. Of these the first three countries are, self-defined,
majority Muslim countries, and India is not. Whilst India has a large Muslim
population it was founded (on independence in 1947) as a nation for Hindu’s.
The ‘War on Terror’ prioritises Muslim or Islamist groups, and as such, Afghani,
Pakistani, and Bangladeshi, populations are the most obvious South Asian
migrant groups to be identified in the ‘War on Terror’. Pakistani and Bangladeshi
South Asian Muslims remain the largest ethnic groups in Britain (Ali, 2015: 24)
11
and (as evidenced in Chapter Three), the most established migrant Muslim
communities in the UK. In other words, they are amongst the most visible Muslim
ethnic minority groups in the UK. The inclusion of Pakistani women, is perhaps,
more obvious, given the links made between Pakistan, al-Qaeda and Islamist
activity in the north-western tribal areas of Pakistan (Crilly, 2010). This
connection was made explicit by the former British Prime Minister, David
Cameron, in 2010, when Cameron ‘accused elements of the Pakistani state of
promoting the export of terrorism’ (Watt, 2010). Three, of the four, (7/7) London
bombers were also of Pakistani descent (Anwar, 2014), adding strength to links
between Pakistan and terrorism. These facts support the view that some British
Pakistani’s pose a risk as ‘legitimate’ potential terrorists. However, this is not the
case for Bangladeshi’s. Bangladeshi women are vulnerable to Islamophobic
assault, in the context of Islamist terrorism, partly because the British public, and
state, have difficulty in differentiating between people of Pakistani and
Bangladeshi origin. This leaves Bangladeshi women at risk of being
misidentified as Pakistani (Pantazis, 2009), with the attendant dangers of being
linked to terrorism. Additionally, Bangladeshis are visibly identifiable as South
Asian Muslims by their skin colour and traditional dress (Ibid.). Bangladeshi
women live with the fear, and risk, as do Pakistani women, of being targeted as
Islamist sympathisers. Rashid argues that:
whilst Muslim men are explicitly regarded as dangerous for their
susceptibility to violent extremism, the Muslim woman as silenced victim,
by contrast, has implicitly come to symbolise the dangerous
consequences of “too much multiculturalism” (Rashid, 2013:2; see also
Ahmad, 2013; Francois-Cerrah, 2011).
There are numerous examples of Muslim women who wear hijab, being attacked
on the streets of Britain; the largest numbers of whom are Asian or South Asian
(Faith Matters, 2016). As recently as June 2017, following the suicide bombing
in Manchester, Islamophobic hate crime spiked with visibly identifiable Muslim
women bearing the brunt. In Peterborough, for example, a hate crime incident
involved the assault of a Muslim woman, while she was crossing the road, with
her three year old daughter. The woman was pushed from behind, knocked to
the ground and her hijab ripped off and thrown back at her (Peterborough
Telegraph, 2017). The incident powerfully inscribes the significance of hijab, it
12
sends clear signals to Muslim women that hijab, is not accepted on the streets
of Britain. Events such as these evidence, the symbolic importance of hijab as
a signifier of, the threat of ‘too much multiculturalism’ for some parts of the British
public. Furthermore, this incident is a prime example of how heightened anxiety,
on a macro level, is felt at the micro level in the daily lives of South Asian Muslim
women in Britain. It is a prime example of the necessity of temporality for
understanding this outpouring of hatred of South Asian Muslims’ that the ‘War
on Terror’ (Lambert 2011) appears to have given licence to.
1.4. Conceptual frames
Movement between abstraction, and grounding in reality, is central to this thesis
mirroring the effects of macro (abstract and distant) phenomenon at the micro
level (the lived experience). To orient the reader a brief introduction is offered
to the conceptual frames utilized in this thesis. The two primary frames are
‘resilience’ and, Gramsci’s conception of, ‘hegemony’ (2007). Resilience is
important because it is the focus of this thesis, and hegemony, because it is the
lens through which resilience is interrogated. The term ‘Islamophobia’ is used,
as a conceptual frame, within the discursive practices integral to the ‘War on
Terror’. Feminism and anti-imperial theory, including Bhabha’s (1994) concept
of hybridity, enable understandings of South Asian Muslim women’s resistance
to adversity in the ‘War on Terror’ constructed within patriarchal and colonial
power structures. These themes and frames also require explanation.
1.4.1 Adversity, resilience and adaptation
Resilience and adversity are intrinsically linked; resilience is contingent on
adversity, and vice versa. Problematically these interconnected concepts
remain attached to conditions of immediate, ephemeral, harm. Most significantly
these concepts fail to acknowledge the possibility of resistance as a
manifestation of resilience. The inclusion of resistance (particularly in relation to
prolonged adversity), troubles the apparent political neutrality of resilience (see
Mackinnon, 2012); in this frame, the political neutrality of resilience, can be read
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as ‘coping’ with/in adverse conditions. Conceptually, this is an important point
for a political reading of resilience, through the lens of hegemony. Hegemony
identifies the struggle of the dominant and subordinate in relation to ideological
supremacy. Hegemony’s challenge to resilience is addressed in 1.5.1 of this
chapter and in Chapter Two. The point is that, resilience through the lens of
hegemony, has to accommodate resistance and power; offering the possibility
of a new reading of resilience.
Despite its difficulties, the concept ‘resilience’ is ubiquitous, as a solution to
problems, in contemporary political and social contexts. Resilience is used in
issues as varied as, child development, natural disaster, mental health, crime
and terrorism (Ball, 2011; Hardy, 2015; Masten, 2001; Walklate, 2011). The wide
spread use of resilience dilutes its understanding, making it essential, and
urgent, to interrogate the use of the concept in the resistance and resilience of
South Asian Muslim in Britain in the ‘War on Terror’.
1.4.2 Hegemony as ideological struggle
This is not an immediate transfer of Gramsci’s ideas; the complex notion of
hegemony brings a distinctive theoretical perspective to bear on British/South
Asian Muslim relations. This thesis utilizes Gramsci’s interpretation of
hegemony, as ideologies in struggle; in this frame ideology is in search for
domination that it can never fully achieve; hence ideology is always searching.
It is in the search of one ideology for hegemony, and another to resist hegemony
(domination; being hegemonized), that spaces of interchange and hybridity are
created.
It is important to understand Gramsci’s interpretation of hegemony because of
its centrality in this thesis. Femia (1981) defines hegemony as ‘an order in which
a common social-moral language is spoken, in which one concept of reality is
dominant, informing with its spirit all modes of though and behaviour’ (p. 24,
emphasis added). Hall’s (1996) definition of hegemony illustrates how the state
and civil society produce, and maintain, consent to the class hierarchies of
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capitalist society. These definitions have in common the all-pervading effects of
hegemony on subaltern groups.
Hegemony is a state of striving and constant struggle; it distinguishes between
the use of coercion and consent as mechanisms of social power. In the use of
consent Gramsci notes, the importance of the intellectuals’ role, in training
people to fulfil their assigned role. Socialisation means discipline linked to
education; Davidson suggests that ‘the move from savage to civilized being
comes through education’ (2005: 8). Hegemonic power seeks to win people over
to the social norms of the dominant group, whilst coercion refers to the state’s
capacity for violence against those who refuse to accept the dominant ideology
(Stoddard, 2007: 200. 201). Gramsci problematizes the conception of
‘hegemony’ as absolute power by including the possibility of resistance (Hall,
1986; Hardy, 2013; MacLeod, 1992). In societies characterized by the exercise
of hegemony, Gramsci suggests, a prolonged ‘war of positions’ is evident
(Gramsci, 2007: 229). This thesis argues that, the ‘War on Terror’ exemplifies a
period in the prolonged ‘war of positions’ in British/South Asian Muslim relations
of heightened anxiety. This thesis argues, that historic/prolonged struggles
shape present struggles for hegemony. In prolonged struggle, Gramsci
suggests, it is the interface of ideology and social experience, that spaces of
contradiction are realised; it is in these spaces that the subordinate subject
resists domination. Bhabha articulates these spaces as holding the potential for
hybrid identities in ‘the third space’12. Hybridity is produced in, and through, the
interrelationship of struggle between the dominant and the subjugated (Gramsci,
2007,; Hall, 1986; Mallon, 1994).
This thesis argues that the ‘War on Terror’ exemplifies a contemporary moment
of heightened struggle for ideological hegemony. Hegemony warns us that the
struggle is on-going, as dominant groups seek continuously, to contain the
12 The significance of the third space lies in its recognition that new meanings are not created
in binaries of ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘Muslim’ and ‘secular’. The creation of discursive ‘third spaces’
accommodates the complexity of multiple positions.
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subordinate group/s in their ideological spaces, until the dominant ideology
appears ‘permanent and natural’ (Hebdige, 1993: 366). The notion of continuity
reminds us that present patterns are repetitions of past patterns of struggle for
hegemony; for British/South Asian Muslim relations they are constructed in, and
shaped by, imperial history.
In keeping with Gramsci’s ‘war of positions’, this thesis places foremost
importance on the location of the ‘War on Terror’ in centuries of struggle
(Jackson, 2011; Spalek, 2013; Slater, 2002) for domination in British/South
Asian Muslim relations. In this temporal framing, South Asian Muslim women’s
resilience and adaptation is located in, and contingent on, history and power.
Temporality acknowledges women’s already-known (historic) understanding of
adversity, structurally, in forms of inequality, and experientially, in forms of daily
struggle to resist dominant ideologies. In short, meanings are secured through
past knowledge and filtered through the experience of subjugation. The past
influences and shapes behaviours, relations, and meanings in the present for
both dominant and subordinate groups. Gramsci suggests that total
transformation (of consciousness and therefore behaviour) is not possible,
because chains of connection between the dominant and the subordinate are
never permanently secured, in the struggle for hegemony (Gramsci, 2007; Hall,
1996). In this reading of hegemony the agency, the resistance, the counter-
hegemonic actions, of the subordinate group insures that ideology cannot be
wholly replaced (Hall, 1996: 26).
Hegemony is not universal; ‘it has to be won, reproduced, sustained’ (Hebdige,
1993, quoting Hall and Jefferson 1976). It is a long-term, on-going and repeated
struggle. This reading of hegemony returns us to the temporal, long-term echo
of imperialism in the ‘War on Terror’. Hegemony, as ‘war of positions’, exposes
the inadequacy of resilience as ‘bounce back’ from immediate trauma or crisis
to a former equilibrium. The lens of hegemony requires resilience to extend its
reach to incorporate prolonged adversity, and processes of adaptation and
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change; hegemony requires resilience to incorporate the survival of the
subaltern who has no previous equilibrium to ‘bounce back’ to.
1.4.3 Islamophobia
The history of British/South Asian Muslim relations, as evidenced in Chapter
Three, exposes a long struggle for hegemony along the lines of race and faith,
which are expressed as hatred of Muslims (Richardson, 1997). However, the
term Islamophobia is relatively new; coined in the late 1980s, it first appeared in
print in 1991 (Allen, 2004; Sheridan, 2006). This is important because the term
Islamophobia is legitimized, in and through, the temporal frame of its history.
The term is problematic, as will be made clear, but first, it is necessary to
understand some of the arguments that surround the label. Scholars suggest,
as does this thesis, that hatred of Muslims has existed for centuries (Allen, 2004;
Lambert, 2011; Spalek, 2013); that it has become ‘more explicit, more extreme
and more dangerous’ since the late 1970’s (Richardson, 1997: 1); and that
hatred of Muslims has escalated post- 9/11 and become more acceptable (Allen,
2004). Through the lens of hegemony, Islamophobia has been embedded in the
consciousness of the wider, non-Muslim, British public via the dominant
narrative of the state, and elements of civil society, such as, the Far Right
(Eatwell, 2010; Goodwin, 2010; Lambert, 2011). These readings of
Islamophobia indicate the continuity of faith hate against Muslims, and, its
ascendance at particular times; notably when faith hate is given licence, as in
the post 9/11 era (Lambert, 2011). Importantly, in relation to hegemony, it
demonstrates the acceptance of a dominant narrative, by growing numbers of
people, who are not coerced into hating Muslims, but who have accepted the
idea that Muslims pose a threat to be feared.
The term is commonly used to refer to the treatment of people who identify as
Muslim, whether or not they observe religious practice. The setting up of the
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Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, in 1996, is further testament
to the fact that prejudice against Muslims was evident prior to the events of 9/11
(Allen 2004). Additionally, the United Nations formally recognised the
proliferation of anti-Muslim ‘prejudice, discrimination, and hatred’ in 2001, just
days before 9/11, again evidencing the presence of hatred towards Muslims
before 9/11 (Allen, 2004). Knowing that hatred towards Muslims exists does not
explain the term Islamophobia; it is, therefore, useful to address definitions as
the combination of the words ‘Islam’ and ‘phobia’ are a potent mix suggesting
irrational fear of Islam.
Definitions of Islamophobia tend to include the presence of fear of Islam. The
Oxford English dictionary (2010), defines Islamophobia as the "intense dislike or
fear of Islam, esp. as a political force; hostility or prejudice towards Muslims"
(emphasis added). A fuller definition is offered by Berkeley
University, Islamophobia Research & Documentation Project:
a contrived fear or prejudice fomented by the existing Eurocentric and
Orientalist global power structure. It is directed at a perceived or real
Muslim threat through the maintenance and extension of existing
disparities in economic, political, social and cultural relations, while
rationalizing the necessity to deploy violence as a tool to achieve
'civilizational rehab' of the target communities (Muslim or otherwise).
Islamophobia reintroduces and reaffirms a global racial structure through
which resource distribution disparities are maintained and extended.
(Berkley University, 2013, emphasis added)
This is a hugely political definition rooted in the history of European supremacy;
it reaffirms the idea of the past in the present, and the construction of a
supremacist reality. Both definitions refer to majority Christian populations ‘fear’
of Islam. They suggest loss of ‘civilization’ or ideology. The Runnymede Trust
report (1997), also takes a broad view of Islamophobia, suggesting that, it
includes prejudice against Muslims structurally, through exclusion from the
labour market, violence directed at people, or material symbols of Islam,
prejudice by the media, or in conversation, and discrimination in the provision of
services or employment practice (Richardson, 1997). The report questions, as
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does this thesis, if links can be made with anti-Muslim views that date back to
the Crusades; when Pope Urban II urged his audience to undertake a ‘just war’
against Muslims. The report acknowledges that human being ‘make selective
use of the past in order to understand, and to justify, aspects of the present’ (p.
5). Nevertheless, the power of, stories of Muslim barbarians has embedded in
the psyche of the Christian West, leading to Islamophobia (Salter, 2002).
In the present day, the Manchester arena suicide bombing on 22nd May 2017,
and the London bridge attack on 3rd June 2017, have again, heightened anxiety;
spreading fear amongst British Muslim, and non-Muslim, populations. Fear,
and/or hatred, of Muslims were expressed, in the week after the Manchester
bombing, by a sharp increase in attacks on Muslims. Statistics, from Tell MAMA,
show that anti-Muslim hate crime increased by 500% in the week after the
bombing. Anti-Muslim hate crime dropped the following week, and increased
again, after the London bridge attack (Dodd, 2017). Figures released by the
mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, show a fivefold increase in Islamophobic attacks,
in the city of London, in the days following the London bridge attack (Ibid.). The
steep rise in anti-Muslim hate crime targeting Muslims, who are not responsible
for the atrocities, evidences a form of irrational fear, or phobia of Muslims, by
some members of the public. Islamophobia enables Muslims to be marked out
‘as distinct from the larger political, social and cultural landscape of 21st –century
Britain’ (Alexander, 2013: 3). From this perspective, differences amongst
Muslims, on the lines of gender, class, religious difference, and criminal
behaviour, are flattened out, homogenizing Muslims into a single category of
community on the basis of faith. The point is that Islamic identity is granted
centrality, without consideration of difference or complicity.
The effect, of these acts, is to spread fear amongst all populations in Britain,
including Muslim populations, as they are acts of indiscriminate violence.
Lambert et al. suggest the concept of Islamophobia is ‘deficient in adequately or
accurately describing the phenomenon of anti-Muslim bigotry, discrimination
and violence’ (2011: 54). The authors suggest it conflates ‘lawful fear or phobia
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towards a religion and an unlawful disregard for the rights of a religious minority’
(Ibid.). This thesis uses the term Islamophobia, recognizing the inherent
problems with the term, and also uses the term, anti-Muslim hate.
1.4.4 Feminist and anti-imperialist frames
Feminist and anti-imperialist frames provide a focus on patriarchal and racial
hegemonies. These theories disrupt oppressive sexist, racist and imperialist
discourses; they provide lens through which gender and racial oppression are
made visible. They acknowledge the unique situated histories, and stand points,
of South Asian Muslim women in Britain, who are constitutes in, and through,
patriarchal and colonial structures and history.
While Feminist and anti-imperialist scholarship are concerned with the
investigation, and the defence, of the marginalised ‘other’ in structures of
domination; they have inherent tensions. Each ‘confronts its limits and exclusion
in the other’ (Gandhi, 1998: 83, see also Mohanty, 1995). Black and post-
colonial feminists, and post-colonial scholars, challenge Western feminisms to
move beyond a homogenized view of the oppression of woman as subaltern; to
insist on recognition of the conflicts inherent in the lives of women, on the basis
of, class, religion, culture, race and caste. Anti-imperialist theory argues that
liberal feminisms are a new form of ‘Orientalism’13. Black feminists charge them
with representing the ‘Third-World woman’, through a Western lens, thereby
silencing her claim to her-story, in ‘pious attempts to represent or speak for her’
(Gandhi, 1988: 88, 89; Mohantry, 1995). These frames enable the identification
of why, and where, narratives are missing in processes of ‘othering’ South Asian
Muslim women in Britain. The gendered subaltern is caught, to quote Spivak,
‘between patriarchy and imperialism, subject-constitution and object-formation,
the figure of the woman disappears, not into a pristine nothingness, but a violent
13 ‘The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe’s greatest and richest
and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one
of its deepest and most recurring images of the other.’ (Said.1978).
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shuttling which is the displaced figuration of the “third-world woman’’’ (1988:
306).
Placing Gramsci’s hegemony under Spivak’s Black feminist, post-colonial, lens
deconstructs hegemonic power relations in terms of ‘patriarchy’ and
‘imperialism’. This thesis, examines the potential of South Asian Muslim
women’s resilience in the face of their ‘subject-constitution and object-formation’
in the ‘War on Terror’ to create identities of resistance. Thus, amidst the ‘noise’
of counter terrorism, the possibility of South Asian Muslim women’s resilience
interrupting the ‘deafening silence’, noted by Khan (2013), opens up.
This is not a comfortable position for the subaltern woman, who metaphorically
‘disappears’ (Spivak, 1988); she becomes the subject through whom competing
discourses represent their claims, and their meanings, of who she is. In this
research it is precisely the issue of hearing South Asian Muslim women’s voices
that is the issue of concern; hearing and understanding the meanings placed by
them on their knowledge and their agency. Herein lies the challenge for the
state, and for civil society; to support South Asian Muslim women’s resilience
these institutions are required to hear the South Asian Muslim women subaltern
speak (Spivak, 1988).
Anti-imperialist theory contests Western Eurocentric interpretations of history.
Britain’s ‘civilising mission’14, at the time of empire, is rearticulated as a clear
statement of hegemony. Anti-imperialist theory exposes the intent of the
dominant culture/ideology to enforce a Christian ‘truth’ on Indian Muslims and
Hindu’s, in India. In the context of the ‘war on Terror’, the ‘civilising mission’ in
regard to South Asian Muslim women in Britain is, to enforce counter-terrorism’s
‘truth’ of Islam. Anti-imperialist theory challenges the term ‘post-colonial’
14 Colonialism’s civilising mission is explored in detail in chapter three as an indication of the
ascendency of hegemony in struggle for power. It denotes the claim of the empire that empire
brought progress and modernity to India, as such it is described as the most powerful tool for
embedding the idea of superior and inferior peoples (Fischer-Tine, 2004)
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suggests that it falsely ascribes the end of colonial rule, and, by implication, that
there is an end to colonial effect (Ashcroft, 1995: 117; Gandhi, 1998: 3). The
point is that dominant and subordinate relations continue long after national
independence. Memmi (1986), elaborates the psychic impact, suggesting that,
the term ‘post-colonial’ underestimates the ‘tenacious hold of a colonial past on
the post-colonial present’ (p. 88). Memmi states that:
…the day oppression ceases, the new man is supposed to emerge before
our eyes immediately….Now, I do not like to say so, but I must, since
decolonization has demonstrated it: this is not the way it happens. The
colonised lives for a long time before we see that really new man. (Ibid)
1.5. The structure of this thesis
This thesis is structured in four parts, sub divided, in seven chapters. It remains
for this introduction to orientate the reader; to explain how this thesis lays out its
argument, its analysis and its findings.
1.5.1 Thesis Part I – Through the lens of power – South Asian
Muslim women’s continuing struggle with adversity; their
resistance and resilience
Part I of this thesis lays the foundations for the conceptual frames of resilience,
hegemony, and temporality. Part I includes this introduction, and Chapters Two
and Three. Chapter Two utilizes existing theory, and academic literature, to
ground knowledge and understanding of the concept ‘resilience’ by tracking its
development. It argues that definitions of ‘bounce back’, to former states of
equilibrium, are inadequate in explaining the resilience of South Asian Muslim
women in Britain, to prolonged adversity. In tracking the development of the
concept, this thesis asks if resilience can be scaled up from the individual to
groups or communities. It does this by introducing social network analysis, social
capital and neighbourhood theory to the scrutiny. It argues for a fuller picture of
resilience at the level of neighbourhood. In this frame places, spaces and
relationships matter; together they (metaphorically) form barriers to adversity
and create ‘defensible spaces’ by ‘circling’ the protective ‘waggons’ (Hall, 2010:
22
352). Chapter Two asks if the concept can be stretched from immediate, single
trauma, adversity to encompass temporality; to incorporate change and
adaptation, whilst retaining fundamental pre-trauma characteristics (Hardy,
2015). This is important for acknowledging prolonged adversity; historic and
present in the lives of South Asian Muslim women in Britain. Theories of
resilience, social networks, social capital, and neighbourhood effects, provided
the basis for the field investigation. Social group, and social capital, analysis
were instrumental in making apparent the resistances of South Asian Muslim
women, in the creation of resistant identities, through resilience (Bottrell, 2009).
Chapter Three provides, through the lens of hegemony, a temporal geo-political
overview of British/South Asian Muslim contact over a period of four hundred
years, to the present day. Chapter Three foregrounds the temporal struggle,
evidencing South Asian Muslim women’s history of struggle in hegemony. It
notes the silences, and the noise, historically, and in the present, to demonstrate
the powerful ways in which South Asian Muslim women’s history has been
effaced.
Chapter Three offers a selective view of historic events, to make visible the
continuity of the past, in the present. It acknowledges that the past, and the
present, are continually being redefined and reinvented. Unearthing the missing
narratives of British/South Asian Muslim relations is important, as it offers a
glimpse of what can be known, in the otherwise effaced experiences of South
Asian Muslim women. In tracing this history, the chapter highlights moments,
from the 17th century, in which heightened struggle for, ideological hegemony is
evident either through consent or coercion. For example, an early example is
the coercion of Muslim mothers to have their dual heritage ‘Eurasian’ babies,
christened into the Protestant church. Chapter Three traces the invisibility of
South Asian Muslim women’s story of service, as ayahs (servants), to the British
in India, and in Britain; their disruption of the purity of the British home in India,
and their abandonment by British families, once they returned to Britain. Chapter
Three addresses the issues of Britain’s ‘civilizing mission’, and the ‘India
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question’, as moments in the struggle for hegemony. The hybrid position
adopted by some powerful British men, is also made evident, in their embrace
of India. Equally powerfully, the rejection of hybridity by the British state and
public is echoed in the rejection of the resistant, hybrid identities, of South Asian
Muslim women in Britain today.
Chapter Three changes tempo, as it shifts from historic, to the present day
struggle of South Asian Muslim women in Britain, in the ‘War on Terror’. The
change reflects the increase in studies related to counter-terrorism generally, in
comparison to the study of South Asian Muslim women’s historic, experiences.
The paucity of study, specifically related to Muslim women, in counter-terrorism,
is a further reminder of the ‘deafening silence’ (Khan, 2013) surrounding the
experiences of South Asian Muslim women. In moving to present day contexts,
Chapter Three foregrounds, the political and ideological character of South
Asian Muslim women’s struggle, in the ‘War on Terror’. This reinforces
questions, raised in Chapter Two, of the adequacy of ‘bounce back’ resilience
theory for the study of South Asian Muslim women’s resilience.
Chapter Three highlights the influence of academic and political analysts’, such
as Huntington, in heightening the fear of Islam in modern times, through the
publication of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis (1993). It traces the influence of
the ‘Clash’ thesis, on the ‘War on Terror’, following the al Qaeda attack on
mainland America, on the 11th September 2001 (9/11). The ‘War on Terror’, and
the UK government response, through counter-terrorism measures bring the
temporal tracing of hegemony to the present. Particular attention is paid, in
Chapter Three, to the UK government response; to the three iterations of
CONTEST and to the Prevent strand of the strategy. In response to the central
argument of this thesis Chapter Three addresses, the little scrutinized, effects of
UK counter-terrorism on Muslim women in Britain, whilst interrogating wider
literature, to offer deductions about the impacts of ‘hard’ security measures on
South Asian Muslim women in Britain in the present ‘War on Terror’. Chapter
Three identifies that the ‘War on Terror’ is contingent on, and constituted in,
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imperial history. From the perspective of South Asian Muslim women in Britain,
this intervention breaks the silences that invisibilizes them. Chapter Three sets
the scene for the empirical investigation, to ascertain the claim that the ‘War on
Terror’ is experienced, by South Asian Muslim women in Britain, as prolonged
adversity, and, to understand how they demonstrate resilience through
resistance.
1.5.2 Thesis Part II – research methods, tensions and positioning
Part II incorporates Chapter Four. This chapter has two primary objectives;
firstly, it addresses the relationship of content and method, and secondly, it leads
the reader into the study neighbourhood. These aspects are interrelated, and
not separate, as content and method are coproduced. For example the use of a
flexible framework enabled the co-production of the research.
Feminist and anti-imperialist epistemology, informed the research method; the
nuts and bolts, design, planning, analysis, and content; placing South Asian
Muslim women’s gender, race and faith identities at the centre. Feminist and
anti-imperialist theory provides important checks on researcher power, paying
tribute to South Asian Muslim Women in Britain, as ‘situated knowers’ (Haraway,
1988). From this perspective, the researcher is the ‘situated’ learner. The
conditions of gender, race and faith subjugation become important forms of
knowledge that the research is seeking. Feminist and anti-imperialist theories,
remind the research strategy, design and method, of the power imbalances
evident in anthropology; the tradition in which ethnography is rooted.
Anthropologists have investigated ‘native’ peoples for colonial powers, to better
control their cultures and behaviours (Brewer, 2000; Smith, 1999, 2012). As
Denzin et al., note ethnography has served as a metaphor through which
‘research becomes the objective of representing the dark-skinned to the white
world’ (2005: 1). The danger, Denzin et al., alert this thesis to, is the research
speaking for, or silencing, South Asian Muslim women, to break the silence
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imposed on them. From anti-imperialist and feminist stand points, the tension
inherent in method and content is, in method shaping content.
In keeping with ethnographic tradition, Chapter Four leads the reader into the
field linking design and practice. It foregrounds the importance of trust, in gaining
access to, and working with, South Asian Muslim women in Britain who are
deemed to be ‘hard to reach’. It outlines the importance of trust between the
researcher and a known South Asian Muslim male community leader, whose
endorsement of the research was essential to gaining access to South Asian
Muslim women, in ‘closed settings’ (Hammersley, 1993; Bryman, 2001; Garland,
2006). It incorporates trust in ethnography; ‘dispositional’ or social trust, for
engaging with, and gaining the confidence of, South Asian Muslim women
participants, in the research. It addresses the importance of ‘contextual’, or
political trust, for engaging with South Asian Muslim women in Britain, in
conversations, on political processes in the ‘War on Terror’ (Spalek, 2010;
2013).
Data presented in Appendix 3, is important to methodological considerations;
they provide statistical, and qualitative, information to illustrate the high level of
economic and environmental poverty experienced by residents, in the
neighbourhood, in which the field study was conducted. This is important
because, resilience theory indicates that, financial and environmental resources
insulate individuals, and communities, from adversity. Data presented in
Appendix 3, illustrate the lack of financial and physical resource available to
residents in the study neighbourhood. Qualitative, national studies supplement
local data to, provide further evidence of poverty experienced by Asian and
South Asian communities in Britain. National studies make causal links between
mental health distress, and economic, gender, race, and faith discrimination,
experienced by South Asian, and, South Asian Muslim women in Britain. A high
level of mental health distress was also identified amongst Bangladeshi women
in the study neighbourhood. 90% of the women who used the services of the
Bangladeshi women’s centre, in the study neighbourhood, experienced mental
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health distress, reportedly, resulting from gender, race and faith discrimination
(Bangladeshi women’s centre, 2009).
The chapter introduces Boyatzis’s (1998) approach to the systematic analysis
of qualitative data. It explains that all data generated, or studies, in this thesis
(qualitative and quantitative) were scrutinized using the inductive thematic
analysis approach (see Table 4.3 in Chapter Four, 4.5.5). Chapter Four explains
how data were coded and analysed, using the stages outlined by Boyatzis. This
enabled the thesis to move, from the production of a ‘long list’ of patterns,
through stages of interrogation, to summarise the patterns that emerged in data
as key themes and issues in this thesis. Appendix 4 provides an example of
coding at stage 4 of data analysis.
Chapter Four, identifies tensions that became apparent, at the stages of
planning the research/field study, and in analysing the data generated and
gathered. The chapter explains the challenges, and benefits, of using a flexible
structure for gathering information from South Asian Muslim women in the field
(the framework is attached as Appendix 1). The flexible framework enabled
women to shape their contribution, and the research, in ways that a tightly
structured, objectives based, framework might not have done. Consideration
was given to content shaping method and outcome; women shaping, and
coproducing the research. The other tension, relates to the inherent dialectics
of using ethnography; a research methodology rooted in classical social
anthropology. The dialectic lies in using research tools located in methodologies
that appropriated voice, and silenced, ‘native’ people, to engage a community
of women; South Asian Muslim women in Britain, whose histories are rooted in
colonial occupation. These paradoxes did not go unnoticed or unchallenged in
the design of this research as is evidenced in Chapter Four.
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1.5.3. Thesis Part III – Research findings and analysis. Women’s
narratives: adversity and resilience
Part III comprises two findings and analysis chapters; Chapter Five provides a
focus on findings, and analysis, in relation to the adversities identified in the lives
of the South Asian Muslim women in Britain. Chapter Six identifies forms of
resilience, manifest as the resistances, engaged by the South Asian Muslim
women in the field study. Chapters Five and Six clearly demonstrate the role of
data analysis based on Boyatzis’s (1998) inductive analytic approach. These
chapters, combine theory, design, research implementation and findings in
relation to the aims of this thesis.
Chapter Five responds to the aims, of the field investigation, to evidence
women’s experience of harm/adversity in the ‘War on Terror’ (linked to 9/11). It
identifies the engagement of community leaders, and representatives of the
local state, with South Asian Muslim women, in the study neighbourhood,
including, women’s access to neighbourhood resources. The chapter identifies
that the findings from the investigation are stark; women’s narratives identified
high levels of fear post 9/11; fear of physical and verbal assault and abuse. It
identifies that women’s fear increased after 7/7, and that women gave testimony
to the spread of fear for their safety; in their families and communities. The
findings highlighted in Chapter Five, particularly link Islamophobic assault of
women, to their visible identification as Muslim; because they wore hijab. The
chapter also references national statistics, by the independent monitoring group,
Tell MAMA. These data verify increases in physical and verbal assaults on
visibly identifiable Muslim women, especially following an Islamist related
terrorist attack, anywhere in the world. It offers evidence of a sharp rise
nationally, in assaults of visibly identifiable Muslim women, after incidents, such
as, the Manchester and London atrocities, in May and June 2017 mentioned
earlier. The analysis offered in Chapter Five suggests that, publicising attacks
on innocent Muslims could increase levels of fear, and the spread of fear, within
Muslim communities.
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Additionally, the field investigation found a complete dislocation between
women’s narratives of adversity and fear, and understanding of women’s
adversity and fear, by local state institutions. This dislocation indicates a lack of
engagement, by local state institutions, with South Asian Muslim women, in the
study neighbourhood. These findings suggest an entrenched separation
between South Asian Muslim women from local state institutions. In this
separation local state representatives appeared to have no idea of the daily life
experience of fear of South Asian Muslim women. Additional, there was
evidence of women’s exclusion from potentially protective civil society networks,
on the grounds of their sex.
Economic and environmental context was cited by representatives of the state,
and community leaders, as powerful factors, affecting the lives of all South Asian
Muslims in the study neighbourhood. Poverty, Islamophobia and gender
subjugation, were raised by representatives of the state in the field study. The
investigation also found high levels of gender, race and faith stereotyping of
South Asian Muslim women in the neighbourhood, amongst non-Muslim
representatives of the local state. These attitudes suggest that, the dominant
narrative, of the oppression of Muslim women, in hyper-patriarchal Islam, had
become part of the accepted vocabulary, of the majority, of local state
representatives interviewed in this research. These contextual findings present
a powerful backdrop of, a lack of, material resources to insulate South Asian
Muslim women from adversity. Chapter Five foregrounds women’s missing
narratives, to express their fear, separation, and isolation from neighbourhood
resources.
Chapter Six responds to the aims of the field investigation in relation to
resilience; it includes an understanding of the places, spaces, and people South
Asian Muslim women turned to for support; the situations in which social capital
was generated, and the neighbourhood resources and mechanisms available to
South Asian Muslim women.
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The neighbourhood investigation found that, in the absence of material
resources, and limited support from civil and civic institutions, relationships were
central to South Asian Muslim women’s resistance, resilience and wellbeing.
The places, spaces and people South Asian Muslim women turned to, at times
of hardship, were family, Muslim women friends, and women’s centres. The
complexity of family emerged, through the findings, as a site of coexisting
contradictions; as both places of safety and danger. Family was described as
problematic by South Asian Muslim women community leaders, who described
family as perpetuating gender inequality (as in other ethnic and faith
communities), forms of cultural constraint, and inflicting domestic violence
(again as in other ethnic and faith communities) against women. Chapter Six
articulates that women clearly stated the importance of family to their wellbeing,
and also Muslim women friends. Women in this study, had contact with women
of other ethnic and faith orientations, but these relations were different, to the
close friendship bonds they enjoyed with other South Asian Muslim women. This
reflects the findings of work by Dwyer (2010) in which South Asian Muslim
women’s friendship networks are central to their sense of wellbeing. The findings
of this thesis indicate that South Asian Muslim women generated bonding social
capital in these close networks.
Additionally, in undertaking this investigation, it became clear that particularly
vulnerable South Asian Muslim women, like members of other vulnerable
groups, require high levels of bonding social capital before they are able to
engage in bridging social capital, or are able to link to other networks. This
finding suggests that more work is required to investigate if this is the case (see
Chapter Two, 2.2.2).
Chapter Six identifies that, in relation to neighbourhood, two effects were
identified; firstly, that South Asian Muslim women benefited, from shared ethnic
and faith identity, in the neighbourhood. Neighbourhood protected South Asian
Muslim women from Islamophobic assault and hatred; they described feeling
relaxed in their neighbourhood, and comfortable, in their choice of dress.
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Secondly, that neighbourhood, failed to offer South Asian Muslim women access
to all resources, and denied them access to potential networks of support.
In terms of the wider neighbourhood, South Asian Muslim women felt exposed,
vulnerable, unsafe and uncomfortable, when they moved beyond the boundary
of the home neighbourhood. Another perspective of neighbourhood was
provided in the life story of one participant, who had grown up in an apparently
cohesive multi-ethnic neighbourhood in Birmingham, and moved to the study
neighbourhood as an adult. The experience of this participant, and her family,
who continued to have good relations with white neighbours after 9/11 and 7/7,
suggests positive effects in relation to levels of fear of Islamophobic assault.
Good relations with white neighbours, appear to have, protected this participant
from the fear of Islamophobia. This participant expressed less fear, and anxiety,
as a hijab wearing Muslim woman, than women who had grown up in, or lived
for many years in, the mono-ethnic study neighbourhood. As a single case, and
without further investigation, it is not possible to state definitively that there is a
causal relationship. However, the stark contrast suggests the need for further
investigation. It is clear, from these data, that family, friends and neighbourhood
appear to have had positive effects on women’s sense of wellbeing. However,
the investigation found that, in terms of the generation of social capital, women’s
centres played a central role. Women’s centres engendered human capital
(skills and confidence), bonding capital (trust and reciprocity), bridging capital
(linking to other networks and new opportunities) and linking capital (access to
the local state and institutional resources). Women’s centres also provided
spaces, conversations, dialogue and discourse that can be viewed as ‘dissident’
(Scott, 1990), in traditional Islam and by the state. For example, the Pakistani
women’s centre, ran a series of workshops on women and Islam, challenging
traditional perspectives on women’s role in Islam (see Chapter Two, 2.2.3).
Perhaps, most importantly, the field investigation found that social capital,
generated in social relations enabled, South Asian Muslim women, in this
research, to engage in resistant behaviours. Three forms of resistance were
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identified in the research. Women contested ascribed identity, they formulated
counter narratives, and they created spaces in which they could generate faith
capital. Viewed in the context of prolonged adversities, these are significant
resistances. The first and third resistance are identified as forms of everyday
resistance (Scott, 1985), as they have become etched into women’s daily
routines. Counter narratives, appear to have a different and complex function;
whilst women expressed a loss of faith in government, to promote the best
interests of Muslims, they also displayed a degree of ambivalence and
uncertainty. Uncertainty suggests that the counter-narratives, whilst challenging
the dominant narrative, have not become embedded as part of women’s
consciousness. It could be argued that this ambivalence is because the chains
of connection between the dominant and the subordinate are never permanently
secured in the struggle for hegemony (Gramsci, 2007; Hall, 1996).
Part III of this thesis is, in most part, focused on sharing the findings and analysis
of the empirical investigation conducted in the study neighbourhood. The field
study was centrally important to understanding the ways in which South Asian
Muslim women’s resilience interrupted the ‘deafening silence’, amidst the
‘noise’, of counter terrorism (Khan 2013), and in unearthing women’s resilience
as resistance to prolonged adversity. It also raised fundamental questions about
accepted understandings resilience.
1.5.4 Thesis Part IV – Conclusion - extending knowledge
Part IV concludes this thesis, in Chapter Seven; it draws together the main
strands of learning in relation to the aims. Chapter Seven articulates the
contribution of this thesis in several ways, importantly, in evidencing clear links
between the ‘War on Terror’ and South Asian Muslim women’s fear of being
assaulted because of they are Muslim. Additionally, and also importantly, by
noting the yawning chasm between the reality of women’s fear and the
knowledge of local state institutions. This is important because it reflects, at the
micro, local level, the invisibility of the ‘collateral damage’ inflicted on South
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Asian Muslim women in Britain by the ‘War on Terror’; at the macro, national
level it reflects through women’s invisibility in counter-terrorism policy (Scheinin,
2013). This thesis recommends an urgent review of counter-terrorism policy
from the perspective of gender, to identify and address, the short falls in current
counter-terrorism policy with regard to South Asian Muslim women in Britain.
In breaking the ‘deafening silence’ around South Asian Muslim women’s
experience of adversity in the ‘War on Terror’, at the local level, this thesis has
generated new understandings of resilience, including; the relationship between
adversity and resilience, and insights into collective resilience at the
neighbourhood level. Significantly, this thesis has identified gaps in the potential
to stretch the concept ‘resilience’ to incorporate conditions of prolonged
adversity and resistance. This thesis notes the need to develop the theory of
adversity and resilience to, incorporate these extensions, without losing its
meaning. In particular, under the lens of hegemony, the thesis generates a
political reading of resilience placing it firmly in the field of relations of power,
domination and resistance; specifically enacted in a prolonged ‘war of position’
by South Asian Muslim women in Britain. Chapter Seven summaries key areas
of learning that have been uncovered in this interrogation.
Firstly, Chapter Seven outlines how the interrogation of the ‘War on Terror’
through the lens ‘temporality’ and ‘hegemony’ enabled new understandings of
South Asian Muslim women as gendered subalterns in the ‘War on Terror’.
These lenses place the concepts of adversity and resilience within colonial
relations of power; through these frames adversity and resilience take on
different forms. Adversity takes on a form that incorporates prolonged or
continuous conditions of harm, and resilience takes on a form that incorporates
adaptation, change and transformation. These new understandings
problematize adversity and resilience; they insist on the inclusion of a temporal
dimension to adversity and a political dimension to resilience. This thesis is a
study of resilience incorporating resistance, with the possibility, of change by
South Asian Muslim Women in Britain.
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Secondly, Chapter Seven outlines the new knowledge unearthed in this thesis
in ‘fine tuning’ the theory of social capital and social networks. The study
conducted for this thesis identified the importance, for some South Asian Muslim
women in Britain, and presumably, this applies to individuals from other
marginalised groups, of bonding social capital, in closely bonded networks. The
significance of bonding social capital, in closely bonded networks, enabled
women to develop sufficient confidence to engage with other networks with
which they had weaker bonds. Using Granovetter’s (1973) ideas in, ‘the strength
of weak ties,’ this thesis found that, engagement in networks with strong bonds
had positive effects on South Asian Muslim women’s confidence, enabling them
to move out from strongly bonded networks to other networks. The
neighbourhood interrogation identified the practical application of
neighbourhood effects in generating social capital15 (resilience) at a collective
level.
Thirdly, Chapter Seven suggests that, some aspects of new learning unearthed
in this thesis would benefit from further research. In particular, it notes the fear
of South Asian Muslim women and, the spread of fear for women’s safety,
amongst the communities in the study neighbourhood. This was not a focus of
this study, but emerged as a recurrent theme in the field interrogation. Fear, and
the spread of fear, amongst communities, has debilitating effects on those who
are affected, and serious negative consequences for polices related to
community cohesion. These facts make it imperative that further study is
undertaken, to inform policy, to address, and to minimise, fear. Relatedly, further
academic rigor is required in testing the capacity of the concepts adversity and
resilience to incorporate exposure to prolonged adversity, adaptation, change,
and transformation. The imperative is that, a political dynamic, in the form of
resistance in resilience, is important to extending resilience theory.
Fourthly, Chapter Seven outlines the contribution of this thesis to national and
local policy. The thesis brings women’s experience into counter-terrorism;
highlighting the effects of the collateral damage inflicted on South Asian Muslim
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women in Britain. The findings, in this thesis, reflect, at the local level, what
experts have indicated at the national level; evidence of the gendered violation
of human rights in counter-terrorism policy. This is apparent in the denial by
government, and consequently, in government’s failure to intervene to address
the conditions that generate fear and assault of South Asian Muslim women in
Britain (see Scheinin, 2013). At the local level, this thesis questions the
dislocation of the local state from South Asian Muslim women. This thesis insists
that greater, and closer, contact between local state institutions and South Asian
Muslim women are urgently required. Additionally, when the local state was
aware of South Asian Muslim women’s exclusion from local resources, such as
community centres, no action was taken to rectify this. This failure of local state
institutions, to intervene on behalf of women, further signals the dislocation, of
the state from its citizens.
This thesis also found that whilst South Asian Muslim women in Britain are
subject to high levels of victimization on the grounds of gender, race and faith
the women involved in the study neighbourhood had not taken on the cloak of
‘victim’, instead they proudly and courageously created identities of resistance
in their networks of trust.
35
Chapter Two:
The problem of resilience
2.1 Introduction
Most fundamentally, the concept [resilience] describes the capacity of an
individual, community or ecosystem to survive an external shock or
disturbance by maintaining its fundamental characteristics through a
process of change and transformation (Hardy, 2015: 82)
This chapter interrogates resilience through the frames of temporality and
hegemony. These frames expose a number of interrelated tensions inherent in
resilience as survival/coping with adversity or resilience as
transformation/adapting in conditions of adversity. This chapter does two
important things; firstly, it charts the genealogy, of the concept; and secondly, it
interrogates resilience under different lenses. This examination problematizes
accepted definitions of the concept. Hardy’s (2015) definition indicates the
requirement of resilience, for the individual, group or system, to retain
fundamental pre-trauma characteristics, post, or through, the condition of
adversity/external shock. In this definition, the individual, group or system, does
not change beyond recognition, as a result of adversity. Hardy’s definition
unhelpful, because, it confuses single shock (associated with the theory of
‘bounce back’ resilience), with processes of transformation and change, that
suggest prolonged trauma or shock. Furthermore, Hardy’s definition assumes
that trauma or disturbance is caused by factors external to the system; it fails to
incorporate the complexity of internal unequal group dynamics. The point is, the
notion of disturbance within disturbance has to be acknowledged.
This thesis argues that, the resilience of South Asian Muslim women in Britain
is conditioned by temporality, in an ongoing struggle to resist hegemony. The
struggle is to retain ideology and identity. In this frame, accepted notions of
resilience are challenged; adversity is prolonged and there is no pre-trauma
state of equilibrium for women to bounce back to. A further problem lies in
scaling up resilience from the individual to the group or community. Under the
lens of hegemony, the struggle to resist domination by a class or group could be
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framed as collective resilience as resistance. Firstly, this is central to the
argument that South Asian Muslim women’s resistance is understood as group
behaviour as opposed to individual unconnected acts of survival; and secondly,
it positions resilience in the frame of power, contestation and change.
These are important markers for this investigation into resilience and adversity;
Firstly, in the objective, to explore the claim that, South Asian Muslim women in
Britain experience prolonged adversity as the ‘collateral damage’ (Lambert,
2011) of the ‘War on Terror’. Secondly, in the objective, to explore the claim that,
under the lens of hegemony, resilience is enacted as/in a prolonged ‘war of
positions’ by South Asian Muslim women in Britain. Central to these objectives
are the conceptual lenses of temporality and hegemony.
New readings of resilience are important in the current political and social
climate in which resilience ‘is fast becoming the favoured solution for a range of
contemporary policy problems including natural disasters, mental health issues
and terrorism’ (Hardy, 2015: 77). In contemporary political contexts, resilience
is viewed as largely positive; implying an inherent good. This is evident in its use
for understanding the effects of adversity, such as crime, on marginalised
groups (Hardy, 2015; Walklate, 2011). Other perspectives suggest that, the
contemporary political use of resilience, has the potential to inculcate
government control, through self-regulation (Ball, 2011: 108). This reading of
resilience has overtures of hegemony, in which a subordinate citizenry is
influenced, or coerced, to accept the wishes of the dominant group. From this
perspective, resilience is used, by government, to place increasing responsibility
on communities, to manage risk, whilst at the same time, shrinking its
responsibility to protect populations (Bracke, 2016; Bottrell, 2009; Hardy, 2015;
Spalek, 2009; 2013 Ungar, 2005). These perspectives offer vastly different ways
of understanding resilience; on the one hand the concept suggests that
resilience processes are empowering, and on the other, its use suggests
regulation and control. These contrasting approaches to resilience make it,
particularly, important to trace the evolution of resilience as regulation and
resilience as empowerment.
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2.2 Developments in resilience thinking
Tracing the genealogy of the concept, resilience, in relation to transformation,
opens up a range of tensions that question established ways of theorising
resilience. (Hardy, 2015) For example, how does established resilience theory
incorporate and explain, how and why, transformation is both a process and
outcome in resilience as resistance for South Asian Muslim women in Britain
who live in adverse conditions? The point is that any theory of resilience must
be able to be applied to, and resonate with, the lived experiences and contexts
it seeks to explain; it has to be fit for purpose. Herein lies the important
intervention of this thesis; it proposes a radical political re-framing of accepted
notions of resilience, a necessary reframing that emerges from the lived
experiences of South Asian Muslim women in Britain in the ‘War on Terror’.
This tracing of the genealogy of resilience challenges other, taken for granted
foundational building blocks and established theories of resilience; in doing so
important complexities in resilience are revealed. For example, scrutiny of the
issue of time in the concept ‘resilience’ throws up particular challenges, which
are important for, the ‘fit for purpose’ question, in the application of resilience
theory to lived experience. The lens of temporality enables understanding of the
mutually constitutive relationship, of the past and present; it offers markers that
point to ways of thinking about how resilience needs to be re-framed. The point
of starting with the genealogy of resilience is to use the foundations laid by
existing knowledge to formulate new approaches. Temporality itself is an
important tool in this thesis; it is used in the parallel process of grounding
resilience in regard to transformation, and, in grounding South Asian
Muslim/British relations in a history of prolonged ‘war of position’ struggle
evidenced in the following chapter.
2.2.1 The genealogy of resilience: from static structures to
dynamic systems
Resilience as a concept is derived from the Latin ‘resilire’ (to recoil or leap back).
In the natural sciences, for example in engineering, resilience is conceptualised
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as, the capacity of material under stress, to bend and bounce back quickly to its
former state (equilibrium or homeostasis), rather than break (Holling, 1973;
Masten, 2006). At its simplest ‘bounce back’ is a straight forward equation;
material + stress = quickly regained equilibrium. This definition of the resilience
of materials, such as metal or concrete, is instrumental in the construction of
buildings or bridges, to ensure that they withstand adverse conditions, such as
natural disasters, and return quickly to their former shape. However, this thesis
questions the appropriateness of the ‘bounce back’ equation in resilience, when
applied to contexts such as the resilience of South Asian Muslim women in
Britain as a social group.
Despite developments in the theory of resilience, from its early definition and
wide usage, the idea of resilience as bounce back has retained its potency. It
appears that resilience is usually considered in terms of bounce back regardless
of what, or to whom, the concept is applied (Van Breda, 2001; Martin-Breen,
2011; Holling, 1973; Norris, 2007; Henley, 2010; Maclean, 2004; Masten, 2006).
Norris et al., (2007) challenged the use of resilience in the human condition,
describing resilience as a metaphor, suggesting that it may have been useful
for, the social and psychological sciences, to create a different language
altogether; one free from the inherent (bounce back) qualities associated with
classical interpretations. Despite this challenge resilience has retained, and
increased its currency, if not its clarity, in contemporary society (Bracke, 2016;
Hardy, 2015; Neocleous, 2013).
The evolution of the theory of resilience is relatively new; starting with the
expansion of its use in ecological science and child development studies, in the
early 1970s. A paper published by Holling titled ‘Resilience & Stability of
Ecological Systems’ (1973), problematized the notion of bounce back, by
arguing that, if ecosystems are dynamic, and in constant flux, there is no state
of homeostasis for eco systems to return to. Additionally, Holling identified the
interconnected and symbiotic nature of organisms within systems. From this
perspective, it is the quality of the relationships between the organisms in the
system that determines the capacity, of the system as a whole, to adapt to
conditions of disruption, or, to fail to adapt. This is known as the ‘whole system’
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approach to resilience; all aspects life within the system has a dynamic and
symbiotic relationship with other aspects; they survive or fail to survive together.
This is an important development on many levels, and is absolutely crucial to
analyses of hegemony, in relations between South Asian Muslim women in
Britain, living with adversity in the ‘War on Terror’. An important intervention of
this thesis lies in transposing a ‘whole eco system’ approach onto social
networks; revealing both the potential and underdevelopment or gaps in
knowledge of this transposition. This intervention highlights the interconnections
and fissures in human societies, from the individual, the group, society,
government and international actors; on multiple, intersecting micro/macro,
local/global, spatial and temporal dimensions. From this perspective, for any
group, including South Asian Muslim women in Britain, the strength of their
relationships, to other elements within the system, such as family, community,
society and government are pivotal.
Whole system thinking has influenced the application of resilience theory in
relation to children who live with adversity. Whole system resilience thinking
shifted the resilience paradigm, from the idea of resilience as an inherent quality
in a material, or an individual, to a wider frame of interdependence and mutual
responsibility. Holling’s work went further, in separating whole system resilience
from bounce back resilience, by coining the term ‘engineering resilience’ to
describe the quality of resilience in inanimate material. The development of
whole system thinking shifted the gaze outward, from the individual, to the
quality of relationships between individuals in the system, and the
interdependence of individuals with others. Significantly, it enables
consideration of the complexity of internal and external dynamics to include
processes at all levels in the societal system; political, ideological, social and
economic. This new resilience paradigm had a profound effect on studies of
resilience in some children who, until this point, had been viewed as special
because of their, apparent, innate quality of resilience. Whole system
approaches transformed the study of child development and exposed ‘bounce
back’ theory as over simplistic.
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Whole system resilience thinking led to the articulation of ‘risks’ to positive child
development, and ways of ‘protecting’ children from not adopting socially
sanctioned norms and values. The transposition of whole system resilience
approaches to human social system points to the necessity of incorporating and
attending to political dimensions in the thinking and application of whole system
resilience (Mackinnon, 2013). Under the lens of hegemony, the political
dimension requires thinking about how resilience functions as a tool of regulation
by governments. Whilst some forms of regulation, may be desirable, or
beneficial, for coherence and forms of social order, the question of unequal
power differentials, and the capacity of individuals in the social system to retain
distinct cultural values, expose questions about the issue of equilibrium, within
social systems. In this thesis, these questions are central to the resilience of
South Asian Muslim women in Britain. The important point is that, in this frame,
adversity, conflict and disruption is caused by factors internal to the system. In
turn, this raises further questions about cohesion within society (the human
system), and the quality of symbiotic relationships in the system; for example
between, government, Muslim communities and South Asian Muslim women in
Britain. Under the lens of hegemony, the apparently straight forward transition
of whole system approaches to social groups changes the pattern, or shape, of
resilience entirely. Under the lens of hegemony, there is nothing neutral about
resilience; interrogating resilience through hegemony brings in the dynamic of
relations of power, domination, regulation and control.
Resilience as a tool, for the management of behaviours and social regulation, is
evident in the emergence of its application in child development, as a response
to social disruption and disorder in America in the 1970s. In the 1970s and 80s
benign discourses of care for children’s mental and physical heath ran
concurrent with discourses of a decline in social order (Dryfoos, 1990; Hamburg,
1992; Huston, 1991; Lerner, 1995; Masten, 1992, 2001). It is perhaps, no
coincidence that, in the conditions of rapidly growing economic and social
inequality the distinction between support and regulation were blurred. This
raises questions about the nature of disturbance with implications for how
disturbance managed; is disturbance caused by reactions to conditions of
inequality within the system (by those who resist) or by inequality within the
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system? Where, when, how and why does resilience become a tool for
reinstating a dominant ideology? These questions point to slippage between
resilience as interdependence with the potential for empowerment and resilience
as interdependence for regulation. Under the lens of hegemony, this slippage is
an inevitable aspect of the ‘war of positions’ in which there is no clear separation
or distinction between the dynamics of domination/subjugation,
consent/coercion resistance/conformity; they co-exist and are co-produced in
the slippage. In this framing, the slippage, between the function of resilience as
regulation, and the function of resilience as resistance to regulation, could be
thought of as a space of hybridity; a space for the potential of transformation.
The issue of slippage in relation to resilience theory is underdeveloped,
warranting further research and scholarship
.
The question of resilience, as a tool for social regulation (the system protecting
itself), or as a way of understanding protection and risk to children (the system
seeking to protect children from harm by others within the system), was not a
particular consideration of child development professionals in the 1970s and
1980s. At this time, child development professions increased the range and
scope of studies to understand the resilience ‘competencies’ in children (Luthar,
2000). Studies began to identify contextual factors such as family, environmental
and social structures, alongside internal qualities, such as inherent genetic and
personality qualities, that were seen to contribute to resilience and positive
development, in children (Masten, 2001; 2007; Luthar, 2003; Ciccetti, 2011).
These studies posed challenged bounce back theories of resilience. Masten,
noted that there was no special magic possessed by children who display the
capacity for resilience; that there are a series of factors protect children from
adversity, or that, place them at risk of failing to adapt (Masten, 2001; Neenan,
2009; Cicchetti; 2011). Masten (2001) writes that:
Resilience appears to be a common phenomenon that results in most
cases from the operation of basic human adaptation if those systems
[that enable resilience] are protected and in good working order (p. 227)
(emphasis added).
This is important for understanding the trajectory of resilience, as the studies
clearly identified the interdependence of the parts that make up whole systems,
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in the immediate and proximate life of a child, as important to positive child
development. Masten referred to wider influences in the system, such as
material resources, shifting the focus from, the individual, to a wider system-
based, approach. From this perspective, the difficulty for resilience scholars lay
in their attempts to establish equilibrium for children in a system that might be
the cause of the disruption. In the context of the whole system, that South Asian
Muslim women in Britain in the ‘War on Terror’, find themselves in, the question
is, how can the macro systems (local and national government) that are
generating adversity (i.e. the collateral damage counter-terrorism policies and
discourses) be the same macro systems that protect South Asian Muslim
women in Britain from this adversity? Furthermore, in this frame, the ‘good
working order’ of local, national and international macro systems would require
the realization of liberal democratic values of equal rights to material resources
and cultural freedoms (Brown, 2015; Neoclaus, 2013).
2.2.2 The problem of risk and protective factors
Risk and protective factors assume that parts of the social system are in need
of support, or control, depending on the perspective from which they are viewed.
In the support and protective (empowering) frame, the assumption is that, the
life chances of children who fail to achieve healthy adaptation are poor; typically,
these children are said to experience problems through the life course, such as
mental health distress, criminality, anti-social behaviour, drug and substance
abuse, suicidal behaviours, and underachievement in education (Fergusson,
2003). Paternalistic discourses of empowerment function to maintain the social
norms of the system; where failure to achieve the societal normative standards
is constituted as disruptive to social order, the cause of adversity in the social
system and in need of regulation. The work of social scientists, such as Botterell
(2009) and Ungar (2005), critically examine the constructions of risky
relationships and behaviours, amongst young people represented as disruptive
and anti-social. Botterell (2009) and Ungar (2005) offer alternative constructions
of these same, so called ‘risky’ relationships and behaviours amongst young
people, as demonstrating resilience as resistance to identities ascribed to them
which they find intolerable. In this frame risk becomes resilience; where ascribed
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‘intolerable’ identity constructions generate ‘resistant identities’ Botterell (2009),
or, the transformation of ‘intolerable’ identities to ‘resistant identities’ (Ibid: 329).
Thus, the creation of ‘resistant identities’ is contingent upon the construction of
‘intolerable’ identities. Under the lens of hegemony, this complex relationship
between ‘intolerable’ and ‘resistant’ identities, points to Gramsci’s suggestion
that total transformation in is not possible; in some shape or form, the
discourses, ideology and constructions of the dominant remain embedded
(Gramsci, 1971; Hall, 1996).
These are crucial points for this thesis because; firstly, it questions the stand
point, within parts of the system that create and impose the label of acceptable
or unacceptable behaviour, belief or ideology. From this perspective, the
demonstrations of resilience, by South Asian Muslim women in Britain; that is
their embrace of Islam, is constructed as unacceptable, disruptive and in need
of regulation. South Asian Muslim women in Britain are punished for not
conforming to the dominant view of their ascribed position. Secondly, in the
frame of, resilience as resistance, by South Asian Muslim women in Britain, to
identities ascribed to them which they find intolerable; South Asian Muslim
women in Britain generate identities of resistance, clearly evidenced in the field
study of this thesis. Thus, it could be argued that, the emergence of ‘resistant
identities’, for example in wearing the hijab is a manifestation of resistance in
hegemony in terms of hybridity; a symbolic representation of refusal and
acceptance of dominant ideology on simultaneous multiple levels. Thirdly, the
equation of; risk as resilience – resilience as resistance – resistance as risk,
raises fundamental questions about the construction of resistance risk as a
negative and the possibilities of the construction of resistance as risk for positive
adaptation.
In theories of child development, protection is overwhelmingly identified as the
foundations of resilient emotional well-being, including self-esteem, provided by
secure attachments. The secure attachment characteristics of flexibility,
creativity, frustration management, tolerance, emotional regulation and positive
affect (Garmezy, 1985); can be translated to the conditions for resilient
neighbourhoods. The work of Forrest et al., (2001) raises important questions
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about how neighbourhoods might be transformed into nurturing spaces. The
field study, conducted for this thesis, identified positive and negative effects in
family and neighbourhood, which affirm the work of Forrest et al.; additionally,
the field study raised important questions, related to South Asian Muslim
women’s access to social resources and social capital. These important points,
concerning the scaling up of resilience from the individual to the group, pick up
the question of resilience as empowerment (through equal access to resources)
or resilience as regulation (through denial of access). Furthermore, in whole
systems approaches, the scaling up of characteristics such as secure
attachment, to the conditions required for resilient, nurturing neighbourhood
spaces, is a reminder that the factors of adversity and resilience are
simultaneously internal and external to the system; South Asian Muslim
women’s lived environment.
By the late 1990s and early 2000’s, the resilience paradigm was extended in its
application to cohesion, and neighbourhood resilience (Forrest, 2001; Sampson,
1999; O’Sullivan, 2012). The concept was extended beyond the notion of the
cohesive family, in the private sphere, to widening social and economic contexts,
bringing into focus the interdependency of individual, community and society, in
resilience building (O’Sullivan, 2012). Theoretically, from this perspective,
community, neighbourhood, city, and nation are interconnected in a whole
system. However, the concept appears to have remained neutral in respect of a
political or power dimension. The field study in this thesis, with South Asian
Muslim women in Britain, beings to address this gap in knowledge.
Adversities through the life course, and social and economic disadvantages, are
seen to hold the greatest risks to resilience in children (Garmezy, 1985; Rutter,
1985). There are two important points to be made here; firstly, that continuity of
risk evokes the idea of extended periods of exposure to harm, and this is a
difficult concept, for bounce back resilience, to hold. Yet, little work has been
undertaken on resilience in conditions of prolonged harm (Hardy 2015).
Secondly, that if this rule is applied to South Asian Muslim women, in struggle
to resist hegemony, both temporality and multiple disadvantage (see Appendix
3) are stacked against their chances of survival/resilience.
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Earvolino-Ramirez’s (2007) examination of studies of resilience, indicate a lack
of gender and race perspectives in existing resilience scholarship. Earvolino-
Ramirez compiled a table, defining twenty-eight protective factors that have
been studies (to varying degrees), by resilience scholars. Earvolino-Ramirez
was not looking for gender and race specific or related studies; however, there
is little evidence that, the important studies analysed addressed gender or
ethnicity. Thus, whilst resilience scholars were focused on extending the reach
of resilience, beyond inherent individual characteristics, to include social and
economic dimensions, they appear not be ready, at this time, to include these
dimensions of social power. Tracing the development of the concept of
resilience uncovers, the invisibility of ethnicity and gender, thereby
universalising the function and production of protective and risk factors. Feminist
and anti-imperialist theoretical lenses on resilience as resistance by South Asian
Muslim women in Britain clearly demonstrates that their lived experiences of the
intersections of sexism and racism within the hegemony of patriarchy are factors
that cannot be ignored. This points to need for resilience to be fit for purpose.
2.3 Social structure, place and governance
Hall (2010) notes that:
[p]eople need the structure of a coherent organized physical
environment that affords them basic goods. They want to live within
communities that support their needs for social connection and
psychological growth. Resilient community structures build on peoples’
hopes, as well as provide a means of circling the wagons to provide a
“defensible space”’ (p. 352).
The quote from Hall, is reminiscent of Masten’s (2001) writing notes the
necessity to, ‘protect and keep[ing] in good working order’ (2001: 227), the
systems that support resilience. Hall extends Masten’s idea of a coherent and
cohesive family structure, to a coherent organised physical environment. Hall
implies, that coherent community structures support the ‘needs and social
connections and psychological growth’ (Hall, 2010: 352) (read resilience) of
individuals and groups in neighbourhoods. Here, cohesion is relational;
described as social connection and psychological growth. However, the inherent
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tension is formulated in the question: cohesive from whose standpoint? Or, to
pick up on the work of Ungar (2005) and Bottrell (2009), the questions are: when
does, resistance as resilience for one group, become an adversity for another?
What is the relationship between, ‘intolerable’ and ‘resistant’ identities, and
enforced dominant norms? These questions require resilience to be scrutinized
under the lens of power.
In order to fine grain our understanding of resilience, it is helpful to amplify the
theoretical lens of social networks and social capital, as mechanisms in
neighbourhoods that have important implications for resilience.
2.3.1 Social interaction
In this section, the thesis takes a closer look at studies of the formation of
relationships; to better understand how social networks perform the functions of
support and psychological growth, described by Hall (2010). An important
development, in social network analysis, involved the publication of the paper
titled, ‘[t]he strength of weak ties’ by Granovetter (1973). Granovetter defines
interpersonal ties as: ‘the combination of the amount of time, the emotional
intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and [the] reciprocal services’ shared
by individuals’ (1973: 1361). This description of interpersonal ties as: time,
emotional intensity and intimacy in relationships, between individuals, can also
be viewed as support, for the psychological growth and resilience of, community
members. Inter-personal relations and networks of relations, generate trust,
establish expectations, and create and enforce norms (Ibid.). This is important
for understanding how values are enforced, and reinforced, in community.
Granovetter concludes that, weak ties are indispensable to the opportunities
accessed by individuals, as well as to their integration into society, and
conversely, that strong ties, within groups, can lead to social fragmentation and
isolation (p. 1378). This may be true in relation to resource opportunity, but may
not be the case in terms of psychological support. Close family and kinship ties,
mutual aid and voluntarism are often strong features of the relationships of
economically poor people, in poor neighbourhoods. These characteristics might
be viewed as, offering psychological support, enabling people to cope with
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poverty. They may produce considerable social capital, but members of these
networks seldom realise the assets and resources that enable improved lives
economically, and movement out of poverty. Put another way, coping with social
problems is not the same thing as overcoming them (Forrest, 2001: 2141;
Woolcock, 2001). In this frame, social capital generated in close relationship
ties, are essential to the survival/resilience of members of the community.
Granovetter’s (1973) thesis contends that, network structures of strong ties, are
likely to lead to inward looking isolationism, which is negative for members of
the network and for wider society, in terms of social cohesion. Coleman’s thesis
(1988) demonstrates something different; that strong ties, in closed network
structures, are likely to develop strong social norms (that might be either positive
or negative for wider social order). For Coleman, strong ties are essential for the
development of social norms and behaviours. Coleman suggests that, all social
relations and structures facilitate some form of social benefit, and that some
social structures are particularly important for imposing ‘external effects’ (1988:
105); norms. Coleman uses the term ‘closure’ to describe the social structure
necessary for norms to come into existence. He used diagrams to depict open
network structures and network structures with closure. These are replicated in
Figures 2.1a and Figure 2.1b on the following page.
Figure 2.1a Network without closure
(Coleman. 1988:106)
Coleman contends that networks with open structures (figure 2.1a) are able to
exert controls on either figures B or figure C or both, since they have a direct
relationship but A cannot carry out this duty in relation to figures D or E where
there is no direct relationship and vice versa.
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Figure 2.1b Network with Closure
(Coleman. 1988:106)
In structures with closure (figure 2.1b), B and C can combine to provide
collective sanction in relation to figure A, and indeed in any combination,
demonstrating that the closed structure (with strong ties) is the most effective in
developing collective agency and facilitating trust and social norms.
For Coleman, the point is that relationships are central to determining and
retaining social norms and social controls. Coleman acknowledges that in
situations of intergenerational relations there are likely to be other influences, on
children, than family alone (Sampson, 1999), such as school. Coleman’s work
on social relations is raised here as, it provides one way of understanding how
social order is conceived, and its function maintained, through social relations.
In this frame, state coercion is unnecessary, as cultural norms are upheld by,
and within, family groups, demonstrating the importance of interpersonal
relations, in upholding, accepted notions, of cohesion and social order. A
challenge to Coleman’s notion of closed structure (Figure 2. 1b) was realised, in
the field study, conducted for this thesis. In the field investigation, there were no
totally sealed units of relations apparent; they were close family structures.
However, these structures were influenced by, South Asian Muslim women’s
membership of other social networks beyond the family, as in Coleman’s
intergenerational model (see Figure 6.1). Additionally, the field investigation
found that norms, within close family networks, were themselves, challenged by
South Asian Muslim women, leading this thesis to note that, a more nuance
understanding of the complexity of interrelationships, needs to be considered
than suggested in Figure 2. 1b.
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This is important for two reasons: firstly, because this thesis places central
importance on relationships; and secondly, because in whole system resilience,
the insulation of Coleman’s (1988) closed family network (Figure 2.1b) is
intrinsically linked, by social values, to the macro social structure. There appears
to be a contradiction, the idea of a tightly closed unit being also inherently linked
to social values is only possible if the unit is imbued with the dominant
ideology/value or hegemony. Under the lens of hegemony, the (family) unit is
not only a construction of hegemony, but also, has either been hegemonized
into the values of society, or is engaged in anti-hegemonic resistance. Either
way Gramsci’s notion of consent and coercion (Gramsci, 2007) is present.
Social network theory is important to the investigation of the resilience of South
Asian Muslim women in Britain, because it provides a basis for understanding
the generation and maintenance of social relations, norms and power. Coleman
(1988; 1990) referred to ‘social good’ as the social capital outcome of social
networks. In this frame, Coleman suggests that, the continuity of community
structure is key to the emergence of social capital (Ibid.), leading to the questions
of: what is social capital? What is the function of social capital? How is social
capital related/ relevant to the resilience of South Asian Muslim women in
Britain?
2.3.2 Social capital
The terms generally used to describe social good derived in relational
associations are; ‘social assets’ and ‘social capital’ (Field, 2008; Fukuyama,
1998; Putnam, 2001; Woolcock, 1998; 2001). Social capital refers to the non-
tangible benefits that are generated in connections between people; when they
come together in common purpose. The result is that, they achieve outcomes
that are good for themselves (confidence, self-esteem and agency) and also
have wider benefits for society (for example crime reduction through
neighbourhood watch schemes) (Field, 2008; Fukuyama, 1999). According to
Crawford:
social capital lies between individuals and organisations in relationships.
It is not reducible to individual possession. This relational quality of social
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capital means that it is believed to operate as a form of social glue that
fosters integration, cohesion and order (2006: 959).
If social capital is a form of social glue, its outcomes include, hard to measure
social good, such as ‘integration, cohesion and order’ (Crawford, 2006) and
resilience. Social capital can, therefore, be viewed as a tool to measure the value
derived from individuals working together. However, measuring the economic
and social value of social contracts, integration, cohesion and social order has
proved difficult (Field, 2008). The concept of social capital builds on Hall’s (2010)
notion of resilient communities, requiring networks of support for their members
to grow psychologically. These are networks of trust, in which the social capital
generated serves to motivate members to act together. Social capital is
produced, for example, when network members support each other to cope with
crisis and shock (Woolcock, 2001). From this perspective, group/community
resilience is a social capital, accrued through cooperation by individuals, in
groups, to overcome stress and hardship.
Two forms of social capital have been identified; bonding and bridging social
capital, along the lines of Granovetter (1973), and Coleman’s (1988) conception
of bonds within, and between, social and other networks. Social capital theory
initially lacked an analysis of the importance of social structure, power and
authority. This deficit was addressed by Woolcock (1998), in the incorporation
of a vertical dimension to social capital. ‘Linking’ social capital (p. 186) adds a
third dimension to the two horizontal forms of ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social
capital. It enables the concept to explicitly incorporate the notion of power and
links to institutions with power.
Linking social capital offers the potential for civil society networks to accrue
benefits through relations with political and business power. The concepts of
bonding and bridging capital, draw on work to identify the importance of ties
within and between networks horizontally; linking social capital, exposes the
remoteness of powerless networks, from centres of power. Woolcock contends
that, structural issues, such as poverty, are largely a function of exclusion (a
structural issue). Therefore, the activities of the poor require to, not only to be,
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related to ‘reaching in’ to each other, for psychological support, and ‘reaching
out’ to bridge with other networks (for resource opportunities), but also in terms
of ‘reaching up’ to link to networks with power, resources and information
(Woolcock, 2001). Halpern (2002) developed the theory methodologically
producing a multi-dimensional diagram to depict bonding, bridging, and linking
social capital as dynamic processes that allow combinations of change. The
diagram (replicated in Figure 2.2 on the following page), provides a way of
understanding how social capital and resilience can be scaled up from the level
of the individual to the transnational. At all spatial levels there is potential for
community and/or state institutions, to work together to generate the conditions
in which social capital, and social cohesion and resilience can be realised
(Woolcock, 2001). This theory is important because, it offers a way to articulate
whole system approaches and interconnections.
Figure 2.2. Multi-level social capital framework
(Halpern, 2002: slide 4)
Detailed investigation, of the attributes identified in the framework, expose
difficulties in the implementation of this ambitious model. Taking South Asian
Muslim women in Britain, as the group against which to test specific aspects
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such as, the individual level bonding social capital attribute of ‘love and care’
and scaling it up to the meso level of ‘identification’ it is difficult to relate the
aspiration to the reality. South Asian Muslim women, in the field study,
expressed close bonds and strong links with family networks, but also expressed
contestation within family; whilst this does not negate ‘love and care’, for some
it questions if this is the case for all. At the meso level, women recorded feeling
unsafe in their identification as Muslim, beyond the home neighbourhood level.
Thus, the model fits to some extent; it enables fractures in social relations to be
identified, as well as highlighting cohesion through the fragility of the lived
experience. This interrogation suggests that, the lived dynamic is more complex
than the model. It also raises questions, about the role of the state and civil
society in generating the conditions, in which the best outcomes of social capital
can be realised. These are important questions for the safety, wellbeing and
resilience of South Asian Muslim women in Britain, because the field
interrogation found dislocations in the relationship of women to local and
national state institutions, as well as dislocations within their own communities.
There is general agreement, among scholars (Field, 2008), that the
contemporary significance of social capital derives from the work of Pierre
Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam in the 1980s and 1990s. In
tracing the developments of resilience, social capital theory plays an important
part in the development of thinking about communities. Social capital theory
identifies another step in the development of whole system resilience thinking.
Social capital is central to the notion of trusting connections and interaction
(network structures) between people and to the notion of a shared set of values
(social norms) (Ibid.). On a general level and specifically in relation to South
Asian Muslim women in Britain, question is whose social norms?
Putnam is perhaps the best known proponent of social capital theory; and
arguably, the most influential in relation to government policy. Putnam’s
investigation of regional government in Italy, in 1993, identified that the relative
success of the northern administration was due to the reciprocal relationship
between government and civil society. Here, Putnam extended the idea that
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relations of trust, between civil society and state institutions, have positive
effects. This is important to the situation of South Asian Muslim women Britain,
and Muslim communities in Britain in general, in the context of the ‘War on
Terror’; in which trust between communities and the government is seen to be
in short supply (Kundnani, 2009; O’Toole, 2012; Spalek, 2010; 2013). Putnam’s
definition of social capital comprises the components of: ‘networks’, ‘norms’ and
‘trust’, has remained constant, over the decades, in which he refined the
concept. However, scholars suggest that, over time Putnam’s theory has strayed
from incorporating a structural component (Boggs, 2002; Schultz, 2002). Schultz
writes: ‘Putnam lacks a theory of the state and the role it plays in fostering the
conditions that make it possible for voluntary associations to form, exist, and
interact’ (2002: 75). This point is well made and central to the analysis, in this
thesis, of the resilience of South Asian Muslim women in Britain in the ‘War on
Terror’. Social networks function within wider social structures and exit in
conditions of economic inequality, class, caste, gender, race and faith.
Therefore, it is essential that social capital/resilience theory incorporates these
dynamics of structural power differences. Voluntary/civil society networks and
associations, struggle within structures of exclusion and difference, to find their
place between consensus and contestation, and empowerment and regulation.
Although Putnam made the case that trust is an essential aspect of collective
action, he refused to accept that declining trust and social capital might be
affected by the structural condition of racism (Field, 2008). Breakdown in social
relations, along the lines of race, is a structural issue that has ramifications, at
the micro level for social relations across ethnic communities, and for community
cohesion. Scholars suggest that examples such as this highlight, Putnam’s
difficulty in distinguishing between trust as a product of social capital and trust
as a component of it (Woolcock, 2001). Woolcock argues that people invest in
networks and social institutions that produce trust, not in trust in, and of, itself
(p. 7). The important point here, is that, in the history of struggle in British/South
Asian Muslim relations, trust has been eroded over prolonged struggle for
ideological domination; and further eroded in the ‘War on Terror’. The
implications of loss of trust for whole system resilience are grave, because it
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denotes further fissures in the interdependence of all people, in the whole social
system. From this perspective, and under the lens of feminist and anti-imperialist
theory, it is woefully insufficient for social capital theory to refuse to accept the
effects of racial division.
Fukuyama (1999) suggests that social capital cannot be understood
independently of broader structural and institutional arrangements.
Communities, from this perspective, can either be mistreated, or ignored, by
public institutions, or enjoy complimentary relations with the state (1999), with
connotations of linking social capital. Fukuyama warns that excessive state
intervention ‘can lead to serious negative impacts on social capital’ (2001: 18),
indicating that the generation of social assets (social capital) should be left to
civil society actors with government playing an indirect facilitative role. Yet,
social capital has, and continues to, influence government policy in a number of
countries including Finland, Australia, Canada and Britain (Field, 2008). In the
UK, New Labour argued that, ‘the creation of social capital could balance
growing individualism with the need for interdependence, serving as a glue to
prevent modernisation from driving societal disintegration’ (Ferragina, 2015: 2).
Thus, it could be argued that, in different manifestations, the discourse of social
capital is embedded the relationship between macro and micro dimensions at
every level of the wider system; international, national, local, neighbourhood,
civil and state. In this framing, questions about how social capital is used, in
terms of risk, disruption, the positioning of responsibility become important,
particularly when placed under the lens of hegemony in the context of the ‘War
on Terror’. More specifically, in regards to South Asian Muslim women in Britain,
the question is, how do hegemonic productions of social capital function, to
place responsibility on them, to prevent ‘societal disintegration’? This thesis
contents that resilience as resistance is social capital and in doing so, the work
of this thesis exposes and challenges the commandeering of social capital for
the use of hegemony.
Tony Blair’s ‘Third Way’, is said to represent the apex in the political ascendance
of social capital; with (amongst other objectives) a belief in, the value of
community and cooperation between civil society and government (Giddens,
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2002; Niall, 1999). Ferragina (2015), suggests that the Conservative
government’s (2010) ‘Big Society’ was a continuation of Third Way politics at a
time of growing inequalities. In the context of irreconcilable tensions between
growing inequality (felt sharply at the micro level), and the suggestion (from the
state, on the macro level) that disadvantaged communities use social assets,
such as trust, to manage risk brings to the fore the responsibility placed on
communities. Changing political systems continue to use the discourse of social
solidarity for different purposes; in relation to poverty it is mooted as important
for societal wellbeing, and in relation to counter-terrorism to the management of
risk (Spalek 2013). Woolcock (2001) notes that for the poor, and the argument
applies to other marginalized groups, social networks are, one ‘asset they can
potentially draw upon to help negotiate their way through an unpredictable and
unforgiving world…..the very poor have “something left to lose,” namely each
other’ (p. 77). Social networks, and the social capital they engender, are crucial
in the survival of people in marginalized communities. From this perspective, it
appears wholly inappropriate for the state to call on marginalized communities
to generate social capital, to address structural issues, which lie beyond
personal interdependencies and reside at macro levels of responsibility.
Forrest (2001) brings the discussion from theory to practice in suggesting that
theorists observation of macro processes such as, disorder and social and
economic dislocation ‘may underestimate the importance of the lived experience
of the dull routine of everyday life and its role in undertaking “ongoing ‘repair’
work to normalise social relations” (Turner, 1991: 18, 21, 27). This ‘ongoing
repair work’ is essential for South Asian Muslim women in Britain in their
struggles in the prolonged adversity of the ‘War on Terror’. The quote from
Forrest focuses attention on the importance of family, locale and community, in
dealing with the effects of structural adversity. The work of this thesis
demonstrates how social capital is generated in neighbourhoods; the field work
with South Asian Muslim women took place in a study neighbourhood; their
neighbourhood.
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2.4 The problem and possibility of neighbourhood
It might first be helpful to orient the reader with a brief exploration of how
neighbourhood is conceived in theory. This is important, not only, because the
findings of this thesis are based on a neighbourhood study, but also, because
neighbourhood, proximity and relationships, as has been pointed out throughout
this chapter, are important to, and form the basis of, resilience. Scholars have
found it difficult to secure a single interpretation of neighbourhood. The broad
definition of neighbourhood as place (spatial), as people (relational), or both, or
where social identity and life chances are shaped (Forrest, 2001; 2004;
Macintyre, 2002) is adopted in this thesis. In this thesis, neighbourhood is seen
to exist at different scales; the home area, the locality, and the urban district or
region. The home area is the smallest unit and is typically defined as an area of
walking distance from home. At this level the strongest purpose of
neighbourhood relate to the psycho-social benefits for residents. This reference
is a reminder of Hall’s (2010) statement; of the importance of relationships for
psychological growth and resilience (see 2.2). Home neighbourhood is also the
scale of geography of interest to this thesis. It is the scale at which the empirical
investigation was undertaken.
In connecting social capital and disadvantage in urban neighbourhoods,
Sampson (2004a) opens his paper on ‘Networks and neighbourhoods’ with wry
comment on the idealised manner, in which tight-knit neighbourhoods have
been depicted as safe because of their ‘rich supply of social networks’ (p. 157).
Sampson suggests that this idealization bears little resemblance to reality, and
fails to account for neighbourhoods, as places in which the stresses of power
differentials and issues such as racial segregation, and poverty, are managed.
It is within frames of inequality and survival, that the assets accrued from social
capital, in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, must be considered. This
perspective describes neighbourhood as a place of survival; dense social
networks in this frame take on a different meaning; they represent mechanisms
for getting by.
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Forrest at al., (2001) suggest that, at its best, neighbourhood serves the
functions of relaxation, re-creation of self and connection with others; fostering
attachment and belonging, and reflects personal values. In other words, it is
where identity is formed and repair work undertaken, for members to cope with
the unpredictability of the wider urban environment. Place is about ‘dwelling in
nearness’ to others, with face-to-face contact that can bring about reciprocal
relations (Shonkoff, 2000: 328). From this perspective, relationships, rather than
place, are central to ‘nearness’. Neighbourhood cannot be separated from
structural issues of power, and inequality within communities, or, in wider
society. The dimension of power must inform an understanding of the
mechanisms of reciprocity within neighbourhoods in, for example, the equitable
share of neighbourhood resources. Micro level differences, amongst individuals
in communities, are important for exposing power inequality in hegemonic
gender and race relations in neighbourhoods. For the South Asian Muslim
women, in the investigation conducted for this thesis, the home neighbourhood
(as spatial and relational) held both possibilities and problems, whilst the wider
urban neighbourhood largely presented unpredictability and threat. The findings
of this thesis indicate that whilst neighbourhood is, theoretically, difficult to
define, the home neighbourhood remains an important site for South Asian
Muslim women’s resilience building.
To better understand the ways in which neighbourhood can develop social
capital, Forrest et al., identify eight domains of social capital at the
neighbourhood level. The domains are summarised in Table 2.1 (on the
following page). The domains are helpful in translating, the concept of social
capital, to the practice of generating social capital, in neighbourhoods. It offers
suggestions for government support for social capital in neighbourhoods. This
thesis returns to these domains in Chapter Six, in the identification of the
potential benefits of cohesive, ethnically mixed, neighbourhoods in findings from
this research.
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Table 2.1: Domains of social capital and neighbourhood policies to
support them
Domain Effect Policy support
Empowerment People feel they have a voice,
are listened to; and are
involved
Provide support to
community groups, giving
people a role in policy
processes
Participation
People take part in social and
community activities; local
events
Establishing, and/or,
supporting local activities
and publicising events
Association &
common
purpose
People co-operate with one
another, have information of
groups
Developing and supporting
networks between
organisations
Supporting
networks and
Reciprocity
Individuals & organisations
co-operate to support one
another for either mutual or
one-sided gain; an
expectation that help would
be given to or received from
others when needed
Creating, developing and/or
supporting an ethos of
cooperation between
individuals and
organisations, developing
ideas of community support;
good neighbour award
schemes
Collective
norms and
values
That people share common
values and norms of
behaviour
Promulgating an ethos which
residents recognise and
accept;
Trust That people feel they can
trust their co-residents and
local organisations
responsible for governing or
serving their area
Encouraging trust in
residents with one another;
delivering on policy
promises; bringing groups
together
Safety That people feel safe in their
neighbourhood and are not
restricted in their use of public
space by fear
Encouraging a sense of
safety; involvement in local
crime prevention; providing
visible evidence of security
measures
Belonging That people feel connected to
their co-residents, their home
area, have a sense of
belonging to the place and its
people
Creating, developing and/or
supporting a sense of
belonging in residents;
boosting the identity of a
place via design,
Adapted from Forrest and Kearns, 2001, Table 5: 2140
Interestingly, the ‘success’ of social capital in the domains table requires support
from the state at arm’s length to delivery. This reflects Fukuyama’s warning of
the dangers of government intervention (1999). The terms used by Forrest and
Kearns, include the word ‘support’, ‘encourage’ and ‘promulgate’ as indications
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that government policy has a supportive role in the generation of social capital.
The table does not, and was not intended, to raise questions about how policy
suggestions would come about. The table is replicated (in summarised form) as
Table 2.1 on the following page.
Forrest et al., (2001), make the case that poor neighbourhoods have been
viewed, by governments, as receptacles for encouraging the generation of the
informal social resources, necessary for government policy, such as in the Third
Way. Mutual aid, self-help and loose ties are seen to provide ‘solutions,
springboards and alternatives’ (p. 2139) to social and economic isolation. These
suggestions reflect the benign intentions by government mentioned earlier (see
2.2.1), but there is also the suggestion that increasing resources in
disadvantaged neighbourhoods is cost effective for government. In this frame,
the success of neighbourhood social capital is measured by the extent to which
individuals are empowered to participate in reciprocal association (the first four
domains), the development of shared norms (domain five) that have the
outcome of trust (domain six), safety (domain seven) and a sense of belonging
(domain eight). This thesis argues that while these are useful approaches, there
is a need to address neighbourhood social capital through the lens of power and
hegemony.
Halpern’s (2002) diagram (figure, 2.3) then, provides a model for,
conceptualising the horizontal and vertical reach of social capital from micro
communities to macro (national and transnational) phenomenon, while Forrest
et al., (2001) focus on the intricacies of social capital at the neighbourhood level.
The connection of social capital and resilience with social cohesion offers a
reminder of the earlier work of child development scientists. This work identified
that, resilience is nurtured by multiple factors and actors at different levels;
parents, neighbours and neighbourhoods, community and wider society, as well
as government policy. This is important learning in scaling up resilience from the
individual/family level to community/neighbourhood/society level.
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In summary, neighbourhood literature definitively points to the importance of
neighbourhood as local, proximate spaces for relationship building and the
production of social assets and social capital. It is also the case that,
neighbourhoods exist in wider social and political realities of power and this
cannot be ignored in examining social capital in neighbourhoods; as macro level
inequalities are replicated, if differently, at this level. In tracing, the genealogy of
resilience, it is possible to attach the concept to social capital, and to
acknowledge the importance of home neighbourhood geographies as the places
and spaces in which the work to repair adversity is undertaken; that is to build
resilience. The chapter has argued that the dimension of hegemony/power is
vital in the study of marginalised groups such as South Asian Muslim women in
Britain; bringing in the issue of hegemony/power and resistance into the frame
of resilience.
2.5 Resistance and resilience
Michael Foucault (1978) claimed that, ‘where there is power, there is resistance’
(pp. 95-96). The proposition is that, where power is a dominating force there is
a countervailing force; resistance. In this frame, power and resistance are
intrinsically linked; they are mutually constitutive and contingent. Thus, the
resistance of the powerless is itself a form of power. Existing scholarship on
social networks, social cohesion, and the inter-relationship of local contexts with
national policy and structural issues remain largely neutral on the effects of
inequality, power imbalance and processes of domination. The concept of
resistance replaces neutrality with power; it indicates a process of resisting
rather than absorbing adversity. Resilience, from a power neutral stand point
describes processes by which objects, individuals, groups or systems cope with
pressure or adversity; whilst resistance describes the refusal to absorb adversity
and press back against it. Importantly, resistance is derived from resilience; it
can therefore be viewed as resilience’s agentic aspect (Ungar, 2005; Rutter,
2006).
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Ungar (2005) explicitly makes the case for cultural, contextual, and political
sensitivity in understanding resistance and resilience. Resilient individuals, in
this frame, resist cultural, contextual and political systems that have failed them.
From this perspective, resilience is a prerequisite for the capacity to resist. The
terms resilience and resistance are also used interchangeably. Bottrell (2009)
for example suggests that resistances can be framed as resilience; in using the
term ‘[r]esistance based resilience’ (p. 321), suggesting that resilience is based
in resistance rather than the opposite. There is no doubt that the terms are
closely connected, but they are also distinct; Rutter (2006) for example suggests
that (in child development) resistance is an outcome of the presence of
resilience. Rutter notes that resilience ‘implies relative resistance to
environmental risk experiences’ (pp. 1, 2) indicating that resistance is an effect
of the presence of resilience. Ungar (2005) and Bottrell (2009) agree that
resistance is a response to the social construction of individuals and groups as
unequal in society.
Resistance as a concept has wide usage; it describes actions and behaviours
at individual, collective, and institutional levels and incorporates class revolution
and dress code (the hijab) and hairstyle (Hollander, 2004). It is not surprising
that there is little consensus amongst scholars on a definition of resistance
(Hollander, 2004; Vinthagen, 2007a), other than it has entangled and
intersecting relations to power. When viewed as mutually constituted; relations
of power and subjugation become central to understanding group responses to
inequality and injustice as adversity. In the context of power it is possible to view
resistance as a response to, but also integrated with, power at macro and micro
levels; the traditional view of resistance for example refers to social movements,
or protest, as responses to repressive structural relations. Actions traditionally
include protest marches, pickets, and the formation of organisations to
rebalance power relations (Howe, 1998). However, resistance is also
increasingly used to describe individual, micro level, behaviours such as
resistance to acts of violence, resistance to authority, the social construction of
identity or resistance to forms of ideological domination, as in this thesis.
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Howe (1998), like Gramsci, identifies hegemony and resistance nested together
in a complex web of intersecting relations. Power and subjugation are not static;
resistance and power are dependent on the standpoint of the subject’s
(changing) position, of subjugation, or domination. This reading of the
relationship suggests that the stand points of domination and subjugation are
dynamic; that resistance offers the potential for interchange. Struggle leads to
interaction, and exchange, that can lead to the formation of hybrid positions in
some contexts, as evidenced in Chapters Three and Six.
One form of resistance is challenge, to the identities constructed and ascribed
in hegemony, to particular groups (which these groups find intolerable) for the
purpose of domination. Here is where the work of Bottrell on intolerable and
resistant identities is extremely useful (2009). Bottrell’s work, in showing how
relations formed through resisting, became an important part of the resisters
ability, not only to resist, but also, to cope with resistance. This has important
implications for South Asian Muslim women’s resistance of the intolerable
identities ascribed to them as identified in the field work for this thesis. Bottrell
(2009) demonstrates that, the social capital and trust, generated within the
resister group, enabled the resisters to cope with the discomfort involved in
resisting. Acceptance of, and trust in, one another can be seen as comparable
to the function of family. Bottrell points out, and this is important in regard to
South Asian Muslim women in the study neighbourhood, that ‘resistant
identities’, or alternative identities, that are more bearable were identity relations
formed in the margins. In the frame of resistance, it becomes possible to view
‘patterns of deviance [as] healthy adaptations that permit them [people] to
survive unhealthy circumstances’ (Ungar, 2005: 6). Resistance implies refuge
from intolerable conditions; it offers respite from the intolerable, to resisters. In
the frame ‘everyday resistance’ (Scott, 1985), resistant behaviours become
interwoven in the daily activities of resisters. Resistance, in this frame, is made
possible through the creation of spaces for in which ‘dissident sub-culture’
(Scott, 1990) is created. Discourse and annunciation are central to the acts of
resistance. The notion of ‘everyday resistance’ offers useful insights into the
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investigation of South Asian Muslim women’s resistance to the identities
ascribed to them in the ‘War on Terror’, evidenced in Chapters Five and Six.
Resistance is inseparable from resilience even while its function is different. The
important point here is that resistance is centred in power relations, and, in the
social and political construction of adversity. Resistance offers a different
understanding of resilience; the former offers the potential for an active and
collective response, while the latter suggests individualized coping, with the
support of community, in intolerable conditions (Ungar, 2005; Woolcock 2001;
2001). In this frame, resistance has agentic qualities and is collective.
Another purpose of incorporating resistance in resilience is the transformative
dimension of resistance. In this frame, it is possible to raise questions about
processes of adaptation through resistance. Little academic attention has been
paid to the idea of adaptation in prolonged resilience (Hardy, 2015). This is
interesting as ‘whole system’ approaches, and much of human resilience
literature, makes some reference to adaptation. MacKinnon’s (2013), for
example, in one of few studies that emphasise the importance of incorporating
a political dimension in resilience research, notes that the discourse:
of resilience presents something of a paradox of change: emphasising
the prevalence of turbulence and crisis, yet accepting them passively and
placing the onus on communities to get on with the business of adapting.
(p. 259, emphasis added).
Herein lays the core of the difference between the two forms of ‘resilience’.
Coping is defined as ‘getting by’ or surviving in conditions of adversity
(Woolcock, 2001), whist the concept of adaptation (Hardy, 2015) suggests
change or transformation in adverse conditions. Adaptation then, leads to the
consideration that active processes are at play as with resistance; that trauma
or disruption activates processes of change/adaptation. Importantly, for
resilience, the ‘organism’ that is in the process of adapting, is required to retain
fundamental pre-trauma/disturbance characteristics, and not transfigure into a
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different entity. For example, in the work of Ungar (2005) and Bottrell (2009), the
young people who found ascribed identity intolerable adapted giving rise to new
‘resilient identities’ (Bottrell, 2005: 321, 329). We do not know, in these cases, if
the new resistant identities retained pre-trauma characteristics. The field
interrogation, undertaken for this thesis, found that South Asian Muslim women
created resistant hybrid identities, whilst retaining, and strengthening, the pre-
trauma characteristic of Islamic belief. These examples clearly place adaptation,
in the form of identity formation, in the frame of resilience as resistance.
2.6 Conclusion; do we better understand resilience?
This scrutiny of resilience and related concepts, under the lens of temporality
and hegemony, has led to greater understandings of the concept, and also
uncovered a number of challenges. Fundamentally, the chapter has identified
that, resilience has been through processes of transformation that extend its use
to a range of phenomena that may explain its current ubiquity. In moving from
bounce back theory to whole system approaches, a number of challenges
emerge. In the context of the ‘War on Terror’, there is no equilibrium for South
Asian Muslim women in Britain to bounce back to. This investigation identified
that it is not a simple matter of transposing the ‘whole system’ approach,
wholesale form the plant, to human systems. In particular, it found weaknesses
and fissures in the interrelations of parts of the human social system as
problematic for its transference. In particular, the failure of established resilience
and social capital theory to incorporate the dimension of political and power
dynamics, in human relations, need to be addressed. In exposing the fissures,
fractures and dislocations between government and South Asian Muslim women
in Britain, it is possible to consider that pressure/adversity/ disruption is caused
within the system and not just externally to it, as in the eco system (whole
system) model. This thesis argues that political and power dynamics must be
incorporated in the frame of resilience, for it to be meaningful to human whole
system resilience.
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This investigation also found that resilience is transferable (scaled up) from the
individual to groups or communities. It found, that it is possible to protect micro
system disturbance, for example, by introducing government policy, addressing
neighbourhood effects and building social capital. Under the lens of hegemony,
the question that remains unanswered is the capacity, and intent, of the
dominant group to address disruption that is the cause of domination itself.
In considering group or community resilience, the concept ‘social capital’, of
which resilience is itself an outcome, is central. This led the investigation to
consider how; social capital is engendered through psychological wellbeing and
growth in strongly bonded relations at the neighbourhood level. Neighbourhoods
are essential for ‘repairing’ (Forrest, 2001) the damage inflicted by adversity.
Nurturing and supportive relationships are facilitated by positive and nurturing
neighbourhoods at the micro scale of the home neighbourhood. The work of
Forrest et al., (2001) is seen as important in grounding the abstract concept of
social capital in neighbourhood. However, Granovetter’s (1973) work alerts us
to the potentially damaging effects of closely bonded networks in restricting
resource opportunities. Thus, people in poor communities help each other to
survive, but not to move out of poverty; the effect, Granovetter and Coleman
(1988) inform us, is negative for wider social cohesion. This is important for
understanding the intricacies of the breaks in whole system resilience. Thus
strongly bonded relations have both positive and negative effects, as is evident
in the work Bottrell (2009).
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Chapter Three: British/South Asian Muslim relations:
Hegemony, power, and resistance
3.1 Introduction
This chapter contextualizes adversity and resilience as a prolonged process.
The previous chapter traced the transformation of the concept ‘resilience’; it
argued, that the concept requires the incorporation of power/hegemony to be
meaningful for the study of resilience by South Asian Muslim women in Britain.
This chapter explains the significance of prolonged harm to adversity/resilience,
and its central role in resurrecting anti-Muslim sentiments, in the present ‘War
on Terror’. In tracing the struggle for ideological domination/hegemony, in
British/South Asian Muslim relations, this chapter builds on the notion of
prolonged harm. Importantly, historic information offered in this chapter,
provides context to explain, the apparent ease with which, Islamophobia has
been given licence, in the ‘War on Terror’ (Lambert, 2011).
Gramsci’s interpretation of hegemony is used to expose the production, function,
and maintenance of consent, by subaltern Indian groups (Gramsci, 2007; Hall,
1996) (see Chapter One, 1.4.2.). This chapter traces the historic implications of
the meta-narrative; of British colonial power that caused significant harm and
displacement to, micro South Asian communities, including women. This historic
meta-narrative, of power and superiority, constitutively resonates in the present
day rhetoric of Muslims as the ‘other’, and, ‘barbarian’ (Said, 1978; Jackson,
2005; Salter, 2002). In particular, this chapter draws on distinct historic
occurrences, which exemplify heightened anxiety in the struggle for ideological
supremacy, between Islam and the ‘West’. For example, in the ‘India question’
(see 3.2.1) and, in the ‘ayahs home’ in London in the late 19th century (se 3.2.2).
This chapter picks up on the complex ways in which spaces for hybridity, emerge
and are feared, within the search for hegemony. These spaces of hybridity
represent the potential for resistance and transformation through intersecting
simultaneous pluralities that challenge binary positions; for example
transcultural relations/pollination.
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Attention is paid, to the ‘War on Terror’ by setting the global, post – Cold War
context, in Huntington’s (1993) ‘Clash of civilizations’ thesis, and, in the UK
government’s counter terrorism policies, post the al Qaeda attack on mainland
America, in 2001. This chapter provides a particular focus on the implications of
the ‘War on Terror’ for Muslim women, including South Asian Muslim women, in
Britain. It responds to the temporal aims of this thesis, by exposing the mutually
constitutive, non-linear, dynamic of past and present; it locates the harm inflicted
on South Asian Muslim in Britain, in the ‘War on Terror’, in the frame of
hegemony. In tracing this history through hegemony, the thesis looked for
studies and information on Muslim women’s experience of harm. The search
was met with considerable silence, if not, a ‘deafening silence’ (Khan, 2013;
Krishnamurthy, 1989). However, it has been possible to locate feminist, and
other, academic writings that identify the need for studies of Muslim women’s
experience in the ‘War on Terror’ (Huckerby, 2012; Nì Aolàni, 2013). It has been
very difficult to find actual accounts of South Asian Muslim women’s experiences
in the ‘War on Terror’16. Through the lens of hegemony, Muslim women’s
invisibility in academia, and the state, further signals their subordination as a
subaltern group. As stated by Krishnamurthy (1989), in writing about women in
colonial India: ‘the invisibility of women is a major point…..and some part of that
invisibility cannot be remedied’ (p. ix). The tension is between having a focus on
generic issues whilst foregrounding an understanding of the complex position of
women.
3.2 Coercion and consent
For Gramsci, hegemony is rooted in distinctions between, coercion and consent,
as ‘alternative mechanism of social power. Coercion refers to the state’s
capacity for violence, which it can use against those who refuse to participate in
capitalist relations of production’ (Stoddart, 2007: 200, 201). Hegemony is about
gaining consent without the use of force; it includes the power of dialectic
16 There is data available on the assault of visibly identifiable Muslim women from Tell MAMA,
Faith Matters and police hate crime statistics; but it has been impossible to identify any
qualitative studies of women’s experiences of being Muslim in Britain today.
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(Gramsci, 2007: 343). In this thesis, hegemony is used to articulate the
complexity, and rootedness, of power in British/South Asian Muslim relations.
This section, traces the patterns of ‘coercion and consent’ (Gramsci, 2007: 12-
13), in the struggle for ideological supremacy in British/South Asian Muslim
relations. To do this, it draws on selective events, to demonstrate the presence
of coercion, and/or, consent/hegemony, as they have been played out in
British/South Asian Muslim relations (with the caveats outlined above).
Beginning, with early 17th century British settlement in India, the first part of this
chapter traces the history of early contact for trade, rule by the crown, to the
independence of India in 1947.
Early contact
Modern British history in India started, not as an imperial project by the crown to
occupy land that was deemed, ‘terra nullius’17 (Nechtman, 2006), but for trade.
The first East India Company (the Company)18 ship docked in Surat, Gujarat in
1608 and by 1612 the Muslim Mughal Emperor had granted the Company the
‘firam’ or mandate to trade with India (Visram, 1986: 2; Nechtman, 2006). This
is important, because at the time, the British were visitors in India and sought to
live with the cultures of the host, rather than impose British values and ideology,
as was the case in future centuries (Dalrymple, 2002; Fischer-Tiné, 2004;
Visram, 2002). This is an important point, in terms of hybridity, as it signals the
potential for two cultures/ideologies to live side by side. Initial contact was made
in regions of India that had well established Muslim populations; the provinces
of Sind (now Pakistan) and Gujarat. Image 3.1 shows key Indian provinces and
the regions that became ‘British India’ as the Company, and later the crown,
extended control over territory. It also shows how Islam spread from Kabul in
Afghanistan over the western border of Sind.
17 British colonisation policies and subsequent land laws were framed in the belief that land was
being occupied because it was ‘terra nullius’ (land without owners) (Council for Aboriginal
reconciliation, 1998).
18 The EIC was a joint-stock venture made up of a group of commercial investors
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Image 3.1 Pre-partition map of India
Source: http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/india/prepartitionmap.htm
Company officials in India, were initially encouraged to integrate and to marry
‘native women’. Financial inducements were offered in 1687, to encourage inter-
racial coupling, with a fee paid, on the day a racially-mixed, ‘Eurasian’, child,
was christened into the Protestant religion (Carton 2007: 146). These,
apparently, contradictory approaches, could be read as the Company wanting
to foster good relations to facilitate trade, whilst also wishing to preserve British
tradition and belief through Christianity. Under the lens of hegemony, it is
possible to read the contradiction, as an early indication of cultural coercion; as
inter-racial coupling was accepted, only if the next generation retained Christian
faith. This early act to preserve Britishness, can be viewed as the antecedence
of the discourse of ‘Britishness,’ that is prevalent in discourses in the ‘War on
Terror’. The mandate can be seen to serve the purpose of signalling separation
along the lines of faith. Under the lens of hegemony, this is an act of the
dominant class seeking to retain ideological control, through separation; by
creating rifts between the ‘native’ and the British. Separation signalled a change
from integration, to supremacy, highlighting difference, rather than cohesion. In
this early act of separation, it is possible to see the construction of Muslims’ as
‘other’; a discourse that, continues today, through phobia or hatred of Muslims,
and the violence that is attached to it; Islamophobia (Richardson, 1997).
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To emphasise separation, along the lines of race and faith, and to extend the
separation, the Company proclaimed that mixed-race children ‘would not inherit
the primary social and cultural affiliations of their mothers’, thereby ensuring
British paternal rights over racially-mixed children (Carton, 2007: 146, 147).
Under the lens of hegemony, this action functioned to embed a particular
ideology of difference, through prioritising Christianity. This was, perhaps, a
response to the numbers of Company representatives (British men), who had
openly accepted Indian tradition; living as ‘White Mughals’ (Dalrymple, 2002),
married to, or settled with, an Indian wife or ‘bibi’ (companion). These Company
representatives are said to have become so ‘Indianised’ that some converted to
Islam19 (Dalrymple, 2002, Nechtman, 2006; Visram, 2002). By the mid-
eighteenth century, up to ninety per cent of British men in India were married to
Indian women (Blunt, 1999). India Muslim women played a large part in the lives
of British men in India, in intimate relations, as their teachers of Indian culture
and Islam (Dalrymple, 2002) embedding British men in Indian life. It is the dual
heritage children, of the ‘White Moghuls’ who would have been subject to
baptism into Christianity. From the perspective of current socio-political thinking,
it is difficult to understand these acts as anything other than signalling,
hegemony.
Trade involved a huge British civilian and military presence; whilst trade was the
primary purpose for the British, a military presence sent clear signals of
authority, strength and the potential for coercion if required. Thus, from the
beginning, consent and coercion co-existed. Working-class, and better-off,
Britons travelled to India, playing a critical role, through correspondence home,
in bolstering the belief that India needed the presence of the British. Whilst
admitting to the presence of a great Indian civilization, these correspondences
suggested, this was the result of nature (the abundance of the land), rather than
the agency of the people (Nechtman, 2006). These messages to the British
public, portrayed Indian Muslims as lacking agency and scientific rationality;
qualities that were seen as important in Enlightenment Europe (Gandhi, 1998;
19 Hindus were less accessible to the British than Muslims, partly because of the strict Hindu
caste system restricting opportunities for social interaction (Dalrymple, 2002). We can
therefore assume that Islam was more generally adopted by early British officials in India.
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Jackson, 2005; Nechtman, 2006). In these correspondences, we can see the
beginning of a discourse of Muslims as irrational ‘others’, which laid the
foundations for later portrayals of Muslims as heathens and barbarians (Salter,
2002). Here, lies the antecedence of contemporary Islamophobic discursive
representations (intolerable identities) of South Asian Muslim women in Britain.
Transformation in Indian
By the middle of the 18th century, inter racial marriage had almost completely
ended; greater distancing from Indians, and an increased emphasis on Christian
values was evident. Dalrymple (2002) notes, that at this time, a ‘new breed of
Evangelical Christians’ arrived in India (p. 46) openly proclaiming the supremacy
of the British way of life, with a confidence in the coercive capabilities open to
them20 (Dalrymple, 2002; Visram, 1986). In these developments, we can see
that military might and force was ready for use.
Coercion and hegemony were enacted in numerous ways in attempts to
dispossess Indian’s of traditional ways of life; economic and political systems
were restructured (Sharpe, 1989). Muslim women would have been affected by
these changes as land workers, wives, and mothers; in Bengal for example
Muslim women traditionally worked in the fields (Krishnamurthy, 1989). These
processes of change, or ‘transformation’, did not pass without struggle and
contestation (Guha, 1996) by peasant farmers, as will be explored later. In these
reforms we can see Gramsci’s notion of the ‘super structure’ in action.
Economic, political, judicial formations/powers were used in attempts to regulate
Indian social relations with the intent, according to Hall 1986, of: ‘define[ing] the
horizon of possibilities’ (p. 13; Gramsci, 1971). Hall argues that in Gramsci’s
conception of hegemony these regulatory forces cannot guarantee dominant
outcomes become of subaltern struggle and resistance.
20 At this point Christian missionaries were still not allowed to travel to India or to set up
missionary schools. However, increasing numbers of high ranking Company officials were
agitating for this legislation to be changed. In the absence of missionaries these Company
officials voiced supremacist Christian attitudes
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Gramsci’s dialectic of consent and coercion, by the dominant group in search of
hegemony, is evident in the reorganisation of traditional, economic, and farming
practices, which changed the lives of peasant farmers. Counter-hegemonic
resistance was evident in Bengal; by peasant farmers dispossessed of their land
rebelled. These processes indicate the growing confidence of new evangelical
Company officials, to overturn traditional Indian systems with impunity, as the
separation between the British in India and Indian’s increased. They mark
changes in British/South Asian relations at the macro level, that transmute from
working with the grain of Indian culture, to explicit cultural and racial separation,
supremacy and domination (Dalrymple, 2002; Visram, 1986). At the micro level,
separation was different for ‘White Moghuls’ and working class British men, who
had embraced Indian culture and Islam and were embedded in racially mixed
family life and relations (Dalrymple, 2002). Confirming Gramsci’s thinking about
the complexity of relations of power, they retained aspects of their Britishness,
for example they returned to Britain with their families, whilst retaining aspects
of Indian culture. For first generation British in India, for whom inter-cultural
contact was encouraged, cross-culturation was a fact of life (Ibid.). For the
generations that followed, distancing and separation appears to have
engendered fear of loss of culture and identity. 18th century ‘White Moghuls’, and
21st century second generation Muslim women, appear to have cross-culturation
in common. This is evident in their shared experience of adopting hybrid
identities. In this frame they share a refusal to accept the binary of Muslim or
Western. This is important because it demonstrates the potential for creative,
non-binary, ‘third space’ responses (Bhabha, 1994) in the struggle for
hegemony. In this frame, hybridity is a space of resistance and transformation.
In the contemporary context of UK counter-terrorism the binary position (Muslim
or Western/British) is evident in the insistence (via consent and coercion) that
forms of Islam change to be more acceptable to the West (see 3.4).
In order to manage, at the micro level, economic, judicial and other reforms the
Company exploited religious differences amongst Hindu and Muslim India’s.
Hindu landowners became rent collectors for the British in exchange for a
presence in the Bengal Congress and direct lines of communication to the
colonial government established by the Company. This arrangement is said to
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have worked well for the British, who were seeking ‘loyal allies’ among the Indian
population, whilst it also supported the aspirations of upper-caste Hindu’s to
acquire power. The process of co-opting subaltern classes is highlighted by
Gramsci in the role of the ‘intellectual’. The role of this group was, described by
Gramsci, to carry out ‘the immediate execution of the production plan’ (Gramsci,
2007: 14). In other words, the ‘intellectual’ group worked with the dominant
group, to achieve its objectives/plan. It is important to note that a smaller, Muslim
landlord, elite, formed the Praja Party21 that was later to become the Muslim
League (Chatterjee, 2012). This point is raised because it demonstrates the
complex, non-linear, multiple dynamic of struggle in hegemony configured on
consent and coercion. The Muslim League (on independence) agitated for the
creation of Pakistan that is now implicated in the ‘War on Terror’.
Coercion incubated grievances amongst Muslim peasant farmers; grievances
that were acted out in counter-hegemonic protests and uprisings (Guha, 1983;
Visram, 1986). Peasant movements were crushed by the military might of the
Company supported by, predominately Hindu, landowning classes (Chatterjee,
2010; Guha, 1983). Given these hardships it is not surprising that dispossessed,
lower class, Indian Muslims sought any employment that was open to them
including employment as lascars (for men) on board Company ships, despite
appalling conditions and lower wages than for British sailors, and as ayah’s
(servants) to British families (Visram, 1986). Little is written about the gender
effects of these changes, but it is unimaginable that Indian women were not
affected by these hardships. This, ‘deafening silence on gender issues’ (Khan,
2013) is a prolonged dynamic of hegemony; it is harm.
Counter-hegemonic revolts to the Company’s reorganisations, and cultural
insensitivity, are recorded from the late 18th century. The 19th century witnessed
an increase in uprisings against the exercise of British power. Guha (1983) notes
that ‘the instances [of defiance] are far too numerous to cite’ (p. 2). Counter-
hegemonic actions indicate that the dominant, if still a visiting group had not
21 Praja means tenant – the Praja Party was the tenant’s party
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achieved hegemony, had not won the consent of, the Indian Muslim peasant
classes despite two centuries of coercive presence in India.
19th century Europe saw the outbreak of the Napoleonic wars in 1803, these led
to shortages of men to crew the Company’s cargo ships. These shortages
crucially shifted the employment pattern of Indian merchant sea men; lascars
were recruited in larger numbers than before. Growth in lascar labour did not
signal an improvement in the Company’s (or indeed the British public’s) attitude
of Indians’. Legislation was passed, at the end of the Napoleonic wars, to
exclude Indian seamen from British citizenship, or employment, on British bound
ships (Visram, 2002). Indian Muslim women were employed, in growing
numbers in India, as ayahs, as larger numbers of British women travelled to
India. Letters sent home by British women, provide another narrative of Indian
Muslim women. Correspondences painted India servants as lazy, because they
rested in the afternoon, lacking in intelligence, because they didn’t understand
English, dirty and immoral (Chaudhuri, 1994: 553). These correspondences are
important; they built on the 17th and 18th century depictions of Indians as lacking
agency and rationality. These discursive representations of Indian Muslims and
Hindu’s, including women, embedded the idea of Indian Muslim women as
different, ‘other’. These discursive practices are the foundations of present day
‘phobia’ (as in Islamophobia) of Muslims. These metanarrative processes of
subjectification in counter-terrorism ‘echo the imperial mind-set in the age of
colonialism and taps into the narrative of the “civilising mission” towards the
colonial savages' (Jackson, 2005:49). Under the twin lenses of hegemony and
temporality, the persistent ‘intolerable identities’ (Bottrell, 2001) ascribed to
South Asian Muslim women in Britain, in the prolonged adversity of the ‘War on
Terror’, exemplifies that ‘where discourse is mobilized to reinforce systems of
social power it functions as ideology...ideology is discursive’ (Stoddart,
2007:193).
The struggle for Indian independence
Uprisings against the Company, by Indians in 1857-58, by Indian peasant
classes, are the best known resistance to Company rule. The Company’s Indian
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infantrymen, ‘sepoys’, rose-up in violent clashes against Company garrisons
and personnel. Referred to as the ‘sepoy mutiny’, in Western discourse, the
dominant narrative affirmed the view of unruly and untrustworthy natives (Abbas,
2005: 8; Chaudhuri, 2006; Tickell 2012: 6). Chaudhuri (2006) notes that, letters
sent home by British women in India at this time, expressed increased hostility
to Indians and further strained relationships between British women and Indian,
male and female, servants (p.556). The ‘sepoy mutiny’ is important in tracing
British/South Asian Muslim relations, through the lens of hegemony, because it
shifted dominant representations of Indian’s as lazy, incapable or irrational, to
one of people capable of organised savagery and brutality in the massacre of
British women and children. For anti-imperialist scholars, the uprisings are
recognised as the beginning of the Indian War of Independence (Guha, 1983;
Visram, 1986; 2002). Guha (1983) notes that Western texts omitted the agency
of subaltern groups: ‘protagonists in each case had tried petitions, deputations
or other forms of supplication before actually declaring war on their oppressors’
(pp. 46; see also Prakash, 1994). Guha depicts the conscious agency of Indians’
in counter-hegemonic struggle to retain traditional values; a markedly different
perspective to the dominant (Western) discourse. Representations of Indian’s
as ‘wild’ confirmed the idea that they needed to be civilised. The trigger for the
uprisings was the Company’s insistence that sepoys bite off the paper cartridges
for their rifles; cartridges that had been soaked in pig or cow22 fat to lubricate
them (Streets, 2001: 90). Company, still visitors in India, were familiar with
Muslim and Hindu belief systems. This is evident from correspondence from
British women indicated that Muslim servants refused to touch pork and serve
wine (Chaudhuri, 2006: 551).
The response was the use of the military force available to the Company; the
rebellion was crushed. The rebellions’ led to the transfer of power from the
Company to the crown. Other changes, at this time, such as Darwinian science,
affected views of Indians adding a racialized characteristic to representations of
Indian’s. Chaudhuri’s study shows that letters from British women in India, at
22 Touching, or consumption of, beef is against the religious beliefs of Hindus as is the
consumption of pork by Muslims
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this time, demonstrate the promotion of racial hierarchy (2006). This view was
made explicit in 1849, when Disraeli claimed that: ‘[r]ace implies difference and
difference implies superiority, and superiority leads to predominance’ (Ibid.).
Chaudhuri notes that, for the first time, in the 1860s and 70s the predominance
of faith and racial supremacy led British women to portray Indian servants as
sub-human: one letter, quoted by Chaudhuri, describes an ayah as: ‘very small,
and very black, and she sat in her low chair, or on the ground, with her skinny
arms round the fair child, she looked exactly like a monkey wrapped in white
muslin’ (p. 558).
Depictions, such as the one above, indicate that racial superiority had become
an acceptable part of imperial discourse, layered over, already present
hegemonic discourses. Tracing the increasing dehumanisation of Indian
Muslims historically is important in firmly embedding today’s Islamophobia in a
history of hatred. Without this backdrop it is difficult to understand how the
violence perpetrated against South Asian Muslims in Britain can be explained.
In a temporal frame, the psychological build-up of hatred, exposes it as an ever
present phenomenon; ready, waiting to be ignited at particular times.
The embeddedness of anti-Muslim Indian sentiment is expressed clearly in
responses to the close relationship of Queen Victoria with Abdul Karim, her
Indian Muslim ‘munshi’ (teacher), over a period of ten years. Victoria liked and
protected Karim, at a time of an ‘acutely race- and class-conscious’ Britain
(Ballard, 2002: 46). When Karim was dismissed from Victoria’s services, he was
stripped of the many gifts and titles Victoria bestowed on him, and on her death
Edward VII ordered all papers, paintings, letters, and communications between
his mother and Karim to be burnt; a gesture aimed at obliterating all evidence of
the relationship between the Queen and her Muslim teacher (Ballard, 2002;
Visram, 1986). This friendship, across cultures and ideologies, and at the heart
of empire, had the power to disrupt the binaries of supremacy. The potential in
this friendship, of hybridity, was a risk and threat to hegemonic structures of
dominance, located at the highest level of monarchy. Bhabha explains that the
‘margin of hybridity, where cultural differences “contingently” and conflictually
touch, becomes the moment of panic’ (Bhabha, 1994: 207). In this frame, ‘the
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moment of panic’, manifest in the eradication of evidence of hybridity between
Queen Victoria and Karim, is a powerful act of invisibilization: an expression of
absolute unacceptability. On a symbolic level, the act of burning all evidence of
the relationship, represented the reinstatement of the power of the crown as
untouched by Muslim culture. The case of Abdul Karim is a single, extreme, case
that provides a counter narrative to a largely negative colonial relational
dynamic. It brings to mind the ‘White Moghuls’ embrace of Indian tradition; both
situations elicited responses of deep anxiety and fear that ‘the British nation
itself, like the nabobs23, could be – and perhaps [were] being – transformed’ by
India (Nechtman, 2006: 659) rather than transforming the colony. This is the nub
of the ‘India question’ .
3.2.1The ‘India question’
In tracing the struggle for domination in British/South Asian Muslim relations
particular times and events stand out; the period of the late 18th century and 19th
centuries is important in this regard. As has been demonstrated, significant
reforms of Indian tradition had taken place during the 18th century leading to
counter-hegemonic resistance by Indian subalterns. The early 19th century led
to further changes, these changes form the basis of the civilizing mission and
the Indian question.
In 1813 legislative change opened the way for Christian missionaries, and later
British women, to travel to India. The struggle for domination is crystallised, in
19th century relations, in the role of missionaries to instil the civilizing influence
of Christianity, by converting the ‘heathen’ Hindu and Muslim populations
(Dalrymple, 2002; Fischer-Tine, 2004; Visram, 2002). British women bolstered
empire, by upholding Britishness, in returning the homes of British men to British
tradition and Christian morals. British women taught Indian women servants’
British household protocol and Christian morals (Blunt, 1999, see 3.3.2).
Missionaries railed against Hinduism and Islam, as morally bankrupt and inferior
23‘White Moghuls’ were powerful representatives of the Company who converted to Islam and
adopted Indian life styles (Dalrymple, 2003). They were hated by the contemporary British
public and state and pejoratively called ‘nabobs’.
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to Christianity, and promulgating the supremacy of Christian morality;
legitimizing political and economic reform. They accelerated hegemony through
religious teaching and religious discipline. Here we can see the equivalent of
Gramsci’s ‘intellectuals’ (1971: 5-23) working to uphold the dominant system.
Thus far, economic, judicial and political coercion, and the use of military force,
to quell uprisings had not led to British hegemony; the consent of the people.
The British public and political elite were troubled about this and the influence,
they believed, that India was having/might have on Britain.
The ‘India question’ flows from the idea of Britain’s mission to ‘civilise’ India; to
hegemonize India. The ‘civilising mission’ and the attendant ‘India question’
clearly demonstrate the struggle to impose British culture, faith and political
values on Indian Muslims and Hindu’s. The imperative to civilize; to tame, to
bring rational thought to, apparently, irrational Indians, and to save the souls of
the ‘natives’ are embedded in beliefs of cultural, faith and race superiority
(Fischer-Tiné, 2004; Gandhi, 1998; Nechtman, 2002; Salter, 2002). In this
frame, there is no space for the ‘third position’ of hybridity (Bhabha, 1994: 36-
9), making the hybrid position of the ‘White Moghuls’ dangerous to the project
of hegemony.
The ‘India question’ embodies exactly the struggle for cultural/ideological
domination; it asks, which ideology is dominant; ‘Indianess’, or, ‘Britishness’?
Which culture/ideology has influenced the other most? Early British settlers in
India were encouraged to accept Indian tradition and many high ranking
Company officials did this; they lived as ‘White Mughals’. Dalrymple writes that:
a great many Europeans at this period [who] responded to India….by
crossing over from one culture to the other, and whole heartedly
embrac[ed] the great diversity of late Moghul India (2002: 10).
On their return to Britain, nabobs ‘made the Indian empire visible’ (Nechtman,
2006: 659) by bringing Indian fashion, food and architecture to Britain. These
Company employees left Britain as Britons, and returned as something else;
they represented a hybrid culture at the heart of empire. They were described
as ‘a species of viceroys to the Grand Mogul, grown almost independent, in their
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several provinces’ (Ibid: 646). Nabob’s generated fear, as holders of immense
wealth and power that was independent of empire. Nabob’s represented a
permeable boundary between British and Indian ways of life, with the potential
to infuse Indian values in the British political establishment. In 1760, for example,
at a time when the British viewed themselves ‘to be in possession of a superior
state of body, mind and soul’ (Nechtman, 2006: 646) Robert Clive was the first
nabob to use his Indian fortune to purchase a seat in British Parliament. This
example, of a powerful ‘White Moghul’ returning to Britain, and engaging in
British political processes, raised fears that the superiority of the British system
might be undermined; that Britain might be influenced by the colony (Ibid, 647).
There were many ways in which Indian language, food, and clothing were
changing traditional British life; the power of the nabobs most clearly identifies
the idea of hybridity as dangerous to ideological supremacy.
The fear of the hybrid positions adopted by the nabobs, exemplifies the struggle
to both retain, and disavow, the binary of ‘us’ and ‘them’, for ideological
hegemony. Ideology in search of hegemony is unable to accept the possibilities
of hybridity; hybridity is feared because it signals that the subordinate group
might influence, or change, the dominant; generating high levels of anxiety. This
point is central to exposing the fear generated by ideological difference, and also
the possibility of a different, pluralistic, response rather than the polarization of
domination and subordination.
3.2.2 Gender and empire
This section clearly evidences the ways in which the struggle for hegemony
translates and functions on the micro level, in the domestic, day to day
encounters of power relations between women. In this frame, gender, race,
class and caste structures of social power are ‘[a] lived hegemony…It is a
realized complex of experiences, relationships and activities, with specific and
changing pressures and limits’ (Williams, 1977:112, cited in Stoddart,
2007:202). On a temporal dimension, the implications of ‘gender and empire’,
for ‘gender and counter-terrorism’ become clear as this chapter develops and is
again specifically addressed in section 3.5. In the late nineteenth century, British
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women were called on to reinstate British values in Indian colonial homes.
Through imperial domesticity, British wives and mothers, helped to create
homes that were ‘superior to Indian domesticity’ (Blunt, 1999: 422; Chaudhuri,
2006), in this process they returned errant British men to the British way of life.
From the perspective of hegemony; power equilibrium was restored. The home
was endowed with the potential to reflect the power of the empire, and British
women enlisted to enforce British values. They took up the call in large numbers,
and British officials were encouraged to marry them and, to distance themselves
from Indians and Anglo-Indians (Ibid: 426). Studies describe ‘British homes in
India as “a space of racial purity that the colonial house wife guard[ed] against
contamination from the outsider”’ (Ibid: 425), painting a picture of British women
living in separate enclaves. Chaudhuri (2006), confirms, that British women in
India had little contact with Indians, other than those who worked in their homes
as servants. British homes were both the nexus of British power and the places
in which encounters between British women and Indian’s took place. They were
the site of a greater level of ambivalence and transculturation than might be
suggested from British women’s correspondence. ‘[F]emale imperialists’
(Gandhi, 1998: 92) enjoyed an incomparably lavish life in India (Blunt, 1999;
Chaudhuri, 2006) with numerous servants.
Image 3.2 illustrates the lavish life of the memsahib and also the disruption of
racial purity by the presence of Indians in the colonial home. British women
symbolically and actually returned colonial homes to Britishness in style and
order and in so doing British ‘memsahibs’ reproduced the moral (Christian),
social, and domestic (British) values that legitimated imperial rule within and
beyond the home.
Their duties were acted out primarily through their management of Indian
servants, by retaining British traditions, and also by re-enforcing the racial status
of Britain (Blunt, 1999: 432, 433). As already mentioned their correspondences
home largely painted a picture of Indian servants as untrustworthy and lacking
in intelligence. Under the lens of the struggle for hegemony, it is no coincidence
that Indian women were constructed as lacking in intelligence; the reproduction
of unequal social power relations means that ‘not all [women] have in society
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Image 3.2. European mistress with her ayahs (1842)
(Victoria and Albert Museum – IPN. 2503)
the function of intellectuals’ (Gramsci, 2007: 9). In the conceptual frame of
Foucault’s ‘power/knowledge’ relation (1980) and ‘order of discourse’, the
construction of Indian women as lacking in intelligence, is an aspect of
regulating; what is to be known and who knows it. Thus, the correspondences
sent home by British women, were instrumental in the transportation of
representations of India, through their descriptions of Indian women; an example
of how, ‘in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled,
selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures’
(Foucault, 1981:52).
As workers in British households, carers, and in exceptional circumstances, wet
nurses for British children, ayahs transgressed the rule of distancing. The
presence of Indian women in British homes highlights the complex intersection
of gender, race, and power in the domestic sphere. Children developed strong
emotional bonds with their ayahs, who through daily contact and care
transmitted Muslim and Hindu traditions and behaviours. It is not surprising that
Ayahs occupied an ambivalent position with their mistresses; they were valued,
and feared, as ‘domesticated outsiders’ (Ibid: 430). They were depicted as both
‘devotional and devious, trust-worthy and lascivious’ (p. 430). Ayahs became
indispensable as they engaged in the most intimate contact with their imperial
mistresses (Ibid.). This description of the close relationship between ayahs and
their memsahibs is different to the picture painted by Chaudhuri (2006) in the
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study of correspondence from British women to family back home. It is very likely
that both were true. It is also particularly likely that during this time, with
heightened anxiety and unrest between the crown and Indians, that these
stresses would have been played out in the British home in India between British
mistresses and Indian servants.
The ambivalence in the relationship between British mistresses and Indian
servants is perhaps well illustrated in Indian women accompanying their British
mistresses and children back to England. On these journeys ayahs took charge
of the baggage, the children, and the care of memsahib’s on board ship (Ballard,
2002; Visram, 1986). Once in England, their duties were often on longer
required; they were discharged, with no way to return home other than to beg or
wait for a return engagement which could take days or months. The wait required
former servants to take overcrowded and overcharged lodgings until they could
secure their home return. Some ayah’s found shelter in the Ayah’s home in
London, depicted in Image 3.3.
The ayah’s home was set up in the late 19th century by concerned Christians
and later transferred to the London City Mission (as depicted in image 3.3).
British families came to the ayah’s home to secure the services of nannies for
their journey to India. We have no way of knowing how many stayed in the
service of their mistresses, but missionaries estimated that every year between
one hundred and two hundred ayahs came to London, with about one hundred
being housed at the home.
The home was ‘more than just a hostel. The chief object….was to bring the
ayah’s under Christian influence’ (Visram, 2002: 52). Indian women were taught
hymns and taken to church and engaged in ‘“chats on religion” that the matron
though “productive”’ (Ibid). Visram (2002), states that it is impossible to measure
the success of these processes as there is no data available. It would seem that
in offering shelter to destitute ayahs, engagement with Christian ideology was
the price they were asked to pay. We are left with no way to understand why the
remaining destitute Indian women servants in London did not use the home,
leaving us to speculate if they were resisting assimilation by rejecting the
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‘civilizing’ processes engaged in the home. It is also possible that they did not
know of the existence of the hostel or were prevented for other reasons from
using it.
Image 3.3. The ayah’s home
Museum of London. (c. 1901)
These depictions of British and Indian women served to bolster relations of
domination and subjugation. British women came to symbolise the civilized
‘mother land’ in colonial India whilst, in the ‘mother land’, Indian women were
taken under the wing of the same Christian mission that vigorously denounced
their faith and cultural identity. Conversely, we remain unware of the impact of
India on British women and children who were exposed to life with Indian
servants in India. These examples provide a glimpse of the complex
intersections of gender, race, power, and ideology, illustrating that British
women were enlisted in the struggle to return errant British men to Britishness,
and to control and bring discipline, and British order, to British households in
Indian. Indian women were also enmeshed, in important ways, in their care for
British families and rearing of British children. These intimate connections
demonstrate the possibility of transculturation, as well as power and domination
in the relations between women. This struggle for ideological hegemony was
taking place even as British global power was in decline from around 1875 (Cox,
1983) and, this thesis argues, is continued today in South Asian Muslim/British
relations; a process of prolonged adversity in a prolonged ‘war of positions .
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3.2.3 The end of empire
In tracing the genealogy of hegemony in British/South Asian Muslim relations
this far, the history has indicated the use of forms of coercion and hegemony in
British rule of India. The main purpose of tracing this history is to root present
day Islamophobia in the struggle by the British in the insistence on a relationship
of superiority. The question this raises is, did this change with Indian
independence?
The 20th century saw Britain involved in two World Wars, to which, India made
massive contributions of men, money and materials. During the First World War,
Indian soldiers were excluded from holding commissions as it was believed that
‘a British private soldier will never follow a half-caste or native officer’ (Visram,
2002: 172); thus, continuing the dominant narrative of British supremacy. The
Second World War left Britain too weak to rebuild its domestic industry and also
manage the colonies, creating an opening for the Indian political elite to agitate
for independence and the Muslim league to argue for an independent state for
Indian Muslims; Pakistan. Acute labour shortages, at the end of the Second
World War, led to an estimated 7,000 Indian’s working and living in England by
(Ballard, 2002; Visram, 2002). Working class, male, settlement patterns reflect
demands for labour in the UK; sailors who had settled in port towns moved to
the Midlands to work in factories and British employers’ continued to invite
Muslims to fill labour shortages in the textile industries in Lancashire and
Yorkshire (Ballard, 2002). Described as the ‘first wave’ of Muslim migration to
the UK (Ali, 2008; Ballard, 1982; FAIR, 2002; Modood, 2005, 2006), this period
also witnessed considerable turbulence in British/South Asian relations. The end
of colonial rule in 1947 did not (and could not) overturn three and a half centuries
of superiorist mind set, nor restructure traditional Indian economic systems
(Ballard, 2002; Guha, 1983). Migration was not singularly working-class; by the
1960’s Muslim medics were responding to appeals for their services by the then
health minister, Enoch Powell; with more than 18,000 medics arriving to
underpin healthcare provision (Butler, 2008; Esmail, 2007). The embedded roots
of race and faith superiority did not make life easy for any class of Indian or
Pakistani in Britain.
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Indians and Pakistanis were tolerated but not welcome, as indicated by
legislation restricting primary immigration. The 1971 Immigration Act led to a
large increase in Indian migration, before its enforcement in 1973, due to
concerns by Indians in Britain that they would be separated from their families
in South Asia, leading to family members joining fathers and male relatives
(Alexander 2010: 9) here in Britain. The reunification of families led to changes
in the settlement patterns of South Asian’s; from a largely male transnational
population to settled family life. This period, known as the ‘second wave’ of
migration, signified permanent residence. Migrants, from Pakistani Kashmir and
Bangladesh, were amongst the earliest settlers; they remain largely located in
inner-city areas and are amongst the most economically impoverished
communities in Britain (Modood 2006; O’Toole, 2012; Spalek, 2009). Under the
lens of hegemony, the history of South Asian Muslim migration ‘corresponds to
the needs of the productive forces for the development, and hence to the
interests of the ruling classes [dominant group]’ (Gramsci, 2007; 258). Hall
(1986) elaborates on the implications of this, the repercussions of which find
resonance in the struggle against adversity of South Asian Muslims in Britain in
the ‘War on Terror’: ‘Gramsci foregrounds new dimensions of power and politics,
new areas of antagonism and struggle – the ethical, the cultural, the moral’ (p.
18).
20th century patterns of inequality reflect earlier divisions along the lines of
ethnicity, race, faith and ideology that are embedded in British superiority. A PSI
investigation into ethnic minorities in Britain (Modood, 1997), for example,
evidenced that communities that wear traditional clothing, speak their `mother
tongue’ (the language of their country of origin), and place a high premium on
religion in day to day life, experience higher levels of poverty. The investigation
found that assimilation may help reduce poverty. This evidence suggests that,
nativist anxieties, apparent in 19th century Britain, have become embedded;
difference of way of life and belief system continues to affect acceptance by the
host community. From this perspective, well established patterns of domination
in British/South Asian-Muslim relations continue to effect economic opportunity.
The Urban disturbances in the spring and summer of 21st century (also called
86
the riots of 2001), involving (mainly) South-Asian Muslim young men, have been
attributed to lack of opportunity. Ballard notes that it was:
precisely those cities in the Pennine region of northern Britain where
Mirpuri and Syhelti settlers have established ethic colonies in which
violent clashes between the members of these communities and the
police erupted during the summer of 2001 (2002: 206)
The 21st century witnessed the convergence of micro-level unrest amongst
Muslims in the UK, alongside the al Qaida attacks on main land America that
unleashed the macro-level response of the ‘War on Terror’. The UK government
responded to the urban unrest by initiating policies related to community
cohesion and the integration of Muslims into British society. The government
responded to the macro-level ‘War on Terror’ by initiating counter-terrorism
policies. These are important markers in the debate on hegemonic struggle at
both levels (micro/macro), with implications for ethno-religious policy as Muslims
were increasingly put under the spotlight evidenced in 3.3.1 in this chapter.
However, before addressing the ‘War on Terror’ there is further important
context to be addressed in relation to British/South Asian Muslim relations; the
influence of global events and interpretations by influential scholars such as
Samuel Huntington.
3.2.4 Religious implications of global change
It is important to note, that the following discussion is focused on a wide
ideological backdrop, which is relevant to British/South Asian Muslim
communities, but is not specifically focused on them. It is focused on the effects
of changes in the global order at the end of the Cold War because of its direct
effect on the ‘War on Terror’.
The end of the Cold War (from 1989 - 1991), represents a major change in the
politics of the world order; liberal democracy was seen to represent what
communism did not - the ideology of the ‘free world’ (Hardt, 2004: 231). The
former President of America, George HW Bush, was able to categorically state
that ‘the Soviet Union did not simply lose the Cold War, western democracies
won it’ (Salla, 1997: 731).
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In response the respected ‘intellectual’, political scientist, and US Government
advisor, Samuel Huntington, published the controversial, but influential, article
‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ in 1993. The article predicted that, in the absence
of the Cold War, ‘a central focus of conflict for the immediate future would be
between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states’ (p. 48). The end of old
hostilities did not reduce the idea of threat to Western ideology; communism was
replaced with Islam (Salter, 2002). In terms of the role of ‘intellectuals’ in
Gramsci’s formulation of hegemony, the trajectory, critiques and influence of
Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis, can be seen to give ‘form and
expression to the moral, philosophical, ideological and scientific values that are
elaborated into a hegemonic project’ (Jones, 2006: 81; Gramsci, 2007: 5-23).
Huntington argued, that the ‘fault lines between civilizations are replacing the
political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis
and bloodshed’ (1993: 31); that ‘the fundamental source of conflict in this new
world will be cultural…the principle conflicts of global politics will occur between
nations and groups of different civilizations’ (1993: 22). There is no innuendo in
this statement, the ‘battle’ or struggle is designated as ‘civilizational’ which can
be read as based on politics, social order, religious belief, and culture; namely
‘all forms of social thinking’ (Hall, 1983: 60, Salter, 2002) or ideology.
The ideological battle, Huntington predicted, would be between Judeo/Christian
nations and ‘the rest’; that the new axis, of world politics and conflict, would be
based on religious and cultural difference. It is important to note, Huntington’s
rhetoric is configured, and contingent upon, the logics of binary positions: in
stark contrast to the logics of hybridity, simultaneous intersecting multiplicity of
position and plurality; absolutely in keeping with the ideological hegemony. At
the micro-level, between groups, and at the macro-level between states,
civilizations compete for military and economic power, control over international
institutions, and promote their political and religious values. Huntington did not
advocate that conflict between civilizations was desirable; his stated aim was to
inform policy in preparation for potential clashes, but his thesis had a significant
effect on the, yet to be realised, ‘War on Terror’ (Slater, 2002). Huntington was
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in a position to influence US government policy as a member of the political
inner-circle (Chomsky, 1981; Harvard News Office, 2009).
Huntington’s rationalisation is that conflict based on cultural and civilizational24
difference is intrinsic to humans. Locating conflict-enhancing factors in cultural
identities has been criticised, by scholars, as primordial and unhelpful, in its
disregard for the nature of dispute (Henderson, 2001: 320). Said (2001) argued
that the ‘Clash’ thesis was reckless in promoting a populist view resonating calls
of the ‘crusades, good versus evil, freedom against fear etc.’ (Ibid: 4). The
argument that conflict, based on identity, is less likely to be open to compromise
serves to compound the notion of Muslims as unreasonable, unlike us, and as
the ‘other’ (Salter, 2002).
The idea, that post-Cold War conflict, based on civilizational difference is
inevitable has been challenged by a number of scholars (Bruce, 2000; Chiozza,
2002; Henderson, 2001; Inglehart, 2003; Said, 1993; Salter, 2002). On the basis
of data generated in the World Values Survey (WVS), al- Braizat (2003)
suggests that, the claim that Islam is resistant to modernity does not hold up.
The important point here is that Huntington, as ‘traditional intellectual’ (Gramsci,
2007: 5-10) and political advisor to the remaining global super power, promoted
a thesis of the incompatibility of Islamic and Christian ideology. In articulating
ideological difference as oppositional; ‘Clash’ rhetoric replaced communism with
Islamic fundamentalism (Poynting, 2012: 239; Nicholls, 2009) igniting fears of a
new threat to Western political belief systems. Gay (2009) for example notes
that the mantra of 9/11; ‘the “war on terrorism” meant keeping terrorists from
attacking democratic government and capitalist economic interests’ (p. 29).
Regardless of whether or not we accept Gay’s political logic, the re- emergence
of 18th century fears and anxieties (the ‘Indian question’) are again apparent in
the 20th and 21st centuries.
24 Huntington defines civilization as the ‘highest cultural grouping …. defined by common
objective elements such as, language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the
subjective self-identification of people’ (2002: 24).
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3.3 The Present
Thus far, this chapter has traced the struggle for domination through coercion
and hegemony in British South Asian Muslim relations. In doing so, it has
evidenced the ubiquity of British supremacy over a long history of contact, and
despite considerable pressure, the retention of faith, culture and ideology by
South Asian Muslims. The following sections changes from an historic, to a
present-day perspective; this step change allows a detailed focus on the ‘War
on Terror’ as the response by liberal democratic nations (broadly called the
‘West’) to the perceived threat of Islam (Allen, 2011, 2012, Jackson, 2005).
Beginning by making the case for the ‘War on Terror’ as a further manifestation
of ideology in struggle, the chapter narrows its focus to UK government policy
to this perceived threat. It then further drills down to, identify the effects of
counter-terrorism (‘War on Terror’), on South Asian Muslim women living in
Britain, returning the focus from ideology to lived experiences in hegemony.
3.3.1 The ‘War on Terror’
The struggle for ideological hegemony is clear in the rhetoric and actions of the
UK government, in support of America’s second ‘War on Terror’. Events that led
to the proclamation of the so called ‘War’ in 2001 did not ‘suddenly become a
crucial issue’ (Chomsky, 2012: 81). However, the ‘success’ of the 9/11/2001
attacks (9/11) are generally accepted as changing American and British
(amongst other nations) response to terrorism dramatically. It presented the
world to ‘a new and frightening “age of Terror”’ (Ibid: 69), that was seen to require
a military response (coercion). In its most extreme representation, the ‘War on
Terror’ is seen as ‘the Fourth World War’, following the ‘Third World War’ against
the Soviet Union’ (Rogers, 2008: 172, see also Morris, 2012). The escalation of
terrorist violence, to the status of war, heightened anxiety and tensions in
British/Muslim relations.
9/11 took place eight years after the publication of Huntington’s ‘Clash’ thesis,
and could be seen to validate the prediction of civilizational conflict, between
Islam and the West. Huntington’s book ‘soared to the top of the best sellers list
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and became a salient source for explaining the attacks’ (Vertigans, 2010: 27).25
Important political markers such as the State of the Union address by George
W. Bush, in 2002, picked up themes in the ‘Clash’ thesis, such as the notion of
‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ nations (The Washington Post, 2002); indicating that
Huntington’s thesis had become intertwined in political rhetoric (Jackson, 2007)
and public thinking.
Huntington’s belief in the exclusivity of Islam and democracy (1996) appears to
have been accepted into the lexicon of the ‘War on Terror’, by those nations that
have taken up the call (Eatwell, 2010) to engage in this strange ‘war’ (Maria,
2014). Huntington further argued, controversially, that democracies seldom, if
ever, fight each other; a claim that has not been substantiated (Midlarsky, 1998;
Salter, 2002)26. The WVS27 concluded that democracy and Islam are not
mutually exclusive, finding equal levels of interest and belief in democratic
ideals, in both Islamic and non-Islamic societies (2003: 68, 69). The findings
indicate that, both Islamic and Judeo-Christian societies see democracy as the
best form of government. Despite these findings, notions of the incompatibility
of Islam and democracy continue to dominate public and political discourse, as
exemplified in the speech given by Donald Trump, the President of the United
States, in Warsaw 2017 (CNN Politics, 2017, quoted in Chapter One, 1.1).
Huntington’s thesis had become intertwined in political rhetoric (Jackson, 2007)
and public thinking. Using a temporal lens, the embeddedness of early
discourses of power, representing Muslims as irrational savages, find resonance
in the minds of the British and Western publics (Salter, 2002).
Huntington’s belief in the exclusivity of Islam and democracy (1996) appears to
have been accepted into the lexicon of the ‘War on Terror’ by those nations that
25 Neither can, the influence of Middle East historian Bernard Lewis be underestimated. Not only
were Lewis’ views sought after 9/11, and his book viewed as a handbook in the war against
Islamist terrorism, it is also suggested that, American policy-makers had no other perspective
to balance this view (Chomsky, 2003).
26 Midlarsky provides a wide range of examples of findings from studies that verify this point,
however she also makes the point that other studies challenge the universality of democratic
peace.
2727 The WVS is an extensive body of evidence involving more than seventy countries conducted
over 2 years (2000-2002).
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have taken up the call (Eatwell, 2010) to engage in this strange ‘war’ (Maria,
2014). The WVS (2003) disputes this pronouncement concluding that
democracy and Islam are not mutually exclusive. The survey found, equal levels
of interest and belief in, democratic ideals in both Islamic and non-Islamic
societies (2003: 68, 69). The findings indicate that both Islamic, and Judeo-
Christian, societies see democracy as the best form of government. Despite
findings such as these, notions of the incompatibility of Islam and democracy
continue to dominate public and political discourse, indicating another way in
which the separation between Muslim and Christian countries is being played
out. This is another example of the production, and function, of binary thinking
in ideological hegemony.
The ‘Clash’ thesis has left a legacy in the form of American and British foreign
and security policy (Chomsky, 2003; Erden, 2002; Hardt, 2004; Naugle, 2002;
Said 2001; Salter, 2002). George Bush’s (2002) address has been seen, by
statesmen in America, as signalling the current generation’s ‘Pearl Harbour’,
triggering a fundamental reorientation of foreign and security policy (Connor,
2012; Scott, 2008). The idea of civilizational conflict continues to resonate, in
the language used by Western politicians, despite disclaimers from the White
House and UK government (Salter, 2002). The president’s 2002 address can be
seen to set the tone; the speech opened with the line ‘the civilized world faces
unprecedented dangers’ – suggesting un-paralleled threat to ‘our’ civilized world
from an uncivilized ‘other’ (The Washington Post, 2002). In the UK Prime
Minister Tony Blair’s speech to the Labour Party conference just a month after
9/11 resonated a similar rhetoric. Blair said: ‘[t]hey have no moral inhibition on
the slaughter of the innocent…. There is no compromise possible with such
people, no meeting of minds, no point of understanding with such terror’ (BBC
News, 2001). This rhetoric is remarkably similar to that of the time of empire,
emphasising the brutality of the subordinate cultural entity, and therefore the
superiority of ‘our’ cultural mores (Said, 1978, Jackson, 2005; Salter, 2002).
9/11 ushered in the discourse of ‘new terrorism’, promoting a new threat from
Islam, and a further period of struggle. The notion of ‘new threat’ is seen by
scholars as being precautionary; Pantazis (2009), for example, evidences a shift
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in government security focus from the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and Irish
citizens, to Islamic terrorists, and Muslim citizens. There can be no question of
any government taking seriously the security of its citizens, however questions
have been raised about securitising all Muslims rather than targeting those who
pose a threat to the state and to the public (Hickman, 2011; Mythen, 2012;
Pantazis, 2009). The bombings on the London transport system on 7th of July
2005 (7/7) strengthened the UK government’s resolve for national security,
because the bombers were British citizens. At the policy level, the bombings
have shifted government’s focus away from international to “home-grown”
terrorism (Githens-Mazer, 2010: 789, see also Briggs, 2006; 2010; Thomas,
2009; 2010). From the perspective of survivors and family members of the
atrocities, the case that they had ‘endured unimaginable suffering in physical
and emotional terms’ (BBC News, 2007), continued to be made two years after
the bombings in 2007. It is not surprising, given that 52 people were killed and
800 injured, that those closely affected by the bombings remained dissatisfied
with public investigations.
Political rhetoric and policy direction, generate ‘cultural scripts’ (Furedi, 2007),
that shape public perceptions of fear, as does the media (see also Jackson,
2009). Representations of Muslim’s in the British press, at best, generate
confusion and, at worst, fear by codifying Muslim communities ambiguously; as
‘allies in the struggle against “extremists”, victims or potential victims of the
terrorists’ violence and of potential backlash, [and] under suspicion as they may
be harbouring or supporting extremists’ (Hickman, 2011: 3, see also Jackson
2009). We are reminded of Furedi’s (2007: no pagination) argument that, fear
‘does not just happen; it is socially constructed’, shaping anxieties, as well as
responses, to perceived threat. At worst, the juxtaposition of the ‘moderate
Muslim’ with the ‘Muslim extremist’ blurs the boundary between the law abiding
and the ‘extremist’ citizen shaping public perceptions and emotions about all
Muslims (Hickman, 2011; Jackson, 2009; Nickels, 2012; Spalek, 2008).
Poynting (2012) offers a different perspective on the cultural script, in suggesting
that new terrorism is abstracted from historic locations or contexts; it is
dislocated and decontextualized from ‘formative conditions of
violence….eradicat[ing] its socio-economic and political content’ (p. 6). In the
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process of depoliticising and de-historicising new terrorism it is rendered devoid
of history, context, or cause making it possible to represent perpetrators of new
terrorism ‘as occupying entirely different moral universes’ (Ibid.). This cultural
script constructs Islamic terrorism (and by proxy all Muslims), as frightening
‘others’ who engage in mindless violence for its own sake (Jackson, 2005;
Salter, 2002). The rhetoric of threat can be seen ‘in equal measure to unite and
divide’ (Guerrero, 2009). From this perspective, the popular (native) imagination
is united through the imagery of external threat, whilst simultaneously divided
from those who are perceived to present the threat. Put simply we ‘have a victim
(the West), a villain (terrorists), and a hero (the United States)’ (Gay, 2009). We
can replace the United States, in the quote from Gay, with the British state in the
UK context. Under the lens of temporality, in terms of the genealogy of
British/South Asian Muslim relations we can, not only hear echoes of imperial
discourse but, see the actuality of past fears in the present.
It may also be useful at this point to note Maria’s (2014) reminder that the ‘War
on Terror’ is no conventional war. It:
evokes a battle against an emotion or sentiment ….the figure of the
terrorist, like that of the monstrous other is “a regulatory construct of
modernity” deeply interwoven with “questions of culture and race” and an
“implicit index of civilizational development” (p. 61 citing Puar and Rai
2002: 119).
Maria’s depiction reminds us of the cultural script, and also of connotations of
the imperial ‘civilizing mission’, to regulate the belief systems of Muslims and
Hindu’s in India. In the present-day context, the public’s perception of the ‘War
on Terror’ is, at least in part, shaped by political and public depictions of Islam
as non-democratic and non-modern (Gay, 2009). It is in this national and
international context of Islam as ideologically different, and therefore perceived
as a threat, that the UK government responses to new terrorism has been
produced and reproduced.
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3.3.2 The UK government response to ‘new terrorism’
When viewed from the standpoint of post-War Europe, ‘new terrorism’ provides
an explicit focus on ideology. New terrorism is viewed as different from earlier
forms of terrorism, such as nationalist-separatist extremism, that were not seen
to threaten, or de-stabilise, Western politics and values (Eatwell, 2010; Pointing,
2012); however, new terrorism is seen to do just this, leading to questions about
how to respond to the new threat.
At 20:03 hours UK time on 9/11/2001, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair,
made a speech in which he said, we ‘here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder
with our American friends in this hour of tragedy and we like them will not rest
until this evil is driven from our world’ (BBC, 2001). This statement, and
subsequent government actions, committed Britain to George Bush’s stated
‘War on Terror’. The strategy included, passing terrorism-related legislation in
2001, 2005, 2006 and 2008 (Bleich, 2010; Brown, 2010). However, ‘new
terrorism’ was seen to require a more complex response, one that Morris (2012),
suggests makes it noteworthy, because it has integrated counter-insurgency
theory and techniques. This may well be because security experts declared
Islamist terrorism an unprecedented, and unpredictable, danger (Brown, 2010;
Heath-Kelly, 2012; Miller, 2012; Mythen, 2006; Poynting, 2012; Spalek, 2009).
The perceived nature of the threat required, for the first time, the coercive power
of military action (Rogers, 2008) as well as emergency powers; rather than
criminal and judicial responses alone. Under the lens of hegemony the balance
of coercion and consent weighted toward coercion.
The UK’s response is nevertheless played out at different levels, in public and
private, domains. At the micro level, counter-terrorisms reach has extended
beyond the public into the private sphere (Brown, 2010; Miller, 2012); at the
macro level it includes military action. The convergence, in the UK, of global and
local events; 9/11 and the earlier 2001 urban disturbances, precipitated concern
for organized ethno- and religious discontent, placing Muslims at the centre of
counter-terrorism responses. Critique of the disturbances led to an assessment
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of the ‘parallel lives’ of British Muslims (Cantel, 2001; 2004) and of the ‘social
apartheid’ experienced by Muslims who constitute the ‘poorest, large, single
minority group in Britain’ (Eatwell, 2010: 3). This realisation led to the adoption
of policies aimed at community cohesion through engagement; an approach that
continued after 9/11 and the London bombings in July 2005 (7/7) alongside
increased security based policies (Eatwell, 2010; O’Toole, 2012; Thomas, 2009;
2010). Counter-insurgency strategies also view community engagement as
essential for intelligence gathering in order to pre-empt grievances developing
into ‘terrorist-linked subversion’ (Miller, 2012). Whilst no direct link has been
made between the 2001 disturbances and 9/11 more recent studies have
evidenced the discontent of young Muslims as strong ‘push’ factors for joining
violent Islamist groups such as ISIS (Islamic State in Syria) (Briggs, 2014;
Saltman, 2015).
The UK response is complex, involving the pursuit of terrorists; stopping terrorist
attacks from taking place, as well as preventing terrorism; winning the ‘hearts
and minds’ (CLG, 2007) of the Muslim community. Problematically these
measures affect Muslim communities indiscriminately, rather than targeting
those who might be involved in terrorists activities (Miller, 2012). Miller et al.,
suggest that this is not an ‘unpleasant by-product of mistakes, ignorance or
arrogance’ (Ibid: 13) on the part of government. Miller et al. (2012) argue that
the targeting of all Muslims has been ‘created intentionally and purposefully to
coerce and instil fear within the Muslim community… based on the theory and
practice of counter-insurgency’28 (Ibid: 13). Here the intermixing of coercion and
consent at the heart of UK government counter-terrorism policy is evident.
Interestingly, this is not how thinking about counter-terrorism in the UK started.
Singh (2016) notes that David Omand, the ‘instigator of the original version of
28 Counter-insurgency is a military doctrine developed to deal with small wars and insurgency
or guerrilla campaigns. It emphasises military-civilian cooperation,
communications/intelligence gathering, exceptional and emergency legislation and pre-
emptive controls.
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CONTEST’ (p. 22) saw the UK strategy as contrasting with the US approach
premised on America being ‘at war’, while the British team ‘“contended the
opposite, that for the UK, the strategic objective – in 2002-03 and for the next 5
years ….was normality”’ (Ibid.). Omand is also noted to say that, notions of the
need to promote ‘“British values”, including equality for women, however
justified, were not an explicit part of the CONTEST strategy to prevent violent
extremism…Policing is about upholding the criminal law, not about policing
some concept of ”Britishness”’ (Ibid.). Returning briefly to Omand’s suggestion
of ‘normality’; from the historic tracing undertaken for this thesis, normality might
not be as benign as it seems. Normality suggests the uninterrupted undercurrent
of faith and race/hate, if not an escalation of anxiety about faith and race
difference. Additionally, it is possible to see that, whilst counter-insurgency
theorists suggest, a more deliberate focus on control over people and
environments, counter-terrorism experts (such as Omand) do not. Policy
appears, if Omand was correct, to have slipped from the objective of multi-
cultural ‘normality’ to hegemonic notions of imposed British values and
Britishness, as will become apparent, in the policy slippage explored in the
following section, on the UK’s CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy.
3.4 CONTEST – the UK’s counter terrorism strategy
From its inception, it is possible to identify tensions in the design and
implementation of CONTEST, between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ outcomes. Produced in
2003, and made public in 2006, (Briggs, 2006; Birt, 2009; Brown, 2010; Singh,
2016) the strategy can be seen to reflect the insurgency theory approach, in that
it addresses macro level security issues alongside micro level intelligence
gathering, in communities. The point made earlier, that CONTEST has extended
the boundary of counter-terrorism policy into the private sphere, has largely
been undertaken through its ‘Prevent’ strand (Miller, 2012: 15; see also Brown,
2010: 173; Singh, 2016: 34). The overall strategy is complex, comprising dual
objectives; to repress violence and to accommodate ‘moderate’ or ‘acceptable’
forms of Islam (Bleich, 2010). The latter of these has clear roots in imperialist
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hegemonic thinking. The strategy has a broad base encompassing four themes
(also known as the 4Ps) to:
- Prevent terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals;
- Pursue terrorists (and those who sponsor them);
- Protect the public, key national services, and UK interests oversees; and
- Prepare for the consequences of terrorism (Briggs, 2006: 24).
Described by Bleich (2010) as a ‘stick and carrot’ approach; the ‘stick’ or
‘hard/security’ aspect is embodied in the Pursue strand, whilst the ‘carrot’ or
‘soft/accommodation’ aspect is embodied in Prevent (Ibid: 76). The Prevent
aspect is particularly interesting because it positions all Muslims, including South
Asian Muslim women, as members of ‘risky’ or, in counter-insurgency parlance
as, ‘subversive’ communities. It is the construction of Islam (and therefore of its
believers) as ‘risky’ and ‘subversive’ that this investigation contributes to South
Asian Muslim women’s experience of the ‘War on Terror’ as adversity as will be
evidenced in 3.5.
Successive governments’ have retained the dual objectives, and the 4Ps
through three iterations of CONTEST, rather than treat the threat of terrorism as
a matter for policing and for the criminal justice system (Miller, 2012; Singh,
2016). The rationale for this was stated in the first countering terrorism strategy
which noted the importance of:
…understanding how terrorist groups recruit new members […and that]
radicalising factors include the development of a sense of grievance and
injustice…. Another potential factor is a sense of personal alienation or
community disadvantage, arising from socioeconomic factors such as
discrimination, social exclusion, and lack of opportunity (HM
Government, 2006: 9, 10).
Thus, from its inception CONTEST has recognised potential links between
grievances, perceived injustices, alienation and vulnerability to recruitment by
terrorist groups. However, a counter-insurgency approach is not focused on
addressing grievances and perceived injustices, whilst a cohesion and
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integration approach could be. It could be argued that at the centre of CONTEST
there lies a tension between governments knowing about, and addressing, the
grievances of British Muslims.
It is also argued, that a dual objective strategy, requires balance between both
aspects of the duality (Birt, 2009). This was found to be missing in the early
implementation of CONTEST. The House of Commons, Home Affairs Select
Committee (April 2005), found that too much emphasis had been placed on
Pursue; ‘hard’ (police and judicial powers), at the expense of community
engagement and prevention. The outcome Miller (2012) suggests is to instil fear
in the Muslim community, whilst Briggs (2006) and Spalek (2009) suggest that
government had failed to learn the importance of community intelligence
gathering from previous counter-terrorism experiences, such as those in
Northern Ireland. The neglect of community engagement and integration, as
functions of counter-terrorism, as well as functions in their own right, has been
voiced as a matter of concern by a number of scholars including Birt (2009),
Spalek (2008; 2009; 2010a), and Thomas (2010).
Additionally, it is argued that the failure of CONTEST to address non-Islamic
forms of violent extremism, such as that promoted by the British National Party,
(BNP) (Thomas. 2009; 2010; Birt, 2009; Bleich, 2010; Goodwin, 2010; Spalek,
2010a) may contribute to the perception of Muslims as terrorists. Eatwell et al.,
for example note that the BNP has enjoyed growing electoral success even as,
since 2001, it ‘has increasingly sought to demonise Islam’ (2010: 6) with little
intervention from government. CONTEST 3 (2011) has made some changes to
address this short-fall however, its stated focus remains on Islamist terrorism
(Heath-Kelly, 2013). The following section focuses on the role of the Prevent
strand of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, as the main policy vehicle for
integration, and through which, the struggle for ideological supremacy is most
apparent. It is worthy of note that in CONTEST, Gramsci’s notion of the dominant
class seeking to extend its ideology through means of coercion and/or consent,
is writ large.
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3.4.1 Prevent
Bartlett (2010), suggests that ‘[c]ompared with other countries’ counter-terrorism
strategies, Prevent is unique in its extensiveness and level of ambition’ (p. 10).
This quote sets the context for a complex and iterative response to preventing
the threat posed by ‘new terrorism’. Prevent has faced criticism throughout its
implementation (Briggs, 2006; Singh, 2016; Thomas, 2010). A year after the
launch of Preventing Extremism Together (PET) initiative, a report by Briggs
(2006) indicated that PET may have worsened relations between government
and Muslim communities, rather than build bridges (p. 26). It was found to be ill
thought through, rushed (consultation was completed in three months), and
demonstrated a lack of understanding by civil servants of Islam (meetings with
community members were scheduled during the Islamic holy month of
Ramadan). Questions were also raised about the capacity of the (largely older
male) community members engaged in PET, to represent all members of Muslim
communities, particularly women and young people.
Prevent was first mentioned in the 2006 CONTEST strategy concerned with
tackling the radicalisation of individuals through three key objectives; tackling
disadvantage, deterring those who facilitate terrorism, and challenging the use
of extremist or violent ideologies (HM Government, 2006). The relaunch of
Prevent in April 2007, by the Department for Communities and Local
Government (CLG), as the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and
Minds’ (PVE) strategy, addressed earlier operational concerns. For example, to
develop engagement structures through which Muslim women’s, young peoples
and religious leader’s views could be heard (Harding, 2008; Kundnani, 2009;
Lowndes, 2010; O’Toole, 2012; Spalek, 2010a). The PVE action plan was
accompanied by a PVE fund, as the prototype for future years. The fund sought
to deliver community based programmes, to achieve the objectives of,
promoting shared values, supporting local solutions, building civic capacity and
leadership, and strengthening the role of faith institutions and leaders.
Significantly, the focus of Prevent shifted from, ‘inequality, discrimination and
deprivation’, to ‘an ideological campaign’ (Kundnani, 2009: 11). Indeed, scholars
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have made the case that a focus on winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of British
Muslims, can be viewed as a strategy to, reform the attitudes and practices of
British Muslims, rather than a strategy to build cohesive pluralism (O’Toole,
2012; Spalek, 2009a; Thomas 2009). This point is important to this thesis, as it
epitomises the struggle for ideological dominance, rather than allowing space
for differences (as opposed to terrorism) to coexist.
The novelty of an engagement approach, alongside a focus on ‘Islamic
extremism’, led Thomas to describe Prevent as ‘failed and friendless’, but also
as a ‘flawed but arguably [a] constructive British approach’ to the complex
problem of ‘new terrorism’ (2010: 455). It is, for example, interesting to note that,
other European nations (France, Spain, and Portugal) have not incorporated
community engagement to the same extent in counter-terrorism strategies
(O’Toole, 2012). ‘Flawed’ aspects of the strategy include the targeting of Prevent
funding geographically, at areas with Muslim populations of 4,000 or more
(Thomas, 2010). Spatial, as opposed to threat or intelligence based, targeting
exposes the danger of conflating security and cohesion/integration activity.
Kundnani (2009) acknowledges that, it is appropriate to place Muslim individuals
who are suspected of engagement in criminality under surveillance, but that it is
less clear why Prevent-funded organisations have been required to provide
intelligence that is not always of a criminal nature. The blurring of boundaries
between the Protect and Prevent aspects of CONTEST has been criticised as
counter-productive, partly because it perpetuates the idea that all Muslims form
a risk to security (Kundnani, 2009; O’Toole, 2012; Spalek, 2009a). A further
difficultly involves, neglect by successive governments’ to address the key
issues of poverty experienced by Muslim communities or their concerns for
foreign policy.
In these objectives we can see the further embedding of an ideological emphasis
in the ill-defined notion of Islamic ‘extremism’. The CLG, House of Commons
Committee (2010), recommended that ‘the Government take steps to clarify its
understanding of the terms ‘“violent extremism”, “extremism and “radicalisation”’
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noting that ‘holding extreme views is not illegal’ (p. 64). Findings from research,
undertaken by Spalek et al., (2009a) indicate that, under Prevent a wide range
of factors fall within notions of ‘radical’. The authors found, for example, that
‘political activism, narrow interpretations of the Qur’an, travelling abroad,
glorification of martyrdom and martyrs, alongside other factors’ (Spalek, 2009:
128), were being propagated as signs of individual’s movement towards violent
extremism. The authors add that, it is ‘possible to cast suspicion over any
individual as the range of factors is so broad and encompasses majority rather
than minority Muslim and other populations’ (p. 218). In particular these scholars
suggest, that CONTEST 2 has created a new dichotomy ‘in which Muslims are
subject to categorisation into “moderates” and “radicals”’ (p.129). The danger,
they suggest, lies in making judgements over which Islamic practices are
deemed to constitute legitimate (‘moderate’) or illegitimate (‘radical’) practice.
The effect being, that government ‘appears to be attempting to control and
influence the ways in which Muslim identities and practices are to be expressed
in British society’ (p. 130). Githens-Mazer et al., (2010), also express concern
that term’s such as ‘radicalisation’, in counter-terrorism discourse, have been
accepted as popular ‘conventional wisdom’ without clarification of their meaning.
These are important points for the objective of this investigation, as they suggest
a deepening of intent, by a Christian host, to manage Islamic identity.
In July 2011 the new coalition government, announced a new Prevent strategy.
The strategy was heralded by Allen (2011) as ‘regurgitated ideas’ that did not
instil confidence that the new government had engaged in new thinking (2011).
The overhaul of Prevent led to the following three strategic objectives to:
(i) respond to ‘the ideological challenge of terrorism’;
(ii) prevent ‘people from being drawn into terrorism’; and
(iii) work with ‘sectors and institutions’ (H.M. Government, 2011a: 6).
The first objective of Prevent is of particular interest, as it formally extends the
reach of Prevent to forms of non-violent religious-cultural activities. Githens-
Mazer et al., (2010) suggest that the conventional wisdom of radicalization, boils
down, largely, to the assertion that Islamic difference ‘among Muslim
communities has the dangerous potential to mutate issues of differing identities
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into support for violent “Islamo-fascism”’ (p. 890). The explicit incorporation of
non-violent ‘extremism’ in the remit of Prevent can be seen, at best, to use
Prevent to encourage, and at worst to enforce, assimilation to Western norms
and behaviours, intimating a binary rather than pluralistic politic (Spalek, 2009)
and a shrinking or ‘hollowing out’ of aspects of democratic values (Brown, 2015).
Indeed, the strategy states that government: ‘will not work with extremist
organisations that oppose our values of universal human rights, equality before
the law and democracy and full participation in our society’ (HM Government,
2011a, emphasis added) reinforcing the binary of ‘with us’ or ‘against us’.
The importance of promoting human rights values cannot be disputed, however,
questions remain about the basis on which value judgements are made by state
institutions. A robust assimilationist approach raises concerns over the potential
of exclusivity based on Western/Christian normative values; values that lead to
the stigmatisation of other (Muslim) identities and normative behaviours, as anti-
social and extreme (Spalek, 2009; Githens-Mazer, 2010). Singh (2016) makes
the socio-legal case that ‘[p]revents overly broad and vague definition of “non-
violent extremism” creates the potential for systemic human rights abuses’
(p.16). Hence, analysists suggest that, in the name of upholding the principles
of democracy and human rights, the UK government may be in danger of
violating the human rights of Muslim’s in Britain.
Questions have also been raised about the potentially negative effects of
extending the label of ‘threat’ to non-violent Muslim groups, as it reduces
opportunities for the state to engage with Islamic organisations (Githens-Mazer,
2010; O’Toole, 2012; Spalek, 2010). Evidence suggests that, the opposite may
be the case; that ‘[t]errorism decreases as the potential for radical collective
action increases’. (Crenshaw, 2011: 15; Githens-Mazer, 2010; Spalek, 2009).
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Indeed Spalek et al.,29 indicate that involving groups deemed to be ‘extreme’,
but non-violent, should be ‘a logical continuum of the post 7/7 drive to support
community led’ approaches (2009: 126) to counter terrorism. Githens-Mazer et
al., found that policy ‘[a]pproaches that emphasize specific forms of Islamic
ideology or theology as causal “mood music” for terrorism are, at best,
existentializing red herrings that are prone to miss the point’ (2010: 899). The
point being that, counter-terrorism policy should counter the threat of terrorism
rather than ‘reshap[e] the cultural identities of Muslims to be more pro-Western’
(Kundnani, 2009: 39).
The analysis outlined above suggests that, security policy, views Islam itself as
a threat, requiring the state to control the cultural practices of Muslims. In relation
to countering-terrorism, the question becomes one of the effectiveness of
apparently ideologically driven policy. Whilst the effectiveness of counter-
terrorism strategy is not the focus of this thesis, the discussion emphasises the
deployment of ideology in counter-terrorism, to strengthen the case that the ‘War
on Terror’ has a clearly ideological dimension. In doing so it highlights a further
moment in which ideological domination and struggle in British/South Asian-
Muslim relations is apparent.
3.4.2 The notion of ‘shared values’
The idea of ‘shared values’ has become a central theme in Prevent; it highlights
the battle for ideological superiority. British values are describes as, ‘universal
human rights, equality before the law, democracy and full participation in our
society’ (HM Government, 2011a). In analysing the concept of shared values,
(on which the normative notion of radicalisation is premised), Spalek (2009),
suggests that CONTEST 2 might be viewed as constructed in the West’s project
of globalisation and war on pluralism. This is worrying, as it suggests, that UK
29 The research investigation was titled ‘An examination of partnership approaches to
challenging religiously-endorsed violence involving Muslims groups and police’ (cited in
Spalek, 2010 and 2013).
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counter-terrorism policy is failing to reach its (and the West’s), ambition of plural
liberal democracy (Brown, 2015). The ‘War on Terror’, in this frame, can be seen
to: ‘target and alienate those communities viewed as being opposed to [the]
Western modernisation’ project (p. 128). The effect, at the micro level, is to
construct normative Muslim behaviours as radical, anti-social and extreme (Ibid:
124).
An example of the imposition of Western ideological assumption, is evident in
the aim of the fund in the guidance; to support work that produces a
‘demonstrable change in attitudes among Muslims’ (CLG, 2007). This objective
could be viewed as, governance seeking to reform the values and attitudes of
British Muslims, as a whole; suggesting the need to change them, and, alienate
Muslim citizens who object to being ‘changed’ (O’Toole, 2012: 377). Here, again,
it is possible to see the struggle for domination through coercion in government
policy. And, the explicit intent to win British Muslims over to forms of Islam that
is acceptable to the government.
Ideologically loaded language, such as ‘radical’, and ‘extreme’, in relation to
Islam (Richards, 2011), serve to emphasise difference between Islamic and
British values, in counter-terrorism. Heath-Kelly (2012), makes the case that the
term ‘radicalisation’, viewed as the (yet unproven) driver of terrorism, can be
used to underpin the governance of risk pre-emptively, making it ‘possible for
British counter-terrorism to act upon futurity’ (Ibid: 398). Guilty before proven,
renders all Muslims as dangerous. The discourse of ‘prevention’, in this frame,
presumes risk on the basis of difference. It adds weight to the perception of
Muslims as ‘risky’ because they do not appear to share British ways, and values.
The exclusion of non-Islamic extremists, such as, the Far Right, from Prevent,
might be seen to reinforce the focus of Prevent on ‘Islamic terrorism’. This focus
has remained consistent, with a ‘cursory’ reference to ‘other’ forms of extremism
(Kundnani, 2009: 24). Commentators suggest that, the challenge of, Far Right
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extremism can be viewed as damaging to democracy (Eatwell, 2010: 1); a
modernized BNP has been ‘careful to publicly reject violence and downplay links
with the extremist fringe’ (Bleich, 2010; Eatwell, 2010). A culture of violence
surrounds the party, with numerous examples of BNP involvement in incidents
of terror. These include nail bomb attacks that have killed people, the discovery
of a haul of 300 weapons, 80 bombs in 2007, and reports of physical attacks on
Asian people. Bleich (2010) suggests, that despite the BNPs ‘claims of sidelining
extremist elements [it] simply cannot, for organizational reasons, fully purge its
membership base’ (p. 183). Eatwell et al., suggest the risk of ‘cumulative
extremism….the way in which one form of extremist [activity] could spark off a
spiral’ (2010: 7), a potential, the authors suggest should not be overlooked, in
relation to the extreme right, and one that has been evidenced in relation to
attacks on Muslim women (Littler, 2015). Nor should, the transnational links of
Far Right organisations, to groups in Europe, American, and South Africa such,
be underestimated, (Bleich, 2010; Eatwell, 2010). These scholars suggest that,
the extreme right and Islamists pose notable threats to liberal democratic
political order, as we know it. The British state, has found it difficult to include
BNP incidents, intents, and plans as terrorism.
This exploration of ‘British values’, in counter-terrorism, emphasises the political
and ideological emphasis in counter-terrorism. In doing so, it foregrounds
heightened anxiety about the loss of British values and ideology by the state.
3.5 Gender and counter-terrorism
It is accepted, amongst feminist and other scholars, that counter-terrorism policy
is focused on Muslim men, and Muslim women are left outside this policy frame
(Brown, 2016; Huckerby, 2012; Nì Aolàni, 2013). This does not mean that
Muslim women are not affected by, or implicated in, the UK’s counter-terrorism
strategy. The ‘oft-unspoken assumption that counter-terrorism
disproportionately affects men’ (Huckerby, 2012: 1), obscures women’s
experience of terrorism, and counter-terrorism (Brown, 2016; Nì Aolàni, 2013).
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Counter-terrorism policy, at the national level, largely ignores women (Brown,
2013; Huckerby, 2012; Lewicki, 2016; Nì Aolàni, 2013). Nì Aolàni (2013) notes
that, women remain in the margin of ‘the conversations in which definitions of
security are agreed’, and peripheral to the institutional settings in which security
frameworks are implemented as policy and law (p. 1086). Framing women in the
margin of counter-terrorisms concerns, may explain why women are
constructed, in counter-terrorism, simultaneously, as having the capacity, and
power, to influence men (to save them from radicalization), and as having no
power, in a fiercely patriarchal, or hyper-patriarchal culture (needing to be saved
from them) (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Brown, 2016; Huckerby, 2012; Lewicki, 2016;
Pratt, 2012; Rashid, 2013). If we accept these representations, Muslim women’s
visibility is fundamentally contradictory, and their invisibility troublesome. When
viewed through the lens of hegemony, it is possible to see this contradiction as
serving a purpose; to reinforce the supremacy of Western/British ideology over
Islam.
These representations divert attention from, or obscure, the adverse effects of
the ‘War on Terror’ and counter-terrorism, on Muslim women in Britain. These
representations signal that women’s equality is symptomatic of British values,
and inequality is ‘indicative of dangerous [Islamic] ideologies’ (Huckerby, 2012:
6). In these representations, Muslim women are either denied a subjective
experience of counter terrorism, or objectified, to endorse Western ideological
supremacist tropes of gender equality. Furthermore, Nì Aolàni (2013) contends,
that little attention has been paid, by either national security, or feminist scholars,
to the ‘gendered hue’ of apparently neutral antiterrorist laws, and their effects on
women (p.1087, Jackson, 2005). This omission makes it particularly important
to address the impacts of the ‘War on Terror’, and counter-terrorism, on South
Asian Muslim women.
The following paragraphs uncover ways in which Muslim women are directly,
implicated in, and affected by, counter-terrorism. The argument is that the
absence, and/or misrepresentation, of Muslim women in counter-terrorism,
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symbolises processes of hegemony. Under the lens of hegemony,
representations by the dominant group are given primacy, to influence, and win
over, the thinking/consent of the populace.
3.5.1 Muslim women – pawns in the struggle for ideological
supremacy?
This section of the thesis draws, firstly, on information related to the UK
government’s insistence on ‘moderating’ Islam, and its attempts to draw Muslim
women in Britain into the counter-terrorism policy frame through its ‘de-
radicalizing’ project. Secondly, it uses data from counter-terrorism experiences
in Norther Ireland, alongside UK statistics, to suggest that Muslim women are
directly affected by the use of emergency powers, directed at men, in home
searches. These affects, this thesis argues, add to the fear, and spread of fear,
experienced by Muslim women.
Muslim women’s visibility in the political frame of counter-terrorism; to join the
state to de-radicalize Muslim men, can be viewed as constraining, and as
offering opportunities, to Muslim women in Britain. Two important points are
made clear in the following text; firstly, that under the lens of hegemony, coercion
and consent are apparent in government’s attempts to co-opt Muslim women
into its imperative to ‘modernise’ or ‘moderate’ Islam; and, secondly, that Muslim
women are affected by coercive emergency powers enacted in the ‘War on
Terror’. The following sections address the constraints first, and then
opportunities for Muslim women in visibility in counter-terrorism.
3.5.2 Constraints on Muslim women of political visibility
The notion of ‘radicalization’ plays a central part in positioning Muslim women in
the ‘radical’ or ‘moderate’ Muslim debate. The earlier discussion, on shared
values (3.4.2), notes that state intervention is based on the premise that
‘radicalization’ is constructed as, an almost inevitable, facilitator of terrorism’
(Brown, 2014: 37; Githens-Mazer, 2010`), legitimizing intervention in public and
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private spheres. Women have been enlisted in counter-terrorism through, ‘soft’
counter-radicalization measures, in the Prevent strand of counter-terrorism, to
work with the UK government to manage the risk of radicalization. Through
capacity, and resilience building, programmes in Prevent, Muslim women are
invited to ‘engage in generalized social regulation in attempts to minimise risks
to the state’ (Brown, 2014: 38); that is, to reduce radicalization. Whilst women
are not singularly called on in the strategy, there is ample evidence of political
leaders calling specifically on Muslim women to use their femininity, to regulate
Muslim men’s behaviours. New Labour, in 2008, for example, viewed women as
‘an untapped potential’ on which it could draw to counter the radicalization of
young men (Allen, 2012; Brown, 2008; Crown Copyright, 2008; Winnett, 2008).
Whilst Lord Carlile, independent overseer of the Prevent review 2011, is noted
to have said that ‘women are more moderate, non-violent and have the
appearance of more neutrality in ways that make them “safe friends” for
government’ (Huckerby, 2012: 7), and in 2014, the then Home Secretary,
Theresa May, called on British Muslim women to challenge extremism. May
stated that she ‘truly believed that as women, as mothers, sisters and daughters
[Muslim women] have a unique and powerful role to play in helping to combat
the extremist challenge’ (Sanghani, 2014). In framing Muslim women as safe
de-radicalizing friends of government, Muslim women become ‘the litmus test of
British values’ (Huckerby, 2012: 6); bringing a gender stereotypical view of
Muslims women (as expressed by Lord Carlile in 2011) to the centre of this,
ideologically driven aspect, of counter-terrorism policy (Brown, 2008; 2013;
Huckerby, 2012; Nί Aolᾀin, 2014). Thus, amidst the ‘noise’ of counter-terrorism, 
the visibility and purpose afforded to Muslim women has a regulatory function in
service of others; women’s visibility in counter-terrorism does not, in this frame,
bring their concerns into the political frame.
The ‘War on Terror’, then, has been, and continues to be, enacted in the wider
political frame of ‘responsibilizing’ communities to manage risk (Bracke, 2016;
Bottrell, 2009; Hardy, 2015; Spalek, 2009; 2013 Ungar, 2005). In this frame,
responsibility is transferred for de-radicalizing Muslim men, to Muslim women,
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as part of the increasing shift from ‘governing’ to ‘governance’ (Bracke, 2016).
Additionally, and importantly, from a modern- imperialist perspective, it is argued
that the dominant group requires ‘the support of native informers30’ (Akbar, 2014:
166; Bhaba, 1994). In this frame, government requires ‘native informers’ to
denounce radical Islam and to model modern, secular and Westernized Islam
(Akbar, 2014). Under the lens of hegemony, the enlistment of women, to join the
hegemonic project of modernising Islam, requires a class or group similar to
Gramsci’s ‘intellectual’ (2007: 5-25) to teach the new, and acceptable behaviour.
Enlisting Muslim women in Britain, in the states de-radicalization, or civilizing,
project raises complex issues for women; it juxtaposes their perceived
vulnerability to extreme Islamic patriarch, with the liberal freedoms of Western
democracy, whilst linking their inequality with radicalisation. A clear
demonstration of this thinking is evident in a speech given by Prime Minister,
David Cameron, in January 2016. In the speech, Cameron links Muslim
women’s lack of equality, and specifically, their failure to speak English, with
Muslim men’s ‘slide towards radicalisation and extremism’ (Prime Minister’s
Office, 2016). Cameron said ‘it is necessary to confront the Muslim men, whose
“backward attitudes” exert “damaging control” over women in their families’
(Ibid.). Lewicki and O’Toole (2016), interpret these views as ‘echo[ing] dominant
themes that characterize Muslim women as especially vulnerable to patriarchal
practices and manipulation by terrorist ideologies’ (2016: 1, 2).
Linking English language with Islamist radicalization, has been challenged as
conflating separate issues, and at the same time reinforcing British values; the
suggestion being, that learning English will make women more British. Brown
(2014) suggests that the underlying assumption is that, once ‘liberated’ (by
speaking English), Muslim women will join the state to save Muslim males from
radicalization. There is a dual assumption at play; of women’s disempowerment
(in Muslim communities), and their loyalty (to the British state) (Ibid.). The
30 In the case of managing economic reform in India in the 18th and 18th centuries upper cast
Hindu’s played this role (see 3.2)
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assumption is made, at least in part, on the perception that Muslim women bear
witness, in their day-to-day lives, to a liberal ‘Britishness’ in their educational
success. The resulting logic is that, ‘[t]hey, more than their male relatives have
benefited from becoming “British,” which is interpreted [by the state] to mean
that they have been liberated from primitive cultural practices’ (Ibid: 42). From
this perspective, ‘liberated’ Muslim women have a shared interest, with the
British state, in ‘modernising’ and ‘liberating’ Islam (Akbar, 2014; Brown, 2014).
This binary denies Muslim women’s positions of hybridity; of being engaged in
‘Western’ and ‘Islamic’ ways of thought, behaviour and ideology. It denies
Muslim women’s various positions; between the labels of ‘saviour’ and ‘victim’.
In total it denies Muslim women’s right to be themselves.
Additionally, the notion of Islam as an illiberal and gender constraining social
order, powerfully characterises Islam as ‘bad’ (radical) requiring, in this logic, to
be liberated by Muslim women to generate ‘good’ (moderate) Islam. A number
of tensions flow from this logic; firstly, there is a lack of clarity in the terminology
used. Secondly, there is the assumption of women’s intent to change Islam (Birt,
2009; Brown, 2008; Jackson, 2011; Mamdani, 2002). Thirdly, the explicit
hegemonic binary logics of good/bad, radical/moderate, constrained/liberated
characterise the very opposite of the logics of hybridity; in terms of resistance
and transformation, under the lens of hegemony, the tension is in the
inhabitation of both sets of logic or the central dialectic of hegemony, namely the
dialectic of domination and subjugation.
Muslim women’s visibility in counter-terrorism, positions them between ill-
defined ‘bad’ Islam and ‘good’ liberal democracy, with little consideration of the
multiple positions in-between that they occupy. Furthermore, Muslim women’s
positioning is based on Western hegemonic assumptions rather than being
developed in dialogue with Muslim women. As one Muslim woman community
leader said in interview ‘we want to do something about these things
[radicalization], it isn’t like we don’t, but we don’t want to be separated’ (Shazia,
research participant, 2013).
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3.5.3 Opportunities for women in political visibility
Within the constraints outlined in the previous section, Muslim women’s visibility
in policy, also offers opportunities, through Prevent, for funding women’s
projects, and, to decision makers. State funding to build community capacity is
however not ‘without controversy’ (Briggs, 2010: 274; see also Brown, 2013).
Not least, because it securitizes state/Muslim relations rather building relations
to address social justice needs (Briggs, 2010). Additionally, acceptance of state
funding, in the context of the ‘War on Terror’, has raised question of trust within
Muslim communities. There is, for example, evidence of state funded groups
losing the confidence of the communities they serve, because they are seen to
have a ‘parallel agenda’ (Ibid: 60), in the ‘surveillance of Muslim populations’
(O’Toole, 2012: 374; Birt, 2009; Kundnani, 2009). The perception that Prevent
encourages Muslims to spy on other Muslims has not been uncommon, as
articulated by the Muslim Council of Britain: ‘[t]he government first wanted our
imams to act as spies on young British Muslims and now they seem to want
Muslim women to do the same’ (Winnett, 2008). Similar points have been made
by Huckerby, 2012, Spalek, 2013, and Thompson, 2010. From this perspective,
opportunities for Muslim women’s organisations to gain state funding, through
Prevent, places them in the dilemma of being seen to be co-opted into the state’s
counter-terrorism strategy.
The benefits for women include the growth in women’s organisations; in 2005
there were few formally constituted Muslim women’s organisations in the UK
(Briggs, 2010: 274). This has changed, at least in part, as a result of state
funding. Through Prevent 103 payments were made between 2007 and 2009 to
counter-radicalization projects (Ibid; see also Brown, 2014; Huckerby, 2012).
Funding for women’s empowerment and leadership programmes can therefore
be viewed as expanding women’s formal networks (Brown, 2014; see also
Lewicki, 2016). Blurred boundaries, between integration and radicalization, in
CONTEST appear to have opened up opportunities for women. Huckerby,
quotes a former Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Prevent officer,
who said that: ‘a small number of women’s projects have successfully discussed
some Prevent issues and the root causes of radicalization [but] the majority of
112
women’s projects have tended to focus on areas such as community barriers,
access to services, education and the arts’ (Huckerby, 2012: 4). These activities
strengthen women’s networks, but appear to do little directly non-radicalization
work.
There is general agreement, amongst scholars, that Prevent has promoted
Muslim women’s empowerment and inclusion (Brown, 2014; Huckerby, 2012;
Lewicki, 2012), whilst failing to realise full representation of either Muslim
women’s concerns, or Muslim women’s engagement (Huckerby, 2012: 11). This
echoes the point made in the last section; that Muslim women in Britain remain
in the margin of policy. Additionally, funding through counter-terrorism policy,
reinforces the idea that Muslim women are vulnerable in extreme Islamic
patriarchy, requiring them to be supported, through capacity and empowerment
programmes. This raises the dilemma for Muslim women of accepting state
funding, which may be essential to their work in Muslim communities, and risk
being seen to be disloyal to communities, or refusing state funding with the
potential for the work not taking place.
Lewicki (2016), notes that Prevent can be seen to bring a ‘significant number of
[Muslim] women into civic and political life’ (p. 8; see also Huckerby, 2012). This
has enabled some women to ‘challenge both “the political strictures imposed by
male community leaders” and their exclusion from mainstream institutions’
(Lewicki, 2016: 8). It would appear, that some Muslim women, aware of the
essentialised identity ascribed to them, accept state funding and political
engagement, as a way to challenge the constraints imposed by the institutions
funding them. These data suggest that, whilst counter-terrorism continues to
portray Muslim women in abstract and malleable forms, Prevent offers the
opportunity for Muslim women to refute these constructions. The strategies
adopted by women demonstrate, under a Gramscian conception of hegemony,
the inability of the dominant structure to fully win over the subaltern. This is an
important point; it positions Muslim women between ideologies, rather than fully
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embedded in one or the other; a position of hybridity as resistance and
transformation.
Prevent offered opportunities for Muslim women to have direct access to
government officials and departments, specifically to CLG and the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO). Funding also enabled Muslim women to access
local state institutions such as the police and local government. However, the
narrowing of funding criteria, under Prevent in 2011, marked a shift in Prevents
funding, from integration and resilience building, in the separation of cohesion
and integration work from the prevention of violent extremism. This was not a
‘strict requirement’ of Prevent (Hardy, 2015), suggesting that some funding
remains available for Muslim women to access, to undertake work on community
cohesion.
There is general agreement, Prevent has promoted work on Muslim women’s
empowerment and inclusion (Brown, 2014; Huckerby, 2012; Lewicki, 2012),
whilst, failing to realise Muslim women’s representation, engagement, or
concerns (Huckerby, 2012: 11). Counter-terrorism continues to reinforce the
idea, that Muslim women are vulnerable to extreme oppression, in extreme
Islamic patriarchy. The lack of change, in the state’s representation of Muslim
women, suggests that Muslim women’s engagement with the state, through
funding, has not brought them to the centre; it has not influenced policy. From
this perspective, Muslim women remain in the margin of counter-terrorism
policy. There are two important points to be made in summary; firstly, at the level
of engagement and empowerment, Muslim women appear to have benefitted
from Prevent funding. Secondly, engagement with the state appears not, at this
stage, to have changed dominant perceptions and views of Muslim women, nor
has engagement brought women, in their own right, into the counter-terrorism
policy frame. From the perspective of hegemony, the dominant narrative
continues to influence Christian, or non-Muslim, populations. However, as noted
by Brown (2013) even as this thesis is being written, perceptions of Muslim
women in Britain are changing, through other representations of Muslim women,
114
such as the Muslim women’s power list, that presents Muslim women as ‘“more
than” victims of patriarchal communities… [or] pawns of the state’ (:np.).
3.5.4 Women’s invisibility in counter-terrorism
The discussion thus far, has highlighted, the complex position of Muslim women,
including South Asian Muslim women, in the margins of soft counter-terrorism.
Muslim women are also affected by hard counter-terrorism ‘create[ing] further
insecurity in women’s lives’ (Nί Aolᾀin, 2016: 284). For example, from a human 
rights perspective, it is possible to see an overwhelmingly male focus in ‘hard’
counter-terrorism, such as the detention of male terrorism suspects, with little or
no attention to the ordeals endured by spouses and families. This thesis, is not
suggesting a direct comparison between, the terrorism and security- related
experiences of Muslim women in Britain and Muslim women in other parts of the
world. It is suggesting, that there are things that could be learnt in the UK
mainland counter-terrorism context, from the experiences of women in
securitized Northern Ireland.
At the global level, Kaseem (2014), notes that US human rights activism, and
legal counsel, has focused on the rights of men who have been subject to
rendition, interrogation, and detention. Human rights interventions at the global,
and national (UK), levels have failed to address the ‘concrete and indisputable
impact on women’ (p. 17; Nί Aolᾀin, 2014). Kaseem makes the case that, the 
ordeals endured by women, who are affected by security and emergency
powers, are ‘comparable – and intimately related – to that of their spouses’
(2014: 15). Women are, for example, present when their husband, son or
relative is apprehended, and they share the ‘trauma, terror, and anxiety of that
experience’ (Ibid.). Like-wise, Nί Aolᾀin, notes that there is much to be learned 
from experiences closer to home; in Northern Ireland, where the population has
‘undergone long-term exposure to [UK] emergency regulation’ (2014: 242).
It is noteworthy that, the UK government extended emergency powers under the
Northern Ireland, Emergency Provisions Act, (1973) to the whole of the UK in
115
2000 (before the 9/11 attack on mainland America). Emergency powers, since
this time, have included home and property stop and search, of suspected
terrorists’, in mainland Britain. Home searches follow a consistent pattern;
operations take place early in the mornings; ‘when individuals and families were
likely to be off-guard and would be disoriented’ (Nί Aolάin, 2014: 243). During 
the search, forms of house arrest contain family members to one room, or one
portion of the house.  Nί Aolᾀin notes that ‘the intimacy of presence in the home 
and the destruction and vulnerability associated with home stops and searches
clearly fell more acutely on women and children than on men’ (ibid.).
The harms created by violations, in private spaces, are largely ignored in
counter-terrorism, although women describe experiences in private settings, as
increasing their sense of vulnerability, and lack of security. Srinivasan (1990)
notes, that when violation is internally incorporated, its effect can far exceed the
time/moment of the violence (Nί Aolᾀin, 2014: 243, 244). These violations also 
serves to create a culture of fear, spreading fear in the wider Muslim community
(see Furedi, 2007). There are two points to be made here; firstly, that there is
no reason to believe that the pattern of home searches is different in mainland
England, to Northern Ireland; and secondly, that in the UK context, women’s
experiences have been almost entirely ignored. In this sense the violations
women experience can be written off, as inadvertent ‘collator damage’, in the
interests of national security.
This argument, might be accepted if the violations were rare. In the UK, there
is reason to believe this is not the case, despite the lack of research evidence
to verify this proposition. It is possible to state, with some certainty, that between
September 2001 and the end of August 2012, terrorism-related powers were
invoked to make 2,29731 arrests. Of these, 838 led to charges, and 241 to
convictions (Anderson, 2016). In 2015, 280 arrests were made, 83 of which led
to charges, and 38 (7.3%) to terrorist related convictions (Crown copyright,
31 The caveat with this data is the difficultly to secure precise figures for arrests through home
searches
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2016: 10). Data provided by Anderson (2016), indicate that not all those
arrested and charged were Muslim, however, given the focus of counter-
terrorism on Islam, it is very likely that the majority were.
Statistics cannot offer a sense of the insecurity, fear, and anxiety experienced
by women when their home is raided, or family member arrested. Nor can they
explain the infection, or spread, of fear they generate amongst the wider Muslim
community (Furedi, 2007; Jackson, 2008; Stanko, 1995). But, these experiences
remain largely unrecorded, as little work has been undertaken to identify the
impacts of home searches on Muslim women in the UK.
In summary, the evidence presented in this section establishes that, Muslim
women are affected in a number of ways by the ‘War on Terror’. Muslim women
are affected, whether they are visible, or invisible in counter-terrorism policy.
Visibility, in counter-terrorism, relegates them to feminised stereotypical roles,
which suggest they are amenable to ‘moderate’ forms of Islam; potentially
pitching them against members of their communities. Acceptance of state
funding has different outcomes; women’s groups either view acceptance of
funding as a risk to their community credentials, or as necessary to achieve their
own outcomes. Within the constraints of counter-terrorism, Prevent funding has
enabled women to develop networks that extend beyond themselves, to
institutions of the state. The result, of Muslim women’s contact/engagement with
state institutions, appears, at the national level, not to have changed the
dominant narrative of Islam, or of Muslim women. This suggests that Muslim
women remain in the margin, and peripheral to counter-terrorism’s discourses
in Britain.
It has been highlighted that Muslim women, including South Asian Muslim
women in Britain, experience prolonged adversity in the UK’s counter-terrorism
strategy, and the ‘War on Terror’. Muslim women in Britain, have benefited from,
and are also constrained in, their engagement with the Prevent strand, of the
UK’s counter-terrorism strategy. Muslim women, in relatively large numbers,
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experience distress resulting from the execution of ‘hard’ counter-terrorisms,
emergency powers. These effects are little understood through academic study
or in counter-terrorism policy. This has necessitated placing a caveat on
terrorism related arrests that result from home search violations because the
evidence provided is not direct.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter set out to trace the temporal progress of British/South Asian Muslim
relations; to demonstrate hegemonic struggle over a prolonged period of time. It
has located the ‘War on Terror’ in its historical context, to make the case for the
‘War on Terror’ as the current manifestation, in a prolonged struggle/adversity.
Prolonged adversity has two dimensions; the past and the present. In a
temporal frame, the present is constituted in the past, locating the past in the
present.
The past gives meaning to present actions and reactions; it explains how brutal
and difficult action, such as the assault of innocent Muslim women, is legitimised
by those who undertake these actions. In tracing the history of hegemonic
struggle it becomes possible to understand how dehumanising tropes of
Muslims as ‘other’ have taken root. From this perspective, it is possible to
understand how hatred and representations of Muslims as a threat are easily
resurrected. These tropes have a long legacy in the psyche of the dominant
group (Memmi, 1986; Salter, 2002). This thesis concurs with scholars who
locate Islamophobic hate crime in this history; giving licence, to its re-emerge in
the ‘War on Terror; (Jackson, 2005; Lambert, 2011).
In tracing the temporal dimension of ideological hegemony, this chapter provides
an essential building block on which to interrogate adversity, resistance and
resilience. The interpretation of hegemony applied in this thesis, offers the
opportunity to tease out the complexities and spaces that are created in the
struggle of domination/resistance, in the form of plurality, mixing and hybridity.
The possibility of living with/between/in two cultures was evidenced in the lives
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of the ‘White Moghuls’ in the 17th century. They transgressed the boundary of
acceptable mixing, and they were made to pay the price. They were vilified for
this transgression, because the dominant group was unable to co-exist with the
culture/ideology that it believed to be subordinate. This is useful learning for this
thesis, as similar positions of hybridity are being adopted by South Asian Muslim
women, in the ‘War on Terror’, as will be made clear in Chapter Six.
This chapter has demonstrated that the struggle for domination, and to resist
ideological loss is, in Gramscian terms, a prolonged ‘war of positions’. In this
frame the group in search of hegemony; the dominant group, has the options of
coercion and consent at its disposal. Over time, coercion was used in
British/South Asian Muslim relations, in the reform of Indian judiciary/legal
systems, political systems, and the use of military might to quell Indian uprisings.
Attempts to win consent were also evident, in arrangements to manage change
between the dominant group and its allies; upper caste Hindu land owners. The
20th century equivalent is the ‘War on Terror’; in which extra-ordinary
judicial/legal powers are invoked and military force used. Additionally, Muslim
women can be seen to occupy the role of ‘trusted ally’, in the invitation by the
government, to join its project to moderate/regulate Islam.
The chapter has identified the difficulty of access to studies about South Asian
Muslim women’s experiences throughout this period, with glimpses into specific
times and contexts, from the perspective of the dominant group (Krishnamurthy,
1989). History has repeated itself in this regard; there is little evidence of
qualitative enquiry into the effects of the ‘War on Terror on the lives of Muslim
women, and South Asian Muslim women, in Britain. Feminist scholars note the
assumption that counter-terrorism disproportionately affects men; it obscures,
and denies, Muslim women’s experience of counter-terrorism. The denial of
Muslim women’s experience silences their experience and invisibilizes them.
This chapter has identified the possibility of the co-existence of cultures and
ideologies, at the micro level, and the inability of the dominant group to accept
co-existence. This raises important questions for the capacity of liberal
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democratic political ideologies, such as that in Britain, to live up to the ideals of
acceptance of difference, equality and plurality (Brown, 2015).
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Part II
Research methodology
Research involving South Asian Muslim women
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Chapter Four:
Research involving South Asian Muslim women
4.1 Introduction
Humanistic qualitative research situates the subject historically and culturally
(Foley, 2000), echoed in the previous chapter and in the temporal aims of this
thesis. Locating South Asian Muslim women in Britain historically, and culturally,
is essential to understanding South Asian Muslim women as the subject of this
thesis (Hall, 1996: 448). South Asian Muslim women are situated in a history of
ideological struggle; experience that informs (internally) their knowledge of, and
response to, current struggles in the context of the ‘War on Terror’. Thus,
portrayals of Muslims, and Muslim women, as ‘outsiders’ and the ‘enemy within’
(Allen, 2012: 9; Moore, 2008), are ‘intolerable’ positions that shape South Asian
Muslim women’s responses in all situations, including this research. From this
perspective, past struggle generates experiential patterns that form, and inform,
current experience, and in turn, informs the method of this research. In this
sense, research content (women’s experiences) and research method are
mutually constitutive. Reflexive sensitivity to this constitutive dynamic, between
method and content, should alert the researcher to the ways in which
methodological approaches collude and re-inscribe power relations; for
example, the research objective of enabling the missing/silenced voices and
experiences, of South Asian Muslim women in Britain, requires methodologies
designed to enable voice and seek silence.
Chapters Two and Three constitute the conceptual and temporal contextual
frames of the research in terms of ‘subject’ and ‘purpose’. Chapter Two develops
and problematizes understandings of adversity, resilience, social networks and
social capital in terms of resistance to prolonged adversity. These foundations
have led to the articulation of specific research aims that the field study set out
to address. Chapter Three uses a temporal frame to set the historic context for
South Asian Muslim women as ‘situated knowers’ (Haraway, 1988) and alerted
the research to the outsider/insider dichotomy of South Asian Muslim women in
Britain. This is a hybrid position; neither in, nor out; the researcher shares, in
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different forms, the experience of hybridity with South Asian Muslim women, as
dual heritage South Asian Indian; neither Asian, nor English. The researcher’s
occupation of hybrid spaces has influenced, and shaped, this research by
bringing the experience of hybridity to this thesis. Additionally, shared ethnic
background and experience of hybridity may have influenced research access,
as will be explored later. In terms of the mutually constitutive relation of content
and method; hybridity, is both content and method: content in regard to
simultaneous multiple positions (in and out) and method in regard to the refusal
to use the tool of binary logics (in terms of negotiation of spaces, conceptual
frames, and analysis). The inherent tension is that there, ‘remains the question
as to whether it even really makes sense or is useful to talk about a dichotomy
of “insiders” and “outsiders”, particularly given that the positionality of both may
change through and across such categories over time or depending upon what
attributes of each one’s identities are stressed” (Herod 1999:325).
The implication is that, for the researcher, positions of insider and outsider,
whether configured along the logics of binary or, in the logics of hybridity are
always in transition. Keeping hold of these multiple spatial, temporal and
subjective dynamics within the frame of hybridity is a continual task and
challenge, both in terms of method and content. In this frame, it was the task
and challenge for the research in this thesis, to occupy rather than attempt to
resolve these tensions (see 4.3).
Feminist and anti-imperialist, theory alerts this research to the harm of ‘epistemic
violence’ (Spivak, 1988:280; Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1987; Sarantakos, 2005).
In other words, the construction of South Asian Muslim women’s gender, race,
and colonial experiences (past and present; past in present) are constituted in,
and through, hegemonic epistemologies. Anti-imperial and Black feminist
scholars, alert the research to the role of intersections of sexism, racism and
colonization as important epistemic considerations (Ashcroft, 1995; Gandhi,
1998; Memmi, 1986; Spivak, 1988). Knowledge, and understanding, of the
‘subjective positions of South Asian Muslim women in their prolonged ‘war of
position’ was essential to the design and practice of this research. Sprague
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(2006) offers a useful reminder in writing that: ‘epistemology directs us in how
to approach an understanding of a phenomenon’ (p. 26, emphasis added).
There are two further important points to be raised: firstly, with regard to the
issue of inclusion/exclusion and its relation to trust in this research methodology.
Chapter Three, identified exclusion the impacts of exclusion in counter-terrorism
on women at the national policy level, (Huckerby, 2010; Nì Aolàni, 2013, see
Chapter Three, 3.5). In addition, the failure to include South Asian Muslim
women in Britain’s in the ‘War on Terror’, this thesis identified difficulty in finding
academic studies into women’s experience of adversity. In this research
methodology, the issue of inclusion was pivotal to the negotiation of trust with
research participants. Trust is constituted by, and contingent upon, inclusion.
The negotiation of trust was fundamental to inclusive exchanges with South
Asian Muslim women, enabling them to share (include) their
narratives/testimonies (predominantly excluded in policy and academic spaces);
in turn, the inclusion of these narrative/testimonial findings are central to this
thesis in a direct challenge to their exclusion elsewhere.
Secondly, it is important to acknowledge, at the outset, that this research starts
from the perspective that South Asian Muslim women have individual
subjectivities; they are not a homogeneous group. The use of generalised ethnic
terminology, such as, ‘Pakistani’, and ‘Bangladeshi’ women, are used in this
chapter but should not distract from the individual subjectivities of individual
women.
4.2 Epistemologies of South Asian Muslim women
Chapter Three, alerts this research to the prolonged denial of voice experienced
by South Asian Muslim women, historically. The experience, and, repeated
experiences, of invisibility, shapes the epistemology of South Asian Muslim
women, making it important to address the implications of this experience in
research design and practice. It was essential for the researcher to understand,
and respond to, concerns of culture and power as they relate to Pakistani and
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Bangladeshi women participants in this research. In ‘Reading Antonio Gramsci
as a Methodologist’, Jubas (2010), demonstrates the relevance of Gramsci’s
epistemology to humanistic methodological research approaches. Gramsci’s
theory of hegemony questions the production and function of knowledge from
the perspective of power relations. The focus on hegemony, and the conceptual
lens of hegemony, is fundamental to this thesis and also informs the
participatory, inclusive, power sensitive methodological approach of the
research design and practice. In addition to Gramsci’s insistence on the
importance of context, dialectics and analysis of plural, divergent social relations
of knowledge production, in the following quote he adds proximity of feeling:
The intellectual’s error consists in believing that one can know without
understanding and even more without feeling and being impassioned...
in other words that the intellectual can be an intellectual (and not a pure
pedant) if distinct and separate from the nation-people, that is, without
feeling the elementary passions of the people, understanding them and
therefore explaining and justifying them in the particular historical
situation and connecting them dialectically to the laws of history and to a
superior conception of the world, scientifically and coherently
elaborated—i.e. knowledge. (Gramsci, 2007: 418)
The implication here, in conjunction with feminist and anti-imperialist frames, is
the imperative for liberatory research approaches to check researcher
domination in ‘believing that one can know without understanding’; this
necessitates the opening up of spaces for women’s voices to be heard (Ashcroft,
1995: 249). Feminist theories of knowledge are centrally concerned with the
concept of the ‘situated knower’ (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1987; Sarantakos,
2005; Kralik, 2008), and that, situated knowledge reflects the experiences
(epistemologies) of women as marginalised people (Gandhi, 1998: 3). Anti-
imperialist theory is concerned to make accessible the complex condition of
peoples associated with the ‘aftermath of colonial occupation’ with its continuing
and ‘tenacious hold’ (Memmi, 1968) on ‘post-colonial’ ethnic communities
socially, politically, and culturally. Both of these theoretical examples seek to
understand, and to contest, the biases of dominant cultural conceptions and
practices of knowledge (Anderson, 2014: 1); they offer potentially useful insights
into the generalised situation of South Asian Muslim women. The design of this
research investigation is predicated on understanding and accommodating
these sensitivities. Feminist research principles encourage a research style that
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is open; in which, all the facts are made known to women participants to facilitate
trust building, and encourage cooperation and co-production on the basis of
‘equality of intellectual authority’ (Sarantakos, 2005: 56) and anti-sexist, anti-
racist and anti-imperialist practices. Feminist research principles insist:
‘that the inquirer her/himself be placed in the same critical plane as the
overt subject matter, thereby recovering the entire research process for
scrutiny in the results of research. That is, the class, race, culture and
gender assumptions, beliefs and behaviours of the researcher
her/himself must be placed within the frame of the picture that she/he
attempts to paint. (Harding, 1987: 9)
Figure 4.1 provides an illustration of the flow, and inter-relationship, of theory
and practice are envisaged in this investigation
Figure 4.1 Influences and sensitivities in research design
Source – author (2013)
4.3 Methodology and research design
These sections addresses how the epistemological frames, outlined above in
Figure 4.1 are applied to methodology and design of the research. The
unambiguous interpretative nature of this investigation indicated that a
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qualitative methodology would be most appropriate. Qualitative methodologies
explore dynamic, social phenomena, whilst quantitative methodology, is
frequently viewed as presenting a static image of social reality, with an emphasis
on numbers (Brewer, 2000). Quantitative approaches are concerned with
behaviour, as opposed to ‘the meaning of [their] actions’ (Brewer, 2000; Bryman
1984, 2008). Qualitative methodology differs in its commitment to seeing the
world from the point of view of the ‘actor’. It focuses on the perspectives of the
‘subject’ to generate in-depth data (Brewer, 2000; Flick 2006). Research into the
social world, informed by the principles of the epistemology of qualitative
research, requires methodology to facilitate an ‘insider’ view. This is complex,
raising questions of research ethics, as well as tensions; for example, in regard
to the use of qualitative methodology, such as ethnography that is implicated in
colonial silencing through its genealogy in classical anthropology32.
An inherent tension in the relation between ethics and ethnographic research
approaches concerns the issue of positionality, therefore, ‘[i]t is critical to pay
attention to positionality, reflexivity, the production of knowledge and the power
relations that are inherent in research processes in order to undertake ethical
research’ (Sultana 2007:380). The issue is that, there is no neutral position;
therefore all positions are implicated. Positions constantly shift, in turn ethical
consideration constantly shift in ‘a continuum with multiple dimensions’ in which
all aspects of the research process ‘constantly move back and forth along a
number of axes, depending upon time, location, participants and topic’ (Mercer,
2007: 1). In ‘Learning from the Outsider Within’ (1991), the Black feminist Collins
locates women’s positionality of race and gender in ‘the matrix of domination’
(2000: 228). Thus, engagement with ‘situated knowledge’ becomes multi-
dimensional; both in terms of macro knowledge/power relations, situated in the
matrix of domination, and in terms of micro knowledge/power relations, situated
in shifting, reciprocal, subjective encounters between researcher and
participant.
32 Scholars argue that anthropologists’ investigated ‘native’ peoples largely in order that a
colonial power better understood the cultures and groups it ruled (Brewer, 2000: 11., Smith,
1999, 2012).
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Feminist, Black feminist and anti-imperialist epistemology alerted this research
to the question of, what is fitting what? Colonizing research tools produce
colonizing processes that appropriate voice and experiences to fit a dominant
script, set of objectives and predetermined outcomes. In other words, colonizing
research tools fit the research content (participants, contexts, conceptual
frames, relations of knowledge/power) into fixed outcomes, for fixed purposes.
In stark contrast to this, an open, flexible research design for the ethnography
was adopted (Appendix 1 and 2).
There was not a definitive statement of how the research investigation would be
managed. Although this partly responded to the challenges of ethnography, as
it was not possible to know the degree to which the research would have access
to women participants, it primarily responded to, an acute awareness of the
position, and context, of the research participants: the experiences of the ‘war
of position’ by South Asian Muslin women in the ‘War on Terror’. On the one
hand, the flexible framework did precisely what it was expected to do; provided
an open, largely unstructured framework, through which South Asian Muslim
women participants, could select the aspects of their experience and knowledge
they wished to share. In this regard, women were engaged in co-producing the
findings of the research; they provided the knowledge they felt comfortable to
offer, and that they felt was required.
In terms of the mutually constitutive relationship between content and method,
it became increasingly clear that, the open flexible framework; allowing the free
flow of South Asian Muslim women’s experiences, voice, ideas and aspirations
for past, present and the future, shaped and reshaped the research temporal
aims in terms of past (pre 9/11), present (now) and future (hopes). On the other
hand, in analysing the fieldwork transcripts, there were a number of occasions,
in reading the transcripts and listening to the tapes, where it was difficult to
understand why a follow-up question had not been asked. This issue is raised,
as an inherent tension in qualitative research; tighter and clear aims could also
have risked framing questions in ways that led to sought after responses.
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In determining methodology, the lens of hegemony highlighted questions in the
use of an ethnographic approach in this research with South Asian Muslim
women. Ethnography is rooted in anthropology (as expressed in Chapter One),
alerting the research to the dangers of the research process itself further
colonising South Asian Muslim women’s experiences. The response to this
challenge was to ground the research in feminist and anti-imperialist
approaches. Recent interpretations of ethnography, for example by the Chicago
School, have shifted the focus of ethnography in urban North American studies
to research without a priori knowledge-claims of the subject. Notwithstanding
the fact that all knowledge-claims (with or without a priori knowledge) exist in
hegemony; it is the Chicago School approach to ethnographic research that this
investigation adopted (Sampson, 1991, 2004) inhabiting the inherent tensions.
Positive aspects of ethnography include, the opportunity for research
participants to meet the researcher on their terms, in their environment, creating
opportunities to build trust between the researcher and the participant, before
engaging in focus groups and interviews that have a formal dimension and are
recorded dialogues. The ‘humanistic’ inference of ethnography allows the
investigation of social life in real, naturally occurring settings, independent of
manipulation or staged encounters. This is wholly appropriate to this
investigation, in that it acknowledges that participants are meaning-endowed
(Haraway, 1988); they have the capacity to interpret, and construct, their social
world; to articulate knowledge, and ascribe meaning to experience and situation.
The ethnographic process allows researchers to understand social processes
from the ‘inside’ (Silverman 2000:30-33; Flick 2005; Snow 2003).
A central objective, of some ethnographers, is to uncover the structure of rules
that enable one to behave as a member of a particular group. Ethnography,
when it is done well, suspends judgements, as with the Chicago School model;
it spends time getting to know participants environment. A criticism of
ethnography is its tendency towards analytic neglect; that too often
ethnographers enter the field with the goal of describing and interpreting a social
situation, at the risk of ‘getting too close to one’s informants, side-stepping
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relevant theory, in favour of accenting popular assumptions about one’s
informants’ (Emerson, 1987: 72-3). Description alone can lead to dismissal such
as ‘this is very interesting, but so what?’ This investigation sought to avoid
dismissal on the grounds of description, with no analytic content, by situating the
investigation in academic traditions and by recognising the importance of
analysis and interpretation to ‘thick description’ or ‘intellectual effort’ (Geertz,
1973). In this frame it is the role of the ethnographer to provide ‘thick description’,
not simply to describe the action, or interaction, but to interpret the meaning of
the action.
It is also necessary to address the problem of ethnography from the perspective
of the ‘subaltern’ participant. A history of marginalisation, and ‘othering’, in the
lives of South Asian Muslim women, traced in the previous chapter, was (and is)
unlikely to engender trust of members of outsider groups such as a University
researcher. This challenge to ethnographic methodology amplified the
importance of liberatory epistemological frames; of power relations, as the basis
for building trust between researcher and participants. Starting with Black
feminist and anti-imperial theory, the process of building trust was a continual
process throughout the research; aspects of how trust was built during the
research process are addressed later in this chapter (see 4.5.3). There is also
the problem of time in doctoral research; in which time to undertake an
ethnographic investigation is limited. Atkinson (2001) suggests a ‘middle place’
namely ethnographic interview. Ethnographic interview is differentiated from
other forms of interview by the:
established, respectful, on-going relationships with [their] interviewees,
including enough rapport for there to be genuine exchange of views and
enough time and openness in the interviews for the interviewees to
explore purposefully with the researcher the meanings they place on
events in their worlds. (Heyl, 2001: 369)
Additionally, ethnographic methods are defined by the ethnographer’s role in the
activities of the research group; levels of involvement can range from full (covert
or overt) membership of the group, to the role of being a non-participating
observer, or involvement in which interviews and documents are the main
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source of data gathering. In this investigation, participants were fully aware of
the aims of the research, of researcher observation, group work exercises, and
In semi-structured interviews. The range of methods offered women participants
the choice of being involved individually or as part of a collective group.
This was a small, in-depth, qualitative investigation, which made it possible to
use a flexible research framework (referred to earlier) to aid data gathering in
the field. Gathering participant’s testimonies were the central aspects of this
research. This required women to feel sufficiently confident in the research to
share personal narratives, experiences, feelings, and perceptions of
government policy. To do this trust, and trust building became central aspects
of research design and shaped, along with women’s epistemologies, the
methodology and design of this investigation. The field study also sought data,
from representatives of the state and from male and female community leaders;
a qualitative design was also selected for these interventions.
4.3.1 A narrative approach
Narrative might be viewed as implicit to ethnographic33 research; it opens up
challenges and opportunities for data interpretation. Whilst there is nothing new
in qualitative studies, in the researcher telling participant’s story, there are
ethical issues, for example, through whose lens or stand point is the story being
told. Scholars, such as Mitchell (2003), argue that narrative analysis differs from
ethnography, in the ‘interpretive thrust’ (Ibid.) of narrative analysis. However, the
separation of participant’s accounts, from researcher interpretation, was not the
intention of this research; it was to bring them together. This research used a
hybridity of, aspects of an ethnographic approach, with aspects of a narrative
approach; being with participant’s in their spaces, to gain a sense of their world,
with interpretations formulated through women’s words, language and
behaviours. Insights into a narrative approach are helpful because this
investigation concurs with Fleetwood’s observation that narratives are ‘selective
33 Chapter Four explains the purpose of adopting an ethnographic approach to (neighbourhood
based) data collection.
131
account[s] of past events, oriented to the present listener (whether real or
imagined), which make some point about the narrator’ (2015: 4). Women’s
narratives, in this sense, are viewed as much more than the stories they contain,
they are viewed as discourses that make women’s experience knowable to the
researcher. It is then the task, of the researcher, to interpret women’s knowledge
in the context of historic and present day socio-political frames in which women
participants are situated.
4.4 Research design
The design of this research outlines aspects of the mechanics of making the
field study happen. It explains pre-field work preparation, in the form of
establishing criteria for the selection of the neighbourhood, in which the field
study was undertaken. It also involved decisions on research sampling. These
are explained in the following sections.
4.4.1 Neighbourhood selection
An essential aspect of the research design lay in identifying the neighbourhood
in which to conduct the research. A rigorous process was followed to select the
neighbourhood in which to undertake the field study/investigation. Whilst the
process was rigorous the framework, or criteria, for selection was simple;
neighbourhood selection criterion undertaken included the following broad
themes:
i. must have a majority Muslim population;
ii. Muslim population must have a sizeable South Asian Pakistani and
Bangladeshi population; and
iii. must be located in the north of England.
The selection process began with the study of national data/desk research, to
identify the location of South Asian ethnic minority populations, in cities and
towns in Yorkshire and the Humber and the North West of England. Having
identified several cities and towns with sizeable South Asian populations, the
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search was refined to identify populations at the Middle Super Output Area level
(MSOA).34 Seven MSOA’s met the selection criteria for this research
investigation. With a focus on the selection of one neighbourhood, the process
was further refined, through in-depth investigation of available ‘hard’
demographic, and socio-economic, neighbourhood level data, as well as other
locally, and nationally produced documents where they were available.
Having gathered a short-list of seven possible neighbourhoods, the final
consideration in choosing a neighbourhood for the research, was made on the
basis of pragmatism. The final consideration came down to access to South
Asian Muslim women and this decision was made as the research moved from
design to practice; resulting from a meeting between the researcher and a
known male, Muslim, contact. The support of this contact for access to Muslim
women was central to determining the neighbourhood in which the study would
to be conducted. The final decision on neighbourhood meant the field study was
conducted in a neighbourhood in the North of England; for the purpose of
anonymity the neighbourhood has been called ‘Fieldway’ and the city/town in
which it is located is called ‘Northend’; pseudonyms created by the research for
the purpose of anonymity. Details of the process for choosing Fieldway as the
research neighbourhood are described in 4.5.1, as part of the process of gaining
access to South Asian Muslim women in the North of England.
4.4.2 Sampling; research participants
A purposive, as opposed to random, sampling model is evident from the
specificity of the research and the women whose testimonies this research was
interested in gaining. The sampling process therefore required, of necessity, a
pro-active approach to specific group/s of South Asian Muslim women in a
specific neighbourhood (Denzin & Lincoln 2005: 378). Recruitment of
participants was originally anticipated to be realised through seeking out
community organisations that engaged women residents of Muslim faith.
34 Super Output Areas (SOA’s) are a national methodology for assessing the level of deprivation
in neighbourhoods introduced in 2004. MSOA have an average population of 7,500 and
4,000 households (NHS. 2011).
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However, until the research neighbourhood had been identified, it was difficult
to know which organisations would be contacted, or the number, if any, of
community organisations in the neighbourhood. Consideration was given to
meeting women in formal, open settings, but this was not the priority of the
investigation; access to women in closed, private, or semi-private, settings was
the preferred option. Additional difficulties that affected neighbourhood selection
included time, and cost, for example for travelling to the selected
neighbourhood.
An ethnographic approach entails entering the field, and working with conditions
as they are encountered; there was, in any event, no way of determining a priori
the types of activities that the ethnographer would be given access to. The
strategy adopted to manage this uncertainty was to prepare a broad, flexible
framework for use in informal discussion, focus group or interviews, the
framework could also guide note taking when observing. The framework is
attached as Appendix 1.
At the design stage, a total target sample size of 36 participants was deemed a
reasonable number for this investigation; this was envisaged to involve 26
women, 5 community leaders and 5 representatives of local state institutions. In
actuality, these numbers differed as is evident in Table 4.1. Total participant
numbers increased to 57, of whom 46 were women residents, 4 community
leaders and 7 participants represented the local state. Table 4.1, on the following
page, illustrates anticipated and actual participant size by group. It also identifies
the ways in which participants were involved in the research, i.e. the research
method.
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Table 4.1. Sample size – anticipated and actual participant numbers
Women residents of Fieldway formed the largest group, professionals the
second largest, and community leaders the smallest group. This is perhaps not
surprising; women are the largest group because they are the focus of this
investigation, and representatives of the local state the second largest because
there are more paid professionals than community leaders, who form the
smallest group. It is also helpful to understand the breakdown of all participants
by gender; Table 4.2 illustrates participants by gender. This table shows that 50
of the 57 participants in this investigation were female and that 7 were male.
Table 4. 2. Participants by gender
Participant group Female Male Total
Resident 46 0 46
Community leader 2 2 4
Authority 2 5 7
Total 50 7 57
Table 4.2 indicates that equal numbers of male and female community leaders
were involved in this research and that 60% of the participants who represented
the local state were male, and 40% were female.
The sections that follow shift attention from research planning and design, to the
process of starting the field work. This is complex, as a pivotal point was
precisely the moment between planning and practice, in which key decisions
were made about where to locate the research and to begin to find ways of
gaining access to South Asian Muslim women in closed settings.
Women
(observed)
Women –
(focus
group
&
interview)
Professionals
(interview)
Community
Leaders
(interview)
TOTAL
Anticipated Not known 26 5 5 36+
Actual 10 36 7 4 57
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4.5 From design to practice
4.5.1 Getting started; access to, and recruitment of, Muslim women
Gaining access to closed social settings is recognised as one of the most
important, but also one of the most difficult, steps in ethnographic investigation.
It is described as: ‘not a matter to be taken lightly but one that involves some
combination of strategic planning, hard work and dumb luck’ (Bryman.
2001:435). Access to closed settings is seen as particularly difficult
(Hammersley, 1993, 1995; Bryman, 2001: 433), making the issue of access
particularly important in the selection of the investigation neighbourhood.
Bryman (2001), notes that researchers have developed a range of tactics ‘many
of which may seem rather unsystematic’, such as using friends, contacts, and
colleague, trying to get the support of someone within the organisation, or
neighbourhood, to ‘champion’ (p. 435) the research, others have resorted to
offering something in return to help gain access.
In this research access was a key consideration, and as noted by Bryman
(2001), the research used a known contact to decide the research
neighbourhood, primarily in response to access to South Asian Muslim women.
The ‘insider’ knowledge of this contact, called Shahid in this research to retain
his anonymity, was a person with whom the researcher had worked in the past
in a professional capacity, and with whom there was a level of trust capital that
the researcher was able to draw on. Additionally, Shahid was in the unique
position of working with Muslim communities, professionally through Prevent,
and also in the voluntary sector, giving his access to groups that the researcher
did not have access to. The assumption made, was that prior knowledge, and
trust in the researcher, would lead to support for the research with Muslim
women.
The first meeting with Shahid was held in December 2012, some three months
before the field investigation started. The meeting was held in a community
setting; a confidential space, in which it was hoped frank and open views could
be aired, the research topic was explored and Shahid’s support discussed. The
first meeting opened the discussion on the current socio-political position of
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Muslims in Britain, and the idea of UK Muslims as the ‘new suspect community’
(Pantazis, 2009; Spalek, 2010). Additionally, Shahid was asked for his view on
a non-Muslim researcher conducting this investigation. It was important to know
if, Shahid felt, that being non-Muslim would form too much of a barrier for the
research to be accepted. This was important in view of the multiple
vulnerabilities, and sensitivities, of conducting ethnographic research with South
Asian Muslim women. It was important to know, at the outset, if Shahid felt able
to support the investigation, and, if he was sufficiently confident in a non-
community member researching this sensitive topic.
Exploring a range of socio-policy issues of relevance to British Muslims, Shahid
expressed concern about the pressures faced by the Muslim groups he knew,
stating that: ‘Muslim groups are going against each other….[and that] the
Mosques are not leading on this.’ The implication being; Mosques should be,
and could be, doing more to bring disparate Muslim groups together. Thus, from
the first meeting there appeared to be little anxiety about sharing potentially
damming ‘in-community’ information with an outsider. The question of trust was
indirectly addressed by Shahid, when he added personal experiences of
Islamophobia, to the community level information he had shared, before talking,
in some detail, about the research investigation itself. It would appear, in terms
of trust, that the relationship moved quickly beyond, what is termed ‘thin trust’ in
trust theory to substantive communication (see Giddens, 1990), suggesting a
degree of trust capital between the researcher and Shahid.
Shahid said that he felt the current position for Muslim young men was
intolerable, reflecting views within his networks, of Muslims as the ‘new suspect’
community. To reinforce this fact, Shahid noted the disproportionately high
numbers of Muslims in prison; nearly 10% of the prison population is Muslim,
when Muslims constitute less than 5% of the population. This belief was, not
only verified by 2011 Census data, but showed an even larger percentage of
Muslims in prison that the 5% noted by Shahid. Population Census for England
and Wales (ONS, 2013), show that Muslim prisoners comprised 13.1% of the
prison population, and 4.0% of the general population (Berman, 2013: 10).
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Shahid also expressed anxiety about what he termed ‘the gaze’ of the public,
and his belief in the disproportionate focus of law enforcement agencies on
Muslims. Public gaze and law enforcement attention on Muslims, Shahid said
had led him to change his behaviours and his dress code: ‘before 9/11, I used
to wear salwar kameez35, and also go into town in these clothes, but I stopped
after 9/11 because I just felt eyes on me’. The phrase ‘eyes on me’ was one that
would be repeated often by women during the field investigation. In relation to
trust, Goffman’s (1969), investigation of behaviour in public places identified that
strangers signal their intent, to one another non-verbally. In this frame, Goffman
notes, the difference between ‘civic inattention’ when people passing on the
street signal no ill intent or ill will, and the ‘hate stare’ (Giddens, 1990: 80).
It appeared that before the field investigation had formally started, post-9/11,
Islamophobic experiences were being shared with the research. The distress
caused by recalling experiences of hate for Shahid, was also to become a
familiar pattern in conversations with Muslim women. Shahid confirmed that an
investigation aimed at understanding the, unacknowledged impact of the ‘War
on Terror’ on South Asian Muslim women, may be helpful in raising awareness
of the distress experienced by Muslim women. He indicated support for the
research, and agreed to do what he could to introduce the research to potential
participants. The implication of this meeting, and Shahid’s agreement to support
the research was that he had sufficient faith, confidence, or trust in the research
to recommend it to South Asian Muslim women in communities that he had ties
with.
It may therefore be helpful to explain the professional history shared by the
researcher and Shahid. Having worked together (over sixteen years earlier), and
having had occasional contact since then, it could be argued that the relationship
between the researcher and Shahid had continuity. They shared a history of
work, rather than identity, which generated sufficient confidence in Shahid. A
second meeting with Shahid was arranged before the research was to get under
35 Salwar kameez is also known as kurta pyjama and is the traditional South Asian dress for
men.
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way. This meeting was held at the end of February 2013, in Fieldway, the
neighbourhood that had been selected for the field study. This meeting was to
introduce the researcher to Fieldway; to walk the streets of the neighbourhood
together. Shahid offered an orientation introduction for the researcher. From the
perspective of the research, the walk-about was important for gaining contextual
information, and getting to know, the area. The importance of Shahid’s
endorsement of the research cannot be understated; his belief in the research
influenced the Pakistani women’s centre in Fieldway to accept the research. The
process of acceptance, by the women’s centre, was an unexpected outcome of
the orientation walkabout. At one point, in the walk about, Shahid entered the
gateway to a large Mosque in which the Pakistani community centre was
located. The Pakistani women’s centre, called Ashiana (for the purpose of
anonymity in this research), was located in the centre.
On entering Ashiana, Shahid introduced the research, and stepped back to
observe the conversation between the researcher and centre workers. The
atmosphere was welcoming, with centre staff asking questions about the
investigation, and sharing information about the work of the centre. The meeting
lasted for almost two hours, on reflection, it is fairly clear that this was a form of
interview, for centre staff to determine if they felt able to invite the researcher
into their space. In terms of trust theory, Stoneman (2008), uses the interview
metaphor to note, that in first meetings a character assessment is made using
‘particular clues, the tone of the interviewee’s voice; the level of eye contact; the
posture of the applicant’ (p. 107). To continue the interview metaphor, it is
possible to think of Shahid, as a trusted friend of the women’s centre, providing
a form of reference for the research in brokering the introduction and endorsing
it.
The interview was ‘successful’; Ashiana’s manager extended an invitation for
the research to, immediately, join a Prevent funded Muslim women’s
empowerment workshop at the centre. The research was accepted, and
invested with a high level of freedom in that the researcher was offered virtually
open access to the women’s centre.
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4.5.2 Access to, and recruitment of, community leaders and
representatives of the local state
The approach adopted for gathering data from community leaders and
representatives of the state, as participants in the research was different to that
adopted for access to women residents. Meetings with representatives from
these groups were limited, largely due to lack of time, but also because they did
not make up the primary group. Semi-structured interviews was the method for
data gathering; using a similar broad three part framework to that prepared for
work with women participants. The framework is attached as Appendix 2.
Representatives of the local state and community leaders were selected as
participants in the research because they embody ‘leadership’ on the one hand
and ‘authority’ on the other. Authority and leadership are important in
understanding resilience, particularly in relation to civic and civil society
institutions and their potential role in supporting resilience. It was therefore
important to ensure that participants knew and understood Fieldway. This was
a key criterion for selection of these participants. It is perhaps useful to state
briefly, how the research understood the distinction between leadership and
authority. Authority is distinct from leadership as described by Gastil (1994):
‘democratic authorities do not necessarily serve as leaders, and [popular] non-
democratic leaders sometimes lack formal authority, as was the case with
Mohandas Gandhi’ (p. 957). Both have an influence on the support available to
residents of Fieldway and for South Asian Muslim women.
The strategy for access to representatives of the state, and community leaders
was also purposive. The process of access started by working through known
contacts; however, ‘snowballing’ proved to be effective in access to these
groups as participants freely offered contact details of colleagues, they felt it
may be useful for the research to contact. The strategy targeted representatives
of the state, as holders of operational or strategic neighbourhood portfolios; they
knew and understood the neighbourhood from a professional perspective.
These participants were selected because of the service delivery, and resource
perspective, as opposed, to a resident perspective they could offer to the
research. This perspective was anticipated to provide a further, rich vein, of
140
information to supplement the community focused information from community
leaders and personal experience from women. Initially, a list of service areas
was drawn up and key individuals targeted for interview. Professionals were
asked to share their knowledge of the issues and concerns for Fieldway as a
whole, and for women residents in particular. It was anticipated that
professionals would provide data related to local services, Muslim women’s
access, and to an understanding of the role of public services in supporting
Muslim women at difficult times, such as 9/11 and 7/7. Seven professionals
participated in this investigation (see Table 4.1). Ward councillors, local
government officers (senior managers and neighbourhood workers), and
neighbourhood police officers at constable and inspector ranks were particularly
targeted as participants. Four community leaders also participated; two Muslim
women managers of Asian women’s community centres, and two male leaders,
neither of whom directly managed community work in Fieldway, and both of
whom had close relationships with the neighbourhood.
4.5.3 The importance of trust
Trust, or loss of trust, is implicated at all levels of knowledge in this thesis. At the
macro level, trust is implicated in the relationship of struggle between the
dominant group (for hegemony), and the subaltern group (to resist being
hegemonized); at the micro level, in the dynamic of power relations between the
researcher and participant. Feminist and anti-imperialist theory demonstrate the
importance of the researcher modelling trust in acknowledging the participant as
the ‘situated knower’ (Haraway, 1988); as the holders of knowledge. In this
dynamic the relation of power/knowledge changes; the researcher is the
‘situated learner’. The changed dynamic of power/knowledge, as reflected in
feminist and anti-imperialist frames, lays the basis for reciprocity; it reflects
Haraway’s ‘“informatics of domination” (quoted in Stoddart, 2007: 212) in which
power is a property of the relationship, rather than being top-down. The idea
that, trust builds trust was instrumental in laying the foundation, and sustaining
the process, for the exchanges between researcher and South Asian Muslim
women, that enabled women to share their narratives/testimonies.
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Trust is a social conceptualisation of the relationship of vulnerability and risk; it
is premised on ‘the intention to accept vulnerability to a trustee based on positive
expectations of his or her actions’ (Colquitt, 2007: 909). This definition reflects
Haraway’s (1988) conception of the researcher trusting that participants are
holders of their situated knowledge; in this frame the researcher is raising
expectations that she can be trusted and processes of reciprocity are possible.
This is central to understanding the researcher/ participant relationship; as
women participants were required to trust the researcher with their personal
narratives. This is particularly important because trust, as a cognitive process is
based on evidence of trustworthiness (Lewis, 1985). Trust theory also suggests
that familiarity is a precondition of trust or distrust (Stoneman, 2008). As
mentioned earlier, in this research trust building was premised on familiarity
through access by Shahid, a contact known to the researcher.
Trust is important to social relations (Putnam, 2000; 2007; Stanley 2011;
Stoneman, 2008), and therefore to social science research, and particularly to
ethnographic research. Trust, has been central to the design of the field
investigation. Two dimensions of trust are particularly relevant to this research;
dispositional or social trust (between researcher and participant) and political
trust (between participants and government) (Branzei, 2003). These forms of
trust were crucial to the research methodology (ethnography) and the topic of
the investigation (the ‘War on Terror’). The former, is essential for access to a
population group, often described as ‘hard to reach’ (Garland, 2006; Hooks,
1984). The latter, to understanding the political context of, and in which, the
research was undertaken; a context that Spalek (2009) describes as ‘highly
sensitive’ (p. 24).
Because ethnographic methodology is relational, trust is critical to the process
of developing social interactions (Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1996; Putnam,
2000; Wood, 2010). This places trust at the centre of this research; without trust
the ethnography would not be possible, and women would not participate. Trust,
as a cognitive process, discerns between people and institutions that are
trustworthy, distrusted, and unknown, on the basis of evidence of
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trustworthiness. In this frame, familiarity is a precondition, for trust and distrust
(Lewis, 1985: 970); and reciprocity is an important aspect of building trust
(Fukuyama, 1988; Harding, 1986; Putnam, 2000). However, experiences of
social, economic, and political marginality can influence groups’ ability to trust
that state institutions, including academic institutions and researchers, have
their best interests at heart. Limits in both forms of trust, formed potential
difficulty for this research; there was limited prior knowledge on which
participants could form a judgement, or know the intent, of the potential trusted
(researcher). Stoneman (2008) suggests that the starting point for any
relationship of trust is information regarding the ‘relevant other’ (p. 30), in the
case of research participants, this crucially includes, information about the
research itself, about confidentiality and anonymity, as well as intent. The fact
that the research had the confidence of a known friend of the women’s centre,
and the endorsement of centre staff would also have influenced women’s levels
of trust in the research. The juxtaposition of the prerequisites for the production
and function of trust in the research, with the prerequisites of, suspending
judgements and a priori knowledge-claims of the subject, was an inherent
tension, which the researcher was aware of and inhabited in the methodology.
The following paragraphs outline how the mechanics of building trust were
addressed.
4.5.4 Confidentiality, information and consent
An important part of building trust, and encouraging participants to share their
experiences and meanings, lies in participants being certain that their
testimonies would remain confidential. Their narratives would not expose them,
or their community, in written texts or announcements. For this reason Fieldway
is the pseudonym given to the neighbourhood and, Northend the pseudonym
given to the urban area in which the neighbourhood is located. Participant
names have been changed and coded; participants were assured that the codes
would be securely filed. Participants were also assured that consent forms would
be scanned and saved on a secure encrypted computer system in the
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University. Original signed documents would be destroyed immediately after
they were saved electronically.
Two consent forms were produced prior to the field investigation; one for focus
group, and the other for, interview participants. Consent forms were
accompanied by a sheet of A4 information explaining the objectives of the
research. Additionally, women were given an email address, generated
specifically for the research, to enable women to contact the researcher at any
time that women chose. A mobile phone number, specific to the research, was
also set up for the duration of the research, as a second means of
communication between the researcher and participants. The consent form
reiterated participant confidentiality, and explained that participants were free to
withdraw their contribution to the investigation up to three days after the day of
involvement, without any explanation.
4.5.5 Analysing data
Data analysis was based on an inductive thematic approach (Brewer, 2000;
Boyatzis, 1998). The stages of analysis are described in Table 4.3, although in
practice, new data was being analysed and added to existing data and literature,
throughout the research process. The addition of new information, in fact played
a more important part in data analysis, than is suggested in the linear process
described in the table. It was also the case that the stages outlined in Table 4.3
were rigorously followed. This approach allowed meanings to emerge as the
field notes, transcripts, and other data were read and re-read and tapes listened
to repeatedly.
Table 4.3 Inductive thematic analysis
Step 1 Familiarisation with texts: reading and re-reading all
data texts and listening to audio tapes
Step 2 Identification of recurring themes in the texts (without
interpretation)
Step 3 Identification of patterns across themes
Step 4 Interpretive selection of themes and sub-themes
Step 5 Check for inconsistencies
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Within each of these stages, there was learning and realignment, as new
information was generated in the field, it at times focused and refocused the
attention of the research; learning, analysis and interpretation were a continuous
process in which theory played as important a part as fieldwork transcripts.
Analysis took into consideration existing literature on gender in the ‘War on
terror’, (Chapter Three, 3.5) and data generated in Fieldway; including data from
the three participant groups already mentioned, as well as documents collected
in the field. Using Boyatzis (1998) inductive thematic approach the analysis
followed the five steps or stages outlined in Table 4.3.
A mechanical as opposed to computer aided system was applied to data
analysis, including the (old fashioned) use of stick-it note comments, coding with
coloured highlighter pens, and notes in the margins of text. Every page of each
transcript, and every page of the field notes, was subject to the same detailed
scrutiny, to identify themes in the data. This, pre-analytic, process involved
writing comments on each page and colour coding words and/or sentences; the
overall effect led to the creation of what Emerson (1995) terms ‘scenes on the
page’ (1995, see also Miles, 1994). The ‘scenes’ became clearer each time the
comments and colour coding were refined. Qualitative data analysis
programmes such as NVIVO were not used, as the process of coding itself,
further embedded the researcher in the relationship with data, allowing in
Boyatzis (1998) terms, ‘codable moments’ to occur through ‘sensing a pattern
or “occurrence”’ (p. 4), based on the overall knowledge gained through the
research process. However, coding also included deduction; the importance of
an issue was identified, for example, through the frequent occurrence of
particular words.
Sixty themes, without interpretation, were identified at stage 2. These were then
further analyses to identify eighteen un-interpreted patterns. The penultimate
stage was informed by all the knowledge and data encountered before, during,
and in the field, with the outcome of a list of six issues that are termed ‘themes’.
Four issues were identified under the heading adversity, and four under the
heading, resilience. These have not been called themes, as each heading
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included issues related to context; context is broader than a ‘theme’. Context
emerged as important, to both adversity, and to resilience. One theme was
identified under each heading, with three sub-themes under adversity, and three
sub-themes under resilience. Interpretive analysis, identified as stage 4 of the
analysis process (see Table 4.3), is attached as Appendix 4. Table 4.4, on the
following page, provides a summary of the issues identified.
Table .4.4 Themes and issues to emerge from inductive analysis
Theme/issue Description
Adversity
Context Material and relational resources
Theme 1 adversity Women’s fear and the spread of fear
sub-theme 1a Failure of civic institutions
sub-theme 1b Failure of civil society institutions
Resilience
Theme 2 resilience Relationships and social assets
Sub-theme 2a Resistant identities and behaviours
- claiming space for faith
- contesting ascribed identity
- formulating counter narratives
sub-theme 2b Resilience building networks
- Family and neighbourhood
- Friendship networks
- Women’s centres
Sub-theme 2c
Resilience - adapting in conditions of
prolonged adversity and retaining
fundamental characteristics
- Hybrid identities and new
positions
The key issues are explored in detail in Chapter Five and Chapter Six.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter had three primary purposes; firstly, to explain the rationale and
process for the design of the research and implications of the mutually
constitutive relation between content and method; secondly, to link research
design to research practice by providing an outline of how research was
implemented; and thirdly to foreground the ways in which feminist, Black feminist
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and anti-imperialist epistemological principles alerted the research to inherent
tensions concerning, power, positionality, voice and knowledge production.
Knowledge of, and sensitivity to, the subject group was imperative to the
research design and practice. Epistemology informed the research design and
practice in several ways; primarily through developing trust and demonstrating
that the research was trustworthy. The design of the field investigation can be
viewed as a continual, shifting ‘process-to-create-a-process’ (Sandelowski,
2003: 796), with the inherent tensions of insider/outside hybridity. Most
importantly, the research design and practice, with and about South Asian
Muslim women, in the ‘War on Terror’, could not replicate any aspect of the harm
these women experience as/in the Islamophobic search for ideological
hegemony.
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Part II
Women’s narratives: Adversity and resilience
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Chapter Five: Adversity
5.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the findings of the investigation undertaken for this thesis
in relation to adversity. It addresses the micro level, lived realities of the effects
of the ‘War on Terror’ on the lives of South Asian Muslim women in the North of
England. Adversity is defined as disturbance that generates harm (Hardy 2015).
For South Asian Muslim women in Britain, the ‘War on Terror’, is known to have
generated significance disturbance through the ‘collateral damage’ of
Islamophobic violence inflicted on them. (see Chapter Three, 3.5; Lambert,
2011). This investigation identified, harm directly related to the ‘War on Terror’,
as well as other forms of harm not attributable to the ‘War on Terror’. Adversity
creates harm and multiple, intersecting adversities create multiple, intersecting
harms. Placed under the lens of temporality, to bring in the feature of
‘prolonged’; prolonged multiple intersecting adversities have the potential to
create prolonged multiple intersecting adversities and multiple harms. Adversity
is the condition in which harm is produced and functions. The experience of
harm has implications for how adversity is experienced, particularly in terms of
prolonged multiple intersecting adversity and harm. These are important frames
in locating adversity, and the harm it creates, in terms of the past in the present
and the present in the past with implications for future repair, for resilience as
resistance and transformation. This mutually constitutive relationship between
adversity and harm is evident in the subaltern positions of the communities to
which South Asian women belong, such as inequality, as stated in Chapter
Three (3.2.3). Adversity and harm are inevitable dynamics in the on-going
struggle for hegemony, and, as explored in Chapter Two, resilience.
This chapter responds to the aim of this thesis to expose, to identify, adversity
pre, and post-9/11; to fill the knowledge gap of South Asian Muslim women’s
micro level, ‘lived hegemony’ in the ‘War on Terror’. This research moves
beyond currently available knowledge of forms of adversity and the harm
produced; such as framing Muslims as the new suspect community. Specifically,
it provides, micro level instances, of harm experienced by South Asian Muslim
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women in conditions of adversity, which exemplify how the ‘collateral damage’
of the ‘War on Terror’ is manifest in the lives of South Asian Muslim women in
Britain. Fear of assault, was the most significant finding of this research, and
additionally, that in whole system resilience analysis, South Asian Muslim
women in Britain, experienced multiple, intersecting dislocations in relations with
other parts of the system. This research indicates that these dislocations have
led to the failure, of civil and civic institutions, to protect South Asian Muslim
women in Britain from the harm caused by adversity. These findings suggest
that adversity and harm, exists at multiple levels in the lives of the South Asian
Muslim women. Thematic analysis and coding of data, as explained in the
previous chapter, identified the following key themes/issues in relation to
adversity. These are presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Thematic analysis - key issues for adversity
Adversity
Context 1 - material and relational resources
Theme 1 adversity - fear and the spread of fear
Sub-theme 1a - the failure of civic institutions
Sub-theme 1b - failure of civil society institutions
The following sections use selected quotes, from participants in this
investigation, to substantiate these conclusions. As outlined in the previous
chapter, sixty themes were identified in the first (non-interpretive) coding of data.
These were refined and further refined to arrive at the issues identified above.
This chapter provides evidence to substantiate the issues, themes and sub-
themes outlined in Table 5.1. Poverty and inequality were emphasised by
participants (and particularly by representatives of the state and community
leaders), in this field investigation. Resilience literature alerts us to the important
role of material resources and material wellbeing, as protective factors, which
insulate individuals and communities from adversity and support resilience
(O’Sullivan, 2012; Woolcock, 2001). South Asian Muslim women in Fieldway
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shared structural inequality; poverty, racism and Islamophobia with members of
their community. However, they also experienced Islamophobia differently to
men, as well as experiencing gender inequality, within, and beyond their
communities.
5.2 Context; material resources and relational equality
This thesis has stressed the importance of context; the intersection of the macro
and micro through the lens of temporality and hegemony. The research
conducted for this thesis identified the importance context at the micro level
(home neighbourhood), in the form of environment and the resources, in
Fieldway, that South Asian Muslim women had access to. At the micro level of
neighbourhood, it evidenced the effects of macro-level structural inequality, it
exposed negative gender stereotyping by some representatives of local state
institutions and in communities in Fieldway. These findings indicate that civic
and civil society institutions, in their failure to offer South Asian Muslim women
the support they required, or to insulate them from harm, exacerbated further
forms of adversity. These factors, with the violence inflicted on South Asian
Muslim women in the ‘War on Terror’, indicate multiple adversities producing
multiple harms, in the lives of South Asian Muslim women. From this
perspective, it was difficult, given the evidence available to this research, to see
how local civic and civil society structures were able to offer support to, protect,
South Asian Muslim women from adversity and the harm created. From the
perspective of whole system approaches to resilience, it is difficult to see how,
with these breaks in relations, South Asian women are able to be resilient; as
interconnection between them, and other parts of the system, are dislocated
(Holling, 1973).
Material resources are viewed as important protectors from adversity (Halpern,
2002; O’Sullivan, 2012; Woolcock, 2010). In the frame of whole system
resilience, the lack of material resources forms risk to resilience; a further
adversity, creating further harm. Lack of material resources was a further issue
for Fieldway residents, and therefore, for its South Asian Muslim women
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residents. Evidence of the paucity of economic, social and environmental
resources is provided in Appendix 3. It outlines high levels of deprivation in
Fieldway; it also highlights national studies that evidence the effects of
deprivation on the mental health of the poor. For example, poverty more than
doubles an individual’s chance of experiencing depression (WHO 1995).
Evidence, offered in Appendix 3, indicates that poverty alongside discrimination,
such as sexism, racism and Islamophobia add to the mental health distress of
Asian, and, South Asian Muslim women. Data, provided in Appendix 3, are
important because studies indicate that poverty can have a direct, and indirect,
effect on emotional, behavioural and psychological wellbeing and profoundly
impact on individual’s ability to cope, or to be resilient. People in lower socio-
economic groups are exposed to greater stresses, and have fewer resources to
manage them, than people who are better off. Links between psychiatric
disorder and poverty, for example, have been found to demonstrate that poverty
more than doubles the chance of depression and anxiety disorder (Muarli,
2004:3, Anand, 2005:205, Rowlingson, 2011:16). It is the absence of resilience
building assets, such as structural equality and economic wellbeing, that led this
analysis to incorporate this backdrop to the prolonged adversity experienced by
South Asian Muslim women in the ‘War on Terror’. Structural inequality is itself
a symptom of hegemony as explored in Chapter Three.
5.2.1 Inequality, racism and Islamophobia
The following section substantiates the first issue identified in the thematic
analysis of all data in this thesis. It builds on the introduction above by grounding
the statistical and high level data in Appendix 3, in the evidence gathered in
Fieldway. It starts with a quote from a senior local government officer, with
strategic responsibility in Northend, including Fieldway. In talking about the main
pressures and issues for residents of Fieldway, this participant, called Robert
said:
'I strongly believe most of the pressures are related to inequality and poverty
and that if we [the local state] can really get to grips with inequality and
poverty we would start to erase some of the symptoms that manifest
themselves in all kinds of ways in the area…pressures like unequal
relationships between men and women, distrust between different Mosques,
distrust between the Asian community and authority ermm, high levels of
domestic violence, poor educational attainment, poorer health, ermm and a
deteriorating physical environment, poorer housing, pretty much the
spectrum of the indices’ of deprivation; the indicators are not good’ (Robert,
senior local government manager).152
Robert identified himself as, over 60 years of age, white British, and as having
responsibility for Fieldway over the past five years. Robert’s statement about the
inequality experienced by South Asian Muslim communities was not unusual;
social and economic deprivation was raised by all representatives of the local
state, and also by all community leaders, who participated in this investigation.
Leila, the Muslim woman councillor for the electoral ward, voiced the same
concerns when she said “the main issues for Fieldway hit you in the face when
you come into the area; poor condition of housing, lack of employment, young
people stood on the corners not having enough to do in terms of employment,
training, a lot of drug dealing” (Leila, 40 years old had represented Fieldway on
the local council for three years). The scale of inequality voiced by Robert and
Leila was overwhelming, the enormity of the problem was described by both
participants, but neither suggested that they had any idea about solutions, and
indeed there may not have been any immediate, or easy, solutions. Robert’s
detailed description of the effects of contexts of inequality and poverty, on the
lives of residents of Fieldway, is both seductive and distracting. The detail of the
description is seductive, in that it draws the listener/reader into the dialogue in
sympathy with the overwhelming nature of the problems. It is distracting
because it masks, and thereby disavows, the dislocation of the speaker (and
therefore the institution) from the reality of the lives and experiences of the
people (including South Asian Muslim women) about whom it is speaking. From
the perspective of Gramsci’s writing, Robert can be seen as the equivalent of
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the ‘intellectual’ who fulfils the role of the dominant group to achieve its plan
(Gramsci, 2007: 14). Under the lens of hegemony, the dynamic of seduction and
distraction, present in Robert’s description, could be seen as a manifestation of
consent and coercion.
The quotes from Robert and Leila confirmed that poverty was an issue of
concern that has impacts on intra and inter-community relations; but South
Asian Muslim women participants did not raise the issue of poverty. There was,
in fact, a marked silence from women; an absence of any mention of poverty,
and to a lesser degree of gender inequality. This may not be surprising as
poverty and inequality were not the focus of the research; women’s focus was
on the effects of 9/11 and 7/7, but women’s silence indicates another dynamic
of dislocation; internal, psychic dislocation on the micro level that resonate
macro level dislocations in hegemony. This was different for women community
leaders, whose experiences concurred with existing studies that the adversity of
structural inequality produces far reaching harms on South Asian Muslim
women’s mental health.
Numerous references were made by women community leaders to the mental
health distress experienced by South Asian Muslim women in Fieldway. Two
quotes are offered in the following text; the first is a statement from Shazia, who
described herself as 50-55 years old, of Bangladeshi origin and a Muslim.
Shazia managed the Bangladeshi women’s centre. Shazia said:
we’ve got a large community here who are quite deprived and who’s got
a lot of issues around deprivation, not accessing the service, and
inequality in accessing services. Most of people are living below the
poverty level and are on benefits, we’ve got issues that are underlying
such as domestic violence, the role of women. Recently we carried out a
piece of research and we found out that 90% of our users have got some
mental health issues in some way or other and it’s because of the
oppression they feel within the community, within the wider community.
(Shazia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)
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In this statement, Shazia began with structural issues related to deprivation, then
like Robert, she drilled down into talking about the impacts on women’s lives;
the response from the Bangladeshi women’s centre was to commission, or
undertakes, research to identify the impacts of deprivation on its user’s mental
health. The important point here is that, this community leader was aware of the
adversity faced by users of the centre, and took steps to identify the harms. In
another part of this interview Shazia described the work of the centre in relation
to domestic violence and mental health indicating responsiveness, as opposed
to remoteness, of the centre to women’s needs.
Shazia also said that, in some parts of the Bangladeshi and South Asian
communities, psychosis or distress is not recognised. Many families associate
mental health distress in negative and traditional ways with perceptions that the
individual who is ill, is ‘possessed’, and used the term ‘voodoo’ to describe the
belief system that suggests the individual is possessed by an evil spirit. Mental
ill health is, therefore, often discussed in affected families in terms of traditional
responses within their cultural ideological frame of belief. In the frame of
temporality, the past is in the present, thus, we can assume that when families
are confronted with something that they, firstly, don’t understand, and secondly,
causes them shame, they bring to the fore belief systems and ideologies that
are trusted/familiar to them. Additionally, as Shazia and Rizwana (the manager
of Ashiana) made clear, mainstream health care services do not understand
Asian cultures (lack of understanding then becomes the basis of lack of service
provision). The struggle between cultures/ideologies and the dynamic of consent
and coercion are clear in this example, as the dominant group exercises forms
of exclusion on the basis of race, and the subordinate group, turns to its familiar
past, in the present, for sustenance.
On three separate occasions, when the researcher was present at Ashiana
(Pakistani women’s centre), members of staff were called out of arranged events
to support women in mental health distress. One such situation, that is worthy
of note, arose after the field investigation had come to an end. On a return visit
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to Ashiana, at a time when the centre was not open to users, the researcher
made an impromptu visit to the centre. Whilst in the office, a call was received
by Ashiana staff notifying them that two women would be arriving at the centre
shortly; one woman was in a very bad state of distress. A centre user had
attempted suicide, and her friend had rung the centre, not knowing what else to
do. The two women arrived at the centre, and were taken into another room
where staff could talk to them privately. Staying in the office, it was difficult for
the researcher not to over-hear parts of the conversation, between Rizwana and
the woman, who was weeping and in a very distressed state. An ambulance was
called, and the woman’s health care needs were transferred to health care
services. There are three reasons for raising this incident; firstly, it demonstrates
the actuality of women’s mental health distress; in this instance the woman
wanted to end her life, and secondly, it amplifies that for this woman, and no
doubt many others, there was nowhere else to turn; the services just were not
available to them. Thirdly, it points to the existence, and importance, of trust
between the women’s centre and its users.
As with poverty, the issue of mental health wellbeing was largely not raised by
women in conversations, focus groups or in interview. This may be because of
the stigma attached to mental health distress generally and, particularly, as has
been demonstrated, in South Asian communities. The stigma of mental health
distress is configured on constructions of risk, thus, in the context where South
Asian communities themselves are socially constructed as signifying risk, the
difficulties of members of this community to expose and access support for their
mental health distress is exacerbated. One participant, Tazeem, in response to
being asked where she would go, and who she would turn to, if she felt bad,
talked openly about a time in her life when she was depressed. Tazeem
described herself as being of Mirpur/Pakistani origin, 33 years of age; Tazeem
said she came to Fieldway to marry. Tazeem was unusual at Ashiana; she wore
Western jeans and shirt. Tazeem said:
hmm. Don’t know. Lady you get help or my doctor. Once upon a time I
was really depressed and I talked to my, she used to take my blood, I
don’t know what you call them, to check their [baby] weight and that. And
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I was really close to her. I used to talk to her or you can talk to anyone
like here at the [Ashiana] centre. I don’t really open up to anyone. I deal
with my problems. (Tazeem, interview Ashiana)
Tazeem moved from Mirpur to marry her first cousin, who lived in Fieldway,
fifteen years earlier. It was not clear, from the interview with Tazeem, what had
caused her depression, however, in the interview a number of issues related to
her disillusionment with Britain emerged; some of these are raised later. Whilst
Tazeem appeared confident; she wore Western style clothes and was looking
to further her education, it is highly likely that Tazeem would have been subject
to the issues of oppression raised by Shazia earlier. During the interview,
Tazeem made it clear that her choice of dress was deliberately part of her
personal safety strategy as is expressed later in this chapter. The point here is
that, Tazeem rarely opened up to anyone, other than very trusted people such
as her, (we can assume) community midwife and the women’s centre.
While it is not possible to know the precise reasons for Tazeem’s period of
depression, Shazia’s earlier analysis, about the impact of the intersectional
experiences of gender and racial oppression on women’s mental health, form
an important backdrop. When Shazia’s concern about the, ‘collateral damage’,
of Islamophobic violence, is added to these, earlier stated anxieties, it is possible
to see that adversities are layering on each other. Here, the Black feminist
concept of intersectionality is a highly relevant epistemological lens; Crenshaw
explains that,
‘[b]ecause the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism
and sexism [and collateral damage of Islamophobic violence], any
analysis that does not take intersectionality into account cannot
sufficiently address the particular manner in which [South Asian Muslim
women] are subordinated’ (Crenshaw, 1989: 140).
The lens of intersectionality insists on, and enables, the connections between
vectors of lived experience and identity, in stark contrast to the dynamic of
dislocation and logics of binary. This lens is particularly relevant for the analysis
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of power structures of sexism and racism in hegemony, and specifically in terms
of the prolonged ‘war of position’ in the ‘War on Terror’, the lens of
intersectionality enables conceptualizations of hybridity.
Shazia shared a conversation with a user of the Bangladeshi centre that raises
similar concerns for personal safety, differently. Shazia talked about the
anxieties and concerns of a user of the Bangladeshi women’s centre, uncovering
issues of the complexity of belonging, or not belonging, being accepted, or not
accepted. The experience expresses the complexity of the identity negotiations
that South Asian Muslim women were required to engage in after 9/11. It is clear
from the conversation, that Shazia relayed, that the woman concerned was, in
post- 9/11 Britain, negotiating fear of the consequences of the ‘War on Terror’.
Shazia said:
I was talking to her [centre user] after 9/11, and after receiving all these
things, she said ‘do you know I’m not British; do you remember that I told
you a couple of days ago [before 9/11] that I’m British? My skin colour
tells me that I’m not British and especially I’m going to wear hijab so
they’re not going to accept me, so I feel that I’m going to, well we’re
buying a house in Bangladesh in case they’re not going to accept me
here’ and that’s how they [women] feel threatened. (Shazia, interview
Bangladeshi women’s centre)
In this statement, Shazia highlights the confusion experienced by many of the
centre users, regarding, not only, their ‘British’ identity but also their place in
Britain. It is difficult to tell, from this quote, if the woman concerned had been
subject to direct violence. Shazia said: ‘and after receiving all those things’,
suggesting that the woman had either been personally assaulted, or was
affected in some other way post 9/11; possibly by anti-Muslim images and
rhetoric. The woman expressed fear of the ramifications of not being accepted
after 9/11 when, she felt, being ‘British’ would be different to before; the relation
between temporal and spatial dimensions actively constitute this woman’s
position of dislocation/displacement. The pre/post 9/11 contrast is vivid, as is the
connection between skin colour and hijab; both are symbolic of and (re) produce
‘otherness’. This quote places fear and re-negotiation squarely in the frame of
post -9/11 ‘War on Terror’ Britain.
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Anti-Asian racism was raised, in the quote above, interchangeably with
Islamophobia by Shazia, making it difficult to separate the two forms of hate.
The reality for women (and also for men interviewed in this investigation), who
share both South Asian and Muslim identity, was the difficulty of knowing if they
were subject to race or faith hate. The logics, of dislocation and binary in
hegemony, produce psychic fragmentation and confusion; the implications, in
terms of resistance to subjugation, requires the transformation of dislocation into
connection; collective resistance, contingent on, collective consciousness of
forms of hatred as adversity and harm. The centre user also said ‘I’m going to
wear hijab so they’re not going to accept me’ emphasising her fear of not being
accepted as a Muslim. Several participants described being treated differently
because they were identified as, or identified themselves as, Muslim.
In focus group 3, at the Bangladeshi women’s centre, participant A0 made the
following comment:
I do feel let down by other members of my Muslim community when they
do really, really stupid things. We are constantly apologising which I
refuse to do – that’s not me, I don’t do that; and I don’t see why I should
apologies for someone because I don’t see other people apologising for
something that is nothing to do with them, and I don’t expect them to
either. So that kind of weight does get me down; the fact that I do belong
to something that is the latest hated religion. (participant A0, focus group
3, Bangladeshi women’s centre)
Participant A0 identified that being Muslim means being treated differently,
because she was Muslim, she said she was made to feel responsible for the
actions of all Muslims, in a way that she doesn’t see others being made
responsible. This quote is interesting because firstly, it paints a picture of
Muslims as a homogenous group; of all being responsible for the actions of a
few. It also identifies that a different standard is used for Muslims, than for other
communities. Participant A0 is also clear that, from her perspective, Muslims are
‘the latest hated religion’. This statement confirms the process of ‘othering’
Muslims, and identifies this process through the temporal frame of ‘latest’. This
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was repeated several times by both women and community leaders. Shazia, for
example said:
you know it’s true, because you’re a Muslim people ask ‘what are you
going to do?’….you never ask those things, but, if you are Muslim you
always have to say why you do that, or what you think about that; always
about so many different things. Even when I drive I think I have to be an
advocate; if I drive badly they will say ‘Muslim woman, bad driver, all
Muslim women are bad drives; they drive rough’…It’s really sad that
because we are Muslim we have to carry that burden. It’s really sad.
(Interview, Bangladeshi women’s centre)
Shazia said ‘because we are Muslim we have to carry this burden. It’s really
sad’. One reading of Shazia’s statement is that she is really fed up with being
made to feel responsible, another might be that, in stating ‘It’s really sad’, Shazia
informs us of her longing to belong; in effect Shazia is occupying the space of
hybridity; a desire for multiple positions of belonging. The statement appears to
sum up the additional responsibility, that Muslim women and men, felt because
they are Muslim; a manifestation of the strategic positioning of responsibility in
hegemonic power relations. Both male and female leaders voiced the belief that
‘Islamophobia is here to stay; unfortunately’ (Abdul, interview community centre
Northend). Abdul is of Pakistani origin, was in his early fifty’s at the time of the
interview, and manages a community centre in another part of Northend. He
was born and grew up in Fieldway and many members of his family continue
live in Fieldway.
The quotes in this section, on context, offer a sense of the despair of the
structural issues of inequality endemic in Fieldway, they also, begin to describe
the mental health effects of poverty and inequality on South Asian Muslim
women in Britain. These are important contextual pointers for this investigation,
setting the backdrop of poverty and inequality, on multiple simultaneous
intersecting levels, and their effects on South Asian Muslim women. Additionally,
these quotes indicate direct causal effects between South Asian Muslim
women’s fear, consequent behaviour change, and the ‘War on Terror’; 9/11. It
is within this wider context that South Asian Muslim women’s access to potential
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protection from adversity is located. The following section presents findings that
South Asian Muslim women, and their close family and kinship networks, live in
fear for women’s safety. Fear and the spread of fear, in Fieldway were palpable
in this research.
5.3 Women’s fear and the spread of fear
In adversity, ‘fear and the spread of fear’, is the result of deductive and inductive
analytic processes outlined in the previous chapter. The inductive processes
included observation and insights gathered during the ethnography. Boyatzis
(1998) refers to this process as ‘sensing a pattern’ on the basis of all knowledge
gathered during the research. Data presented in this section start with national
data related to Islamophobic hate crimes reported by Muslim women to Tell
MAMA. National data sets the context for Muslim women’s vulnerability to
Islamophobic assault, serving as the backdrop for South Asian Muslim women’s
narratives in Fieldway. The bringing together of national and local data, helps
to explain the spread of fear for Muslim women’s safety amongst Muslim
communities. Tell MAMA data alludes to fear as a result of assault, but are not
explicit on the experience of fear. Data from the Fieldway investigation makes
this link explicit and clear.
5.3.1 Islamophobic attack on women: the national data
The contradictory constructions of Muslim women’s visibility and invisibility in
counter-terrorism, within hegemonic power relations of patriarchy and
Islamophobia, are elucidated in Chapter Three (3.5). In the context of the ‘war
on terror’, the term ‘hyper-visible Muslim woman’ adds a further layer of
complexity in the production and function of visibility/invisibility in Islamophobia;
Muslim woman as a visible threat, risk, disruption; and hyper as in
heightened/hyper anxiety to a heightened/hyper threat. Muslim women, how
they look, what they wear; in all aspects of their identity come to embody and
signify threat on ‘hyper’ levels. The juxtaposition of Muslim women’s invisibility
in counter-terrorism (Chapter Three, 3.5) with Muslim women’s vulnerability to
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assault on the streets of Britain, because they wear hijab (Middle Eastern
Muslim head covering), or burka, (Muslim head and body cover), exemplifies
how they are positioned in the struggle for ideological domination, between
Islamic and Christian/Western systems of belief, and ideologies in the ‘War on
Terror’. Hijab is illustrated in image 5.1.
Image 5.1 Hijab
Source: google images
Newspaper accounts of incidents, such as, in the Peterborough Times (2017,
see Chapter One, 1.3), report assaults on Muslim women, by members of the
British public, who have dehumanised visibly identifiable Muslim women
sufficiently, to assault them for no apparent reason, other than, that they
symbolise a threat to British values (Allen, 2007; 2011; Rashid, 2013). Rashid
(2013) argues that the depiction of Muslim men, in counter-terrorism, is of men
posing a potential threat to the physical security of the nation, whilst the
presence of Muslim women, is perceived as a potential threat to the ideological
security of liberal democracy, and, to the Western way of life. In this analysis,
Muslim women as hyper-visible manifestations of Islam, become triggers of the
threat, to those who feel endangered by a perceived Islamic challenge.
‘Othering’ in the context of counter-terrorism depicts Islam (and Muslim men in
particular) as fundamentalist; part of the ‘discursive terrain, that uncritically
162
collapses Islam (or certain imagined practices of Islam) with illiberalism’ (Akbar,
2014: 152, see also Spalek, 2009). This generates a climate in which Muslims
(and Muslim women) are viewed as legitimate targets. It brings into focus the
physical and psychological insecurity of being viewed as the ‘Other’, and, being
targeted as the ‘Other’. Women’s bodies in this depiction become the battle
ground of challenge (wearing Islamic dress) and counter-challenge
(Islamophobic assault).
Evidence indicates that the hyper-visibility of British Muslim women, of whom
South Asian Muslim women are the largest group, places them at increased risk
of assault, in reprisal for Islamist related atrocities, that take place anywhere in
the world, and to which they have no connection. This is a prime example of
how, what is happening on the macro level, impacts on what is happening at the
micro level; lived hegemony. Islamophobic hate crime data compiled by Tell
MAMA36 are helpful in building a picture of assaults reported by Muslim women.
Hate crime records show that women, who are identifiable as Muslims, face the
greatest risk of physical and verbal Islamophobic assault. Reports of assault
increase immediately after a national or international incident, of perceived or
actual, Islamist-related violence. For example, in the two months following the
13th November 2015 attacks in Paris, hate crime against Muslim women in
Britain increased by 328%, compared to the three weeks prior to the attacks
(Faith Matters, 2016: 21). Over this period, 61% of all (in-person) assaults
targeted Muslim women; 75% of whom were identifiable as Muslim because
they wore hijab or burka (Ibid: 32) as illustrated in image 5.2, on the following
page.
36 Tell MAMA is a nationally recognised monitoring project for anti-Muslim hatred (Faith Matters,
2016)
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Image 5.2 woman in burka
Source: google images
Perpetrators of Islamophobic assault are identified as overwhelmingly white,
male, with the single largest age demographic of 40+ years (Littler, 2015).
Increase in assaults on Muslim women, following an Islamist related attack;
suggest reprisal, by one ideological group, against another. Eatwell’s (2006)
‘cumulative extremism’ hypothesis, suggests that one form of extremism sparks
an escalation or ‘spiral’ (see Chapter Three, 3.4.2). The ‘cumulative extremism’
hypothesis, was tested by Littler (2015), by comparing reports of anti-Muslim
assault immediately before, and after, Islamist attacks in Sydney (December
2014), Paris (January 2015), and Copenhagen (February 2015). The
investigation found evidence to substantiate the hypothesis, revealing ‘a spike
in the number of reported anti-Muslim cases in the periods immediately following
each high-profile jihadi Islamist attack’ (p. 13). Increased on-line assaults,
largely reported by Muslim men, were also recorded during these periods.
National data indicate that, male and female Muslims’ are targeted for attack,
but that attacks increase massively at particular times, and also that Muslim
women, who are identifiably Muslim, are most at risk of physical and verbal
assault.
The Tell MAMA annual report (2016), notes that hate crime work needs to
account for the ‘banal and everyday nature of incidents and crimes’ (p. 18) that
affect and blight the every-day lives and mobility of victims’ (Ibid.). This was true
for South Asian Muslim women who participated in the Fieldway investigation.
National data, clusters in-person hate crime by place of attack, indicate that
Muslim women are most at risk in public spaces, and on public transport (Ibid:
38). These sites of risk were raised by women in the Fieldway investigation also.
These data, alongside information about women’s vulnerability to ‘hard’ counter-
terrorism (see 3.5.2), though not raised in the form of home searches in the
Fieldway investigation, validate women’s fears and anxieties of victimization.
They contribute to the spread, or ‘culture of fear’, (Furedi, 2007; Jackson, 2008;
Stanko, 1995) generated in Muslim communities for Muslim women’s safety.
5.3.2 Fear generated by Islamophobic assault: women in Fieldway
Throughout the field investigation, South Asian Muslim women spoke of attacks
on themselves, or of attacks on other Muslim women, suggesting the prevalence
of a ‘culture’ of fear amongst women participants. Quoting Garland (2001),
Furedi notes that: ‘fears and resentments, but also our commonsense narratives
and understandings, become settled cultural facts, that are sustained, and
reproduced by cultural scripts’ (2007: no pagination). A powerful ‘cultural script’,
presented by women in Fieldway, was one of fear of the world beyond the home
neighbourhood; particularly for women who wore hijab. The quote (in the text
box) from Shafia, who was thirty-five years of age at the time of the interview,
and who was born in Fieldway, illustrates the fear of her parents’ for her safety,
as a daughter who chose to wear hijab, against their wishes.‘I think that when I went out and about and stuff, because I was wearing
a hijab my parents were really worried that if I was in a particular area of
if I was alone that I’d need to be really careful because there may be
attacks, there was a real fear not to be in a particular place you know and
not to be alone, so always be in groups. Families and elderly were
worried about what’s going to happen now if somebody tries to hurt
another person because of what has happened’ (Shafia, interview164
Bangladeshi women’s centre).
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The anxiety and fear of parents, expressed by Shafia, was not unusual; a
number of participants spoke of their parents, brothers and sisters worrying
about their, or other hijab wearing women’s, safety. The, often voiced, cultural
script was of family members’ anxiety, and fear, for women’s safety. The
association of hijab with attacks on the wearer were repeated. In generational
terms, this is perhaps not surprising, as many first generation migrant
Bangladeshi and Pakistani women (mothers), tended not to wear hijab, but to
wear traditional, South Asian, salwar kameez. This was the case with Shafia’s
mother, who wore a dupatta; a loose fabric worn over the shoulders that also
easily serves as a head cover when required, as illustrated in Image 5.3. It was
also the case that older women, at Ashiana, and in the Bangladeshi women’s
centre, wore traditional South Asian dress and not hijab, that originates from the
Muslim Easter.
Image 5.3 Dupatta
Many women recalled events, following 7/7 with surprising clarity; almost as if
recalling recent incidents, rather than events that had taken place eight years
ago. Under the lens of temporality and in regards to prolonged adversity, this
suggests that the wounds of fear inflicted at the time, had not healed, and this
could well be the case, as the reality, and the script of anti-Muslim hate,
continued beyond 7/7/2005. Anxiety was both a personal and a collective
experience (as in the quote from Shafia above). For example, Ishmael, who was
30 years old, of Pakistani descent, and a regular attender at Ashiana, displayed
deep emotion as she recalled the anxiety in her kinship network after 7/7:
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‘everyone was looking out for each other, everyone was saying “tell your
daughters to be careful because they could be, for example, attacked’’, it was
horrible’ (Ishmael, interview Ashiana).
In a discussion of 7/7, in focus group 3, at the Bangladeshi women’s centre, the
conversation also reflected fear and the spread of fear. Participants in this focus
group are coded A1, A2 and so on to indicate the flow of conversation. The
conversation went as follows, starting with participant A5, who said:
7/7 was the first time where – I’ve been here for a few years, 10 years,
that was the first time someone actually shouted racist abuses you know,
never, ever had before had I had anything like that….(participant A5)
I’ve grown up with racist abuse – I live in XXX and I’ve grown up with
racist abuse from a young age. Because I’ve grown up with racist abuse,
but I’ve not felt much impact personally from 7/7 or from the Woolwich
one’ (participant A3) (focus group 3, Bangladeshi centre).
Both participants A3 and A5 wear hijab. When asked to elaborate, the following
conversation took place:
I think everybody was a little more wary, shocked after the London thing
(participant A1)
yeah, you were a bit more careful, more girls…. (participant, A2)
yeah shocked, you’d be a bit more careful, be more vigilant you know
when you’re wearing a hijab and stuff like that…. (participant, A3)
that’s right, I think people were worried about their own safety (participant,
A6)
when that happened I was going into town and I thought ‘oh my God what
if someone goes for me’ because I had my hijab on, I actually thought
that and that was like…….. (participant, A5) (focus group 3, Bangladeshi
women’s centre).
In the same focus group, a further discussion elaborated the cultural script of
fear, or transference of fear, when participant A1 said:
I think there was one lady on XXX Lane, she was driving and a lady pulled
her scarf off and stuff like that. They did as she was parking. She was
taking driving lessons that time she got attack on XXX Lane. Then just
like there used to be XXX supermarket there was a lady who was
attacked there as well and one of the ladies took off her….. (participant,
A1) (focus group 3, Bangladeshi women’s centre).
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Participant A1 did not have first-hand knowledge of either of the incidents she
shared; they were part of the script of attacks on women who wear hijab, which
appeared to have become embedded in the discourses of the networks that
these women belonged to. Women’s fear appears to have been grounded in
these events and also in attacks experienced by members of their group.
Tazeem (quoted earlier), shared the following story:
after 7/7 my friends; she covers face, guys they say bad stuff. A few of
my friends they say that they go on bus but I go in car. My friend – she
wears full scarf and stuff [burka]. You know she was on bus and these
boys say stuff to her she got scared and she came home. I drive, I don’t
go on buses….maybe because of the way I dress; Western style and stuff
I never had any bad comments or bad stuff (Tazeem, interview Ashiana).
Women, who had not experienced assault themselves, noted the vulnerability of
other Muslim women; a dynamic of fear spreading fear. Tazeem was clear that
she will not put herself at risk by wearing hijab; as mentioned earlier Tazeem
dressed in Western style clothing. Tazeem was also clear that she would not
travel on buses choosing to drive. Information about attacks on Muslim women
nationally, knowledge of assaults on women locally and the perception of hatred
of Muslims combine to make women fearful and feel insecure. For example,
Aisha, who is thirty-three years old, of Pakistani descent, and was born in
Northend said: ‘I remember a lot of hatred at the time [9/11]; friends and
colleagues were affected by it; Islamophobia. And when 7/7 happened I thought
not again! Is there some sort of conspiracy? Do they, whoever is responsible,
really want us to be hated that much?’ (Aisha, interview Ashiana).
Media portrayals’ of Muslims were another issue raised as fuelling Islamophobia
in many interviews; Shafia asked, ‘why would the media have this campaign
target Muslims as well, and they don’t even understand the religion as well…I
tried to get them [younger brothers] to try to understand as well that what they
hear in the media they shouldn’t take at face value’ (Shafia, interview
Bangladeshi women’s centre). The sense of Muslim’s as ‘Others’ and not
accepted was also often apparent. Talking about hopes for the future, some
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participants again expressed fear that was generated by hatred of Muslims. The
added fear was that this was not going to change soon. Hakeem, a forty year
old community leader, who had grown up in Fieldway said:
my fear is that I don’t want them (my daughters) to be seen as some
people see Muslims; as part of the enemy, as part of this cult, Muslim cult
that promotes terrorism….because the last thing I want for my daughters
is for them to be attacked or them to be abused, verbally or physically
abused because of the colour of their skin. (Hakeem, community leader)
Hakeem, as a father, voiced fears for the safety of his daughters now and into
the future. The sentiment was, ironically, strikingly like, the fears expressed by
the ‘White Moghuls’ in late 17th century India for the concern for their Eurasian
children. Hakeem’s statement clearly links the perception, by some members of
the public, that Islam promotes terrorism and the backlash of physical retribution
and abuse of Muslim women. Under the lenses of temporality and hegemony,
the comparison with the fears of 17th century British men in India are a reminder
that the binary of ‘us’ and ‘them’ has been acted out violently, over centuries,
creating anxiety and fear for dominant and subaltern groups.
The narratives of women in Fieldway, as well as statements by others, such as
Hakeem, confirm that women’s fear of hatred, directed at them, as well as the
reality of their vulnerability to being attacked, was linked to 9/11 and the
triggering of current heightened anxiety about loss of ideology, in the ‘War on
Terror’. Women in this research clearly identified heightened fear and anxiety
after the 7/7 London bombings in 2005. Additionally, although women in
Fieldway, did not talk directly about vulnerability linked to police and security
service home searchers (see Chapter Three, 3.5.2), several comments were
made about the vulnerability of male family members, for example those with
beards; a further layer of vulnerability to their already insecure position. It is also
highly likely that, the sense of being singled out by the state for negative
treatment would be further exacerbated by reports that a minority of Muslims
arrested, using terrorism-related powers, were found guilty of terrorism related
offences (Anderson, 2016; Nì Aolàni, 2013).
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Within the wider context of inequality outlined at 5.2, increased Islamophobic
assault on women, the spread of fear amongst women, and in family and kinship
networks, the field investigation, found little support for women from institutions
of the state. The sub-theme 1a outlines what the investigation identified in
relation to state institutions responses to women’s insecurity.
5.4 Insulation from adversity; the role of local state institutions
The following text outlines findings that indicate, that representatives of the local
state institutions involved in this investigation, had little knowledge of South
Asian Muslim women’s anxiety for their personal safety. It is useful to start with
a brief outline of the three democratically elected councillors who represented
Fieldway at the time of the investigation. Harry was a White British male, aged
over 55 years, Harry had represented Fieldway for eleven years, Harry did not
live in Fieldway; Leila was a female of Pakistani descent, 40 years of age, Leila
had represented Fieldway for three years, Leila was born in Northend but did
not live in Fieldway; Wahid, was also of Pakistani origin, male, aged around 45
years, Wahid moved to Fieldway 18 years ago from Kashmir, he has
represented Fieldway for six years, Wahid lived in Fieldway. Having represented
Fieldway for eleven years, Harry knew the neighbourhood well, Leila
understood, subjectively, as a hijab wearing Muslim woman, the pressures on
Muslim women, and Wahid said he had two daughters, but we have no way of
knowing if they wore hijab, and he knew the neighbourhood well from the
perspective of being a resident. The combination, of knowledge and
subjectivities of these three representatives, of local state institutions, in terms
of experience, and with gender, ethnicity and faith subjectivity, might suggest a
deeper understanding of, or a stronger connection with, South Asian Muslim
women in the neighbourhood, than appeared to be the case in this research. In
interview, Leila expressed concern about the repercussions of 9/11 on ‘innocent
parties’ and also shared a personal experience of Islamophobic abuse as a hijab
wearing South Asian Muslim women. Leila said she thought the:
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tarred with the same brush, and what’s going to happen now?,
because the lash-out; I’ve worn my scarf since I was about the age
of 18, and never have I felt uncomfortable before about wearing it,
but after that [9/11] I felt uncomfortable, because I was approached
and said ‘you Pakis get out of our country’ – it was awful’ (Leila,
interview, Ashiana)170
also spoke of her fears for her family; children, siblings and parents and
ularly stressed her concern for her brother who she said is in the ‘police
, and he’s still in the police force, and the thought that every day when he’s
ting people; it’s just awful’. These statements suggest that Leila, not only
d gender, faith and ethnic identity with women in Fieldway, but also the
rience of Islamophobic assault, as well as anxiety about the welfare of
y members. Leila’s position of authority within local government, might
est that post-9/11 anxieties, such as South Asian Muslim women’s fear for
safety, would be understood and acknowledged within local government
artner organisations. Leila was located in dual positions simultaneously;
r and an outsider, in Fieldway and in local government; a position of
dity within hegemony. Leila’s words testify to the complexity of hybrid
ions; a continuously (inter)changing position of ambivalence, conflict and
iet (Bhabha, 1994).
wo male councillors for Fieldway, Harry and Wahid, clearly stated that they
ot been aware of the effects of 9/11, or 7/7, on women in their constituency.
sponse to the question by the researcher: ‘were you aware of any issues
uslim women?’ Wahid said: ‘no, no, not one single resident’. We can
me that not one single resident contacted Wahid after 7/7 (Wahid was not
ected member for Fieldway in 2001); the response was one of certainty.
id was certain that there had been no effect on any resident, leaving no
e for confusion for Wahid, but his response opens up questions about the
ion of his unqualified certainty, in the contexts of Islamophobia, counter-
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terrorism, social inequality and prolonged adversity of the ‘War on terror’. In
other words, what is the function of dislocation in terms of what can be thought,
voiced and seen in the search for ideological hegemony in the ‘War on Terror’?
How do binary logics (unqualified certainty) function, as a psychic defence
mechanism, in the face of overwhelming and prolonged adversity in ‘War on
Terror’? How does hybridity function in the ‘war of position’ in the struggle for
ideological hegemony in the context of the ‘War on Terror’?
When Harry was asked about the impact of 9/11 and 7/7 on the neighbourhood
(and by implication on Muslim women) his response was:
No, because the strongest feeling was caused by the Iraq war, and I and
XXX [labour councillor at the time]; he was the candidate the year after
me in 2003. It was a question of making it clear that although the Labour
party in the shape of Mr Blair, had agreed with this approach to the
problem, but we did not. Not that it did us any good, still, the XXX got in,
but there were feelings, and I know there were feelings, and I know XXX
(Labour MP), although he didn’t turn up, at one of his surgeries lots of
people turned up to criticise him. It was much more of an issue than July
2005 (Harry, interview Ashiana).
For Harry it was clear that 7/7 had no repercussions for his female Muslim
constituents; this is equally as surprising as Wahid’s statement. Harry’s
deflection of the question is much the same as Robert’s (mentioned earlier in
relation to pressures on the communities in Fieldway). Harry, went on to talk
about the holy books of Christianity and Islam, and how the council had miss-
informedly, in his opinion, given space to Asian councillors to talk about Islam in
full council, and agreement for a procession through Fieldway organised by an
anti-war campaign group. Harry said: ‘so, when I think about tensions, I do not
remember tensions coming up about July 2005’. On being pressed to recall any
impact at all, Harry’s response was: ‘No, the police were probably extra vigilant
and maybe just checking out places, but you didn’t know. You didn’t know; you
couldn’t pick up anything that there had been horrific acts in London. Well, I
didn’t know and I didn’t pick up anything’.
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Leila, had not been elected to democratic office in 2005, but was working near
the neighbourhood at the time she said:
I wasn’t closely linked at the time but the rumours were that they [women]
were withdrawing, and they weren’t going [out] because of fears that
there might be lash back from the other communities (Leila, interview
Ashiana).
In response to a question about the recent (in terms of the interview) murder of
the soldier Lee Rigby, in 2013, during the time Leila was a local councillor, she
said: ‘I didn’t get any calls…I think that again people went on as normal’. This
statement correlates with women’s responses; police reassurance appears to
have functioned differently on this occasion, perhaps because the local police
community engagement processes were better established by 2013, than was
the case in 2005, as was made clear by Ali, the neighbourhood constable for
Fieldway.
Returning to the responses from Wahid, Harry and Leila about the impacts of
9/11 and 7/7 on Fieldway residents: Wahid clearly said that he had no
knowledge of impacts for any, not one single, resident; Harry also said, after a
long distraction, that he didn’t remember ‘tensions coming up’; Leila, who was
not an elected member for Fieldway in 2005, but worked nearby said, she was
aware that South Asian Muslim women had become ‘withdrawn’. Leila’s insight
is the closest, to the narratives of fear shared by women in this research. These
responses are hugely significant as they indicate an almost total disconnect
between the lived experiences of South Asian Muslim women in Fieldway, as
expressed to this research, and the understanding of the elected members who
represented their interests in the local state.
This was different in relation to the police. Following the 2005 London bombings,
there was general positive feedback of neighbourhood policing responses; the
immediacy of the response and the effectiveness of police reassurance. The
swift response was viewed positively by most participants, including women.
However Ali, the neighbourhood police officer, who was mentioned earlier,
offered a different perspective: Ali said:
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in terms of the police response, as I can remember, I got a call,
I was at home at the time; can you come in? It was about going
out there and giving reassurance and walking the Fieldway
area on patrol, really just to reassure people. You had a lot of
bravado from young people, boys, you know ‘London deserved
what it got’ and all that but I remember the police response was
good. But, to be honest I found it to be fake, and when I say
fake, I mean the community engagement at the time was fake.
We had no relationships built with the community, we had no
engagement with the community, and it was very much a
reaction, so you know, people also saw it as, you know, what
we were trying to do. Ermm, that in itself doesn’t build trust (Ali,
interview police station).
Ali described himself as a 35 years old South Asian Muslim, he had been a
neighbourhood officer in Fieldway for the past seven years. It was perhaps
understandable, in light of the profile of the bombers (young Muslim males), that
young Muslim men might be particularly sought out, or engaged, by police
officers, but it was surprising that Ali volunteered no information about the impact
of 7/7 on Muslim women, either immediately after 7/7, or in the following months.
Women reported a positive response from the police, in terms of community
reassurance, but there was no mention, by this neighbourhood officer, of specific
work to support women after 7/7.
The independent Muslim hate crime reporting organisation; Tell MAMA, had not
yet been established and there is evidence that many women did not report hate
crime to the police (Faith Matters, 2016; also the findings of this investigation).
It could be argued, that the police were unaware of assaults on South Asian
Muslim women. The police may not, at this time, have had either community, or
hate crime intelligence, through which to understand the vulnerability of Muslim
women, and neither did they have engagement processes through which they
could gather this information. Women participants, in the research, also reflected
a reluctance to turn to neighbourhood police officers in times of trouble. When
focus group 1 participants were asked if they would turn to their local
neighbourhood police, they said “no, no way”. This was also the case for some,
but not all, interview participants. Lack of trust, and therefore communication
between, South Asian Muslim women and the police, may explain Ali’s silence
on the issue of women’s vulnerability. It could well be that the police, at the
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institutional level, did not understood women’s vulnerability. This is deeply
worrying and suggests another dislocation in the relationships between South
Asian Muslim women and representatives of the local state.
From a whole system resilience perspective, these dislocations indicate the
further loss of potential protection for South Asian Muslim women in this
neighbourhood (and in Britain) in the face of prolonged adversity. Despite this
dislocation, women participants clearly indicated that from 7/7, relations with the
police had improved. Given the apparent lack of knowledge of the police about
women’s fears, if not their vulnerability to assault, it is difficult to reconcile these
findings. Through the lens of feminism and hegemony, it is possible to state that;
women might have been hegemonized, placing their needs in a subordinate
position to those of their communities. The conflictual and contradictory
positions, in the face of adversity produced by ideological struggle, points to
hybridity as a complex position/space of consent and coercion
It was difficult to gauge, the extent to which relations between the police and
women, and women’s organisations, had progressed from the responses in this
investigation. From the perspective of the presence of the research in the
neighbourhood, it was noticeable that, over the eight months the researcher
spent largely at the Ashiana centre, in Fieldway, no officer voluntarily visited the
centre. It may have been that the time spent, by the researcher in the centre, did
not coincided with police visits, but this is highly unlikely, as police presence was
not mentioned by women or Ashiana staff. Operational issues, or cuts in
neighbourhood policing services, might also have led to the apparent neglect of
relationship building between the police and Ashiana. It has not been possible
to conclude this, as this was not a key line of research interest and further study
would be required to evidence levels of engagement. What was clear is, the
need for greater interaction, contact, and engagement between public services,
such as the police, and local government, and women in Fieldway (see Spalek,
2013).
Local policy is enacted in the context of national government. The critique of
counter-terrorism, presented in Chapter Three, offers some insights into the
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complex, and contradictory aspects of counter-terrorism’s dual aims. At the level
of the local state, officials involved in this investigation, noted this complexity
and its effects on local actions. Echoing the work of academic Thomas (2010),
Robert was explicit about the difficulty of local implementation of national policy.
Robert said:
Some of the social policy changes around at the time [2001], were for a
greater push for community cohesion initiatives, but I also found that
those involved in social policy (and not just the council), others involved
in social policy, were a little bit, and have been for many years, double
thinking. They’d talk about celebrating diversity, but they haven’t really
intellectually squared that. They talk of integration, and they talk of
multiculturalism, but then they talk in weird terms of what the culture of
England is. You wonder whether or not, you should be taking forward
initiatives in increasing peoples chances of English classes, or if you
should be putting information out in different languages. It’s that kind of
dichotomy and schizophrenia, in social policy, in this field that’s very
reflective of policy makers being very unsure of themselves in this new
environment. (Robert, interview local government office)
Robert’s comment most clearly highlighted a pattern of hesitancy apparent in
interviews with representatives of local government; a sense of uncertainty
about how best to deal with, the complexity of a rapidly changing demographic,
in what Robert called a ‘schizophrenic’ policy environment; to build cohesion or
encourage British values. The analysis offered in Chapter Three (3.4) of the
national counter-terrorism strategy may explain the ‘schizophrenia’ experienced
in the delivery of CONTEST at the local level. This point reiterates the
importance of strong relations in all parts of the social system for the coherence
and survival of the system, as in whole system resilience theory. It paints a
picture of dislocation between national and local policy, and between national
and local policy and South Asian Muslim women citizens.
Again, Robert’s input is seductive; it is difficult not to have a degree of sympathy
with the position of being between government and community, of the enormity
of the issues faced (as stated in the first comment from Robert), and confusing
policy initiatives to address them. In this complex mix of issues, Muslim women’s
experience of fear and anxiety for their safety was missing. Women’s experience
of fear, post 9/11 and 7/7, was not raised as a concern by a single participant in
this group. As a consequence, it was not possible to note one support
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intervention, or programme, aimed at South Asian Muslim women. It is important
to note that Robert, in local government, and Ali in the police did mention the
particular needs of South Asian Muslim women, if not their fear of Islamophobic
assault; Robert recognised the valuable work of women’s centres, and Ali
described police support for South Asian Muslim women who experience
domestic violence from South Asian Muslim men.
From a research perspective, the failure of participants representing state
institutions, to mention the effects of 9/11 and 7/7 on South Asian Muslim
women, was particularly troubling. All participants were contacted prior to
involvement in the research, all were told that this was a study of South Asian
Muslim women’s resilience, all were asked direct questions about women’s
experiences during interviews, and a number of the interviews were held at
Ashiana, the Pakistani women’s centre. Hegemony, in relation to gender
appeared, from this perspective to be almost total; there appeared to be little
struggle from the perspective of these participants to question the invisibility of
women. The invisibility of women’s experience of fear, in local state institutions,
questions the role of the local state in protecting South Asian Muslim women
from adversity and fear for their safety. Women’s invisibility at the level of the
local state, adds to their absence in national state considerations, as expressed
in Chapter Three, 3.5. These deficits demonstrate a lack of policy intervention
to protect women at macro (governmental), and meso (local state), levels.
The absence of specific state support for women is telling, as resilience literature
indicates the importance of ‘protective factors’ at all spatial levels (Halpern,
2002, see also France 2010). Resilience literature also warns that a singular
focus on risk (the ‘radicalisation’ of Muslim men), is insufficient for community
resilience; protective processes (support for the community) is essential for
resilience building (Rutter, 1987). These findings suggest that a protective
counter-balance to national risk biased counter-terrorism policy is lacking at the
local level. This research also found that Prevent funding was used to support
women’s empowerment at Ashiana, this indicates that there is a complex
presence of women in counter-terrorism, as addressed in Chapter Three (3.5).
The point here is that, there appeared to be no on-going, systematic,
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engagement with South Asian Muslim women by state institutions. This
investigation found that some civil society institutions, also acted as barriers to
support for South Asian Muslim women; rather than including women in existing
networks, or providing opportunities for women to build networks of support,
women were excluded. The following section addresses the issue of civil society
institutions failings to offer women protection from adversity.
5.5. Insulation from adversity; the role of civil society institutions
Two types of civil society institutions, in Fieldway, were particularly identified as
offering little, if any, support to South Asian Muslim women; local Mosques and
generic community centres. It is important to note that this was not the case for
all Mosques in Northend, or all community centres. The centres identified were
local to Fieldway. The issue of women’s access to, and use of facilities, in the
neighbourhood, was amplified by the lack of public meeting places and spaces,
in the neighbourhood, reducing women’s opportunity to develop social networks
and collective action (Kilpatrick, 2005). This was evident in the lack of local
facilities identified in neighbourhood data in Appendix 3. Meeting places and
spaces are particularly important to building social networks and social capital;
Forrest et al., (2001) suggest that support from individuals, and organisations,
in neighbourhoods are essential to developing social capital and reciprocity (see
Table 2.2). Exclusion suggests that communities are not working together, to
generate reciprocal benefit and social good, with serious failings in terms of
protecting and maintaining community in ‘good working order’ (Masten 2001:
227, see also Chapter Two, 2.3),
Issues related to Mosques in Fieldway, emerged frequently in the field
investigation, as potential places and spaces of faith, and social support.
However, this investigation identified a number of problems for South Asian
Muslim women’s inclusion in these networks. Two examples exemplify women’s
formal exclusion. The first is a quote from Fathema, who identified herself as 36
years of age and a second generation Bangladeshi Muslim woman. Fathema
said she was born, and grew up in, Fieldway. The second statement was made
by Shahid, who was the contact known to the researcher; the statement was
made during the walk about in Fieldway, as the start of to the field investigation.
Fathema said:
Fathema’s
about acces
out the wa
Mosque. Fa
if she had a
and finally s
the Mosque
of realisatio
narrative, o
This Mosqu
occasions;
is an import
explored in‘The Mosque that my father and brothers go to, that is next to
my house, the XXX Mosque, they don’t have facilities for
ladies, but they do have different days with speeches and
things. [if I needed support] I would do it through my dad if
there was an issue that I wanted an answer from the Mosque.
I would give it to my dad, because I couldn’t go there myself.
One of the things that we do have is that we have this two
way radio so that if there is anything, let’s say for example a
death in the community, they’ll announce it, [or] if someone
is ill. Someone needs praying [for] too, if there is an incident
in the Mosque they’ll announce it in the tannoy’. (Fathema,
interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)178
experience of her local Mosque was not unusual in women talking
s to the Mosque. In this narrative, Fathema appeared to be working
ys in which, as a woman, she could be engaged with her local
thema begins by saying that there are special days for ladies, then
need to contact the Imam she would use her father as her proxy,
he says there’s a tannoy and radio system that keeps her linked into
. The quote signifies that Fathema was working through a process
n, allowing her to ‘locate herself’ (Bamberg, 2004: 354) in her
r story of her access to the Mosque that is next door to her home.
e exercises a code of exclusion of women, except on particular
this Mosque is attended by male members of Fathema’s family. This
ant point in terms of the counter-balance to adversity and exclusion
the following chapter.
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Women in Fieldway were also excluded from the Pakistani Mosque that, during
the walk about of Fieldway, Shahid had called ‘the largest Mosque in the
neighbourhood’. This Mosque also managed the community centre in which the
Pakistani women’s centre, Ashiana, was housed during the time of the field
investigation37. The mosque was noted for its orthodox stance in relation to
women; it exercised a total exclusion of women, and had refused to negotiate
with women, for their access to the community centre that is adjacent to it.
Shahid said:
this Mosque offers no services or facilities to women, or families. The
committee is, well, it’s made up of older, and they’re very traditional in
relation to women. To get access to the community centre Abdul
[community leader], did a lot of work. Less traditional young Muslims had
to join the committee to negotiate women’s access, and it’s not certain
how long they [Ashiana], will be able to stay. (Shahid, walk about
introduction to Fieldway)
Shahid’s comment can be interpreted either as progress because Ashiana
gained access to the community centre, or as a lack of progress, as women
were excluded from the negotiation process. The male to male negotiation, and
its outcome of enabling women access to the community centre, might suggest
movement from absolute refusal to another, mid-way point; allowing women
access though the mediation of men. The Pakistani community centre, is owned
by the local state, and managed by the Mosque Committee, offering a different
perspective of women’s complex negotiations to gain access. This experience
exemplifies the complexity of ‘the war of position’ in hegemony; struggles of
ideological power relations, of position and space; issues of access, negotiation,
gender and management. It also exemplifies the complex web of relations of
consent and coercion within hybridity; so much more than different ideologies
sitting side by side. In this context, the failure of to the local state to intervene on
women’s behalf might be read as the local state being sensitive to its dominant,
ideologically hegemonic position and working in a way that was not about
enforcing/coercing the hegemonic ideology of equal access.
37 Ashiana closed months after the field investigation ended due to lack of resources at least in
part related to high rental charges
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Under the lens of feminism, the failure of the state to intervene can be read as
gender hegemony; retaining unchallenged the subaltern status of women in the
dominant ideology. This was a different issue to women’s exclusion from the
Mosque. The Mosque was self-financing; the local state had no coercive
influence over its use. The intersection of state sponsored, and locally owned,
facilities raises challenges in state/civil society negotiations that are rooted in
power and history in complex ways. There is also the additional issue, of the
willingness of local state institutions to intervene on behalf of excluded women
citizens, in terms of influencing change. The issue of state owned, and
community managed, facilities was also raised, in this research, in relation to
the Bangladeshi community centre in Fieldway; this issue is addressed later in
this chapter. The next paragraphs provide an insight into women’s perspectives
of exclusion from the Pakistani Mosque.
The Pakistani community centre, in which Ashiana was located, was in close
proximity to the Pakistani Mosque. The women at Ashiana, were well placed to
know of any incidents related to women’s access, should they arise. A rare event
of a woman, visitor to Fieldway, coming to pray at the Mosque to find that she
was excluded, occurred during the field investigation. The incident is presented
in these findings because it exemplifies women’s exclusion, and also because
the incident raised questions for women at Ashiana. The incident occurred one
Friday before focus group 1 was due to be held on the following Monday; it was
still fresh in the minds of women participants. Women said38:
a man from London, and his wife from Algeria, they came for
prayers and his wife went with him. There were lots of mens’, but
no women. She didn’t know what to do, her husband went in
Mosque. She was looking for the door for women. She was really
not believing that she couldn’t go in Mosque. One of the men said
she should come here. She came here to do namaz39. We told
her, tell your husband to go back and tell them that he can’t
38 Participants in focus group 1 were not code because the group was large, women joined at
different times. These disruptions made it difficult to gather women’s individual details on
arrival and the size of the group made it difficult to separate voices in the transcribing the
recording.
39 Namaz is the ritual prayer performed 5 times a day by Muslims
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believe that his wife can’t go in Mosque. (Focus group 1, held at
Ashiana)
This focus group was very mixed in terms of age with the majority of
women being over the age of forty years. The incident was relayed with
some excitement; as if women in the focus group really felt that it
symbolised something important. The incident itself indicates that the
formal code of exclusion of Muslim women was a local code; the couple
had arrived for Friday prayer expecting that they would both gain access.
The incident sparked discussion in the focus group, with women stating
their discontent; as one focus group member put it ‘if womens’ take
complaint to Mosque they don’t listen’ and another said: ‘it’s not Islam,
its culture’. Women spoke of the futility they felt in trying to change
tradition; one participant added that a nearby Mosque (not in Fieldway)
was: ‘isolated, locked up and not feeling open’. The last statement
articulates women’s outsider position and their isolation from the
Mosque.
The two local Mosques mentioned, were not the only spaces of exclusion for
women; women also appeared to have limited access to generic community
centres. This was particularly mentioned in relation to the two large community
centres in Fieldway. This is important because, as stated earlier, there are few
pubic meeting places and facilities in the neighbourhood. Thus, the slightest
restriction on women’s use of any building is a major setback to building
networks, social capital and resilience. The clearest statement of women’s
exclusion was made by Harry, a councillor for Fieldway. Harry was clear that the
local authority was aware of Muslim women’s exclusion from the Bangladeshi
centre, despite a peppercorn rent subsidy for fifty years, by the local authority
for community use of the centre. Harry noted that:
the Bangladeshi centre management committee, all male; tensions
between them and Bangladeshi women’s centre, who of course, are all
female. It looks to me like they have been abominable towards women;
Shazia [women’s centre manager] in particular, about how they [women]
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could be allowed to use the building, and so on and so forth. So, for
example, when they said they wanted an advice worker, I said yeah we
might explore that. One of the ways that it might be worth doing, obviously
the women’s centre is an organisation that already exists to provide the
right advice to local women and they’re used to trying to get money, to get
the right person in post. Perhaps we could try and get a joint application
together? It became very clear they didn’t want anything to do with the
women’s centre at all. ‘Oh, no, no it isn’t anything to do with them being
women’ [male response]; well of course it blooming well is. (Harry, local
councillor for Fieldway, interview Ashiana)
Nor was this the only situation of women’s exclusion from, or difficulty in
accessing, generic facilities. The account given earlier, of Ashiana’s difficulty in
gaining access to space in the Pakistani centre, is a further example. As
described earlier, in the quote from Shahid, the centre was managed by the local
Mosque with an all- male committee, who had refused to negotiate women’s
access to the centre with women. Additionally, while Ashiana was offered a one
year lease for space in the building, the research was informed that the rent was
high and likely to be unaffordable in the longer-term. Lack of support from the
Mosque, that manages the Pakistani community centre, had in part led to the
closure of Ashiana not long after this field investigation was completed. As far
as this research is aware the building remains unoccupied.
5.6 Conclusion
In the context of the foundations laid in previous chapters in the thesis, this
chapter draws together data from resilience studies, counter-terrorism policy,
the ‘War on Terror’ and national anti- Muslim hate-crime statistics. Importantly,
it adds new data from the empirical research. It demonstrates that Muslim
women, and South Asian Muslim women in Britain, narrate the experience of
fear; of the multiple, intersecting prolonged adversity of being vilified and
vulnerable to, and/or fearful of, hatred directed towards them. Women linked the
experience of fear to the rise in Islamophobia in the context of the ‘War on Terror’
after 9/11.
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Firstly, the structural issues of poverty, relational inequality and lack of access
to generic community resources can be seen as prolonged adversity and harm
for women. Rather than offering respite, or shelter, from adversity, the
dislocation of local mechanisms from Muslim women represents the failure of
these mechanisms to acknowledge, understand and respond coherently to the
needs of South Asian Muslim women in the research. Poverty and disadvantage
are risks to resilience (O’Sullivan, 2012); poverty increases stress levels and
mental health distress. Responses to the adversity, and consequent harms,
experienced by South Asian Muslim women have to move beyond stereotypes
of South Asian Muslim women raising the question, in these situations; where is
the protection from the ravages of adversity and the consequent harms?
Factors that promote resilience to adversity, such as social networks, can be
seen to be fractured, prohibited and constrained. Women’s exclusion, from
limited resources in the neighbourhood can be seen as the failure of the
neighbourhood to protect women. At all levels and in all directions, these
findings demonstrate the ways in which the search for hegemony/power is
played out on the micro level; lived hegemony, including patriarchy. These
failures produce, and reproduce, adversity and harm for women; limiting the
psychological, physical and social places in which they are able to ‘defend’
themselves or undertake the repair work, collectively required to build social
capital.
Failures at the level of the local state reflect failure outlined in Chapter Three
(3.5) at the level of national counter-terrorism policy. These data indicate that
protective approaches, as a counter-balance to state, risk based, counter-
terrorism policy, are in short supply for South Asian Muslim women. Data from
Tell MAMA, and, the narratives of women in Fieldway, indicate a correlation
between perceived or actual Islamist atrocities world-wide and increased attacks
on visibly identifiable Muslim women (Littler, 2015). At the national level
Islamophobic hate crime data confirm the vulnerability of Muslim women to
assault. This investigation suggests that this knowledge might add to already
existing ‘cultural scripts’ of vulnerability to assault amongst women. The scripts
formed, informed and re-informed the day-to-day lived experiences of multiple,
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intersecting prolonged adversity and harm of women in this investigation,
leading them to develop coping strategies and take protective actions.
The Fieldway investigation found that fear of assaults, for hijab wearing Muslim
women, extended into women’s networks and included family and kinship
networks, fear extended beyond these immediate networks to wider community
networks. Individual women’s vulnerabilities appear to have affected most
people in the communities in Fieldway investigation. Whilst it was not the role of
this investigation to explore the extent of the spread of fear, or its effect, on South
Asian Muslim communities, this might form a line of inquiry in a future
investigation. These data suggest that it is important to understand the lived
hegemony; fear has the effect of containing citizens in their views, movements
and behaviours and should therefore offer insights for policy responses (Furedi,
2002).
The overall picture to emerge from these data is one of the extreme adversities;
simultaneous, multiple and prolonged, that create simultaneous, multiple and
prolonged harms. When considered in relation to whole system resilience
thinking it indicates that there are many fissures in the interconnections of parts
of the social system. Individuals, environment, intra and inter-community
relations appear to be fractured. From the perspective of this investigation, it is
difficult to see the symbiotic relationship of support and counter support, which
engenders a protective shield in the system. Nor could this investigation
understand all aspects of the totality of South Asian Muslim women’s
relationships, and inter-dependencies, in family and kinship networks and in the
faith networks they engaged with. With these caveats, the investigation found
that South Asian Muslim women occupied marginal positions, making it difficult
to understand how they survived the multiple shocks and disruptions described
in their narratives. This is a bleak picture of adversity and one that leads to the
questions, how were these South Asian Muslim able to be resilient? What were
the mechanisms and processes that served to protect and enable them to adapt
to multiple, intersecting and prolonged adversity and consequent harms?
185
Chapter Six - resilience
6.1 Introduction
This chapter shares the findings of this research, in relation to South Asian
Muslim women’s, resistant and resilient responses to the, already highlighted,
adversities demonstrated in the previous chapter. It responds to the aim in this
research; to identify forms of resistance and resilience to adversity, and how
they are manifest in South Asian Muslim women’s behaviours and actions. Of
particular importance are the findings, that South Asian Muslim women, in
Fieldway, experienced multiple intersecting prolonged forms of adversity, and
have limited protection from local civic or civil society institutions to respond to
adversity. Additionally, data, highlighted in the previous chapter, identified the
paucity of material resources to insulate women from adversity. These combined
conditions make it particularly important to identify the mechanisms in
communities that make it possible for women to be resilient.
Rigorous thematic analysis of data gathered in this research, found that amidst
women’s narratives of fear, behaviours of resistance were discernible; for
example, the significance of women’s social relations for building resilience, was
evident. Table 6.1 (on the following page) outlines the themes and sub-themes
that were identified in relation to South Asian Muslim women’s resilience. These
themes form the framework for this chapter; the structure through which the
findings are substantiated and given analytic meaning.
The key issues identified in Table 6.1 are in three parts; resistance behaviours
and actions that indicate the presence of resilience, the social mechanisms that
contribute to women’s resilience, and South Asian Muslim women’s creation of
hybrid identities and positions in their communities and in society.
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Table 6.1 Thematic analysis - key issues for resilience
Resilience
Theme and sub-themes Description
Theme 2
Resistant identities and
behaviours
- Contesting ascribed identity
- Formulating counter narratives
- Creating spaces for faith
capital
Sub-theme 2a
Resilience building networks
- Family and neighbourhood
- Women’s friendship networks
- Women’s centres
Sub-theme 2c
Resilience - adapting in conditions of
prolonged adversity and retaining
fundamental characteristics
- Hybrid identities and new
positions
6.2 Resistant identities - women’s behaviours
It is useful to start with a reminder that whilst resistance and resilience describe
distinct forms of behaviour they are intrinsically connected as described in
Chapter Two, 2.4. However, it is also important to remember that acts of
resistance come into existence in the presence of resilience; resistance is the
agentic response to hegemony/power and inequality by a resilient individual,
group or system. From this perspective resilience is the capacity to absorb
adversity and ‘bounce back’ to pre-trauma functioning and resistance is the
challenge to disruption. Resistance, when seen as a response to an ‘intolerable’
condition (Bottrell, 2009: 329), in this instance when South Asian Muslim women
find the identity ascribed to them intolerable, causes further disturbance.
Analysis suggests that South Asian Muslim women, in Fieldway, subverted the
dominant construction of identity, through forming new identities, which more
clearly reflected their identity needs, and more clearly described who they see
themselves to be. The following sections offer detail from women’s narratives to
substantiate these findings.
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6.2.1 Contesting ascribed identity
This section focuses on hijab as resistance, rather than restriction. However, it
is useful first, to clarify the identity of Muslim woman that women in the Fieldway
study contested. Dominant, counter-terrorism, discourses construct South Asian
Muslim women as passive; oppressed by hyper-patriarchal Islam, or, as
sufficiently malleable to be co-opted into the state’s project to moderate Islam
(see Chapter Three, 3.5). In the everyday lives of the Muslim women residents
involved in this investigation, women located themselves in a range of positions
that demonstrate resistance, rather than acceptance, of these dominant
constructions.
Hijab has become a universal signifier of Islamic faith; a dress code for Muslim
women, regardless of ethnic origin, or traditional dress (Afshar, 2005). For
younger South Asian Muslim women, it has displaced the traditional salwar
kameez and dupatta; the loose scarf depicted in image 5.3. The image depicts
a garment that is easy to adorn and to remove, and that is considerably easier
to apply than the hijab (see image 5.1). It is suggested, that wearing hijab is not
accidental; it is a deliberate and conscious decision made by the wearer. During
the field investigation, it was noticeable that women who wore traditional South
Asian dress, had their head uncovered (with the dupatta worn as depicted in
Image 5.3) most of the time, while women who wore hijab, retained the head
cover continuously. This observation is of significance, because, it indicates
deliberation on the part of the hijab wearer.
Western observers view hijab in primarily binary terms; as a symbol of agency
by women, or a symbol of their oppression. The latter view suggests that Muslim
women do not exercise choice; they are told, or instructed, to cover their heads
(Diffendal, 2006; Woldesemait, 2013). This investigation concurs with the former
view; that women, in the Fieldway investigation, chose to wear hijab rather than
being instructed to do so. However, the findings trouble binary framings of
Muslim women’s relation to hijab; suggesting a more complex relation to
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hybridity. The investigation found, concurring with studies by Woldesemait
(2013), Ruby (2006), and MacLeod (1992), that, some South Asian Muslim
women wore hijab against the wishes of their parents. The choice to wear hijab
might be viewed as paradoxical, as the vast majority of women who participated
in this investigation, expressed fear for their vulnerability to Islamophobic abuse,
because they were identified as Muslim (see Chapter Five, 5.3.1). South Asian
Muslim women in this study, spoke of the displeasure of their families, who
viewed hijab as placing them at increased risk of Islamophobic assault.
Nor were all the hijab’s worn by women participants ‘shy’, or ‘retiring’, items of
clothing; some were elaborate, eye-catching, and attention generating
garments. Women who wore elaborate hijab, appeared to choose to put time,
and effort, into creating complex head covers, and talked of the importance of
hijab, as a symbol of their faith. Thus, women’s embrace of hijab, as a marker
of Islamic faith, appears to have been undertaken with pride, and in the
knowledge of the risk of Islamophobic assault, and the fear wearing hijab
generated; creating a complex dynamic, for South Asian Muslim women. Hijab
made these women visible to individuals, and groups, who posed the greatest
risk to their safety. Hijab wearing, in the context of fear, reflects the complexity
of women’s Muslim identity positions; between their solidarity with Islam, and,
fear for their safety. Fahim’s description of what wearing hijab meant to her,
provides an insight into one woman’s subjective experience of hijab. Fahim was
29 years old at the time of the interview, she described herself as being of
Pakistani origin, was born and grew up in Birmingham, and moved to Fieldway
four years before the interview for this research was conducted. Fahim said:
Fahim of
amongst
intention
Fahim to
full time,
I f
ha
be
be
no
as
be
The first
hijab wa
represen
she wor
‘fashiona
suggest
and to he
stylishly,
Fahim’s
to state
suggestin‘I don’t want to be forced into it [wearing hijab],
because I’ve never been forced into it; it’s something
I wanna do from the heart. I do my prayers and stuff,
and when I do my prayers, I should be wearing a
scarf because we should be covering our head, and
it’s something I want to do [full time] only faster. It’s
just to make myself a better Muslim, for myself, in
myself, not for anybody [else] – NO’ (Fahim,
interview Ashiana).189
fered the most ‘positive’, and lest fearful expression of wearing hijab,
all the Muslim women participants in the Fieldway investigation. Her
was clear; she wanted to be a better Muslim, and that would enable
progress, from, what she described as being ‘a part-timer’, to being a
hijab wearer. Fahim went on to say:
eel quite confident and comfortable wearing it. I’ve never really, ever,
d any comments, or had anyone looking at me in that kind of way just
cause I got a head scarf on. No, I’ve never had anything like that just
cause I got a head scarf on. No, I’ve had nothing like that; I still live a
rmal life. I’ve not been wearing it for long, no, and I wear it fashionably
well. I think if I was wearing the whole outfit it would be different,
cause I just wear it in a completely different way.
part of Fahim’s narrative (in the text box), demonstrates that wearing
s a matter of faith. In the second quote, it is more a matter of identity
tation; Fahim was clear that she was comfortable wearing hijab, which
e with style and elegance. The juxtaposition of wearing hijab
bly’ and feeling comfortable, with hijab as a symbol of faith practice,
that Fahim considered the acceptability of hijab to others, to herself,
r faith. It might also be possible, that Fahim considered wearing hijab
as offering her protection from Islamophobic attention. In this frame,
form of protection of herself could be seen as resilience. Fahim went on
that if she was wearing the ‘full outfit’ (burka) it would be different,
g that she might be more likely to be targeted for assault. Fahim did
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not talk about fear, instead she took action to avoid the fear of being targeted;
this indicates that personal safety was a consideration for Fahim in what she
wore and how she wore it. Caught between representing her faith; Islam, and
phobia of her faith, Fahim made clear choices about how to represent her
identity. She was Muslim, but not a burka wearing Muslim, she wore hijab as a
symbol of her faith, but also in ways that were acceptable to her faith and to
society. This is a complex mix of negotiations; undertaken, with personal safety
in mind, reflecting a complex relationship between hijab and resilience.
Fahim’s story was markedly different to those of other participants; if there is no
‘special magic’ (Masten, 2001, see 2.2.1) in resilience, then it is necessary to try
to understand why Fahim’s narrative was so different to that of the majority of
hijab, or salwar kameez wearers, who had grown up in Fieldway. The primary
difference is that Fieldway consists of mono-ethnic (Pakistani or Bangladeshi),
and mono-faith (Muslim), streets whilst Fahim’s neighbourhood in Birmingham
appeared to be ethnically mixed (and therefore presumably mixed in terms of
faith). These differences make Fahim’s story sufficiently interesting to warrant
attention. Fahim was born, and grew up, in a multi-ethnic neighbourhood in
Birmingham. She was a teenager in 2001 and still at school when the al-Qaeda
attack on mainland America occurred. She remembered 9/11 being bought up
in school, but had no recollection of its impact on herself or her family. She was
at college at the time of the London bombings in 2005, but again, remembered
little about 2005, and again, did not recall any negative impact on herself or her
family. When asked about her life in Birmingham, Fahim presented a picture of
a mixed and apparently cohesive neighbourhood. Fahim said:
Here I do live mostly with Muslim’s, but I didn’t in Birmingham; there’s a
lot of white people [where I lived] in XXX in Birmingham. But here, I don’t
live far from here, it’s mostly Asian’s. It’s all right, yeah. It was quite
different in Birmingham yeah, but I didn’t have anything; we had lovely
neighbours there, and we still [live] in the same house, so it’s not really
[changed] much (Fahim, interview Ashiana).
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Looking over Fahim’s interview transcript, it is possible to see that Fahim might
have replaced the sentence ‘but I didn’t have anything’ (in italics), with, ‘I didn’t
have, or experience, anything bad’; to pick up connotations to Islamophobia. On
questioning Fahim about the response of her white neighbours to 9/11, and 7/7,
she said ‘nothing changed, yeah, as normal, as normal, friendly’. This is a very
different picture to the one painted by women who grew up in mono-ethnic
communities in Fieldway, with no white neighbours as a point of reference. It is
possible to see Forrest’s (2001), positive neighbourhood effects for building
social capital, in the neighbourhood in which Fahim grew up (see Table 2.1).
Forrest suggests that, supportive networks, reciprocity, collective norms and
values, and a sense of belonging, are aspects of neighbourhood that generate
social asset. It is possible that these neighbourhood qualities existed in the multi-
ethnic neighbourhood in which Fahim grew up. The social capital generated in
positive multi-ethnic contact may have had a protective effect for Fahim,
protecting her from the ‘cultural scrip’ of fear of white Islamophobic assault
because she had another point of reference. After 9/11 and 7/7 she said that
relationships with her white neighbours did not change it continued ‘as normal’
(Fahim, interview Ashiana).
This is particularly important as national statistics indicate, that the single largest
group of people who assault Muslim women are white, male, and over 40 years
of age (Littler, 2015). It cannot be stated with certainty, from this research, that
growing up in a cohesive, ethnically mixed, neighbourhood offered Fahim
protection from fear, as it is not possible to know if, and what, other protective
factors were also at play in Fahim’s life. Fahim, did however, also state that in
Fieldway she was ‘mostly surrounded by Asian people, and mostly worked with
Asian people’ but that she also attended a community centre in another area of
Northend that ‘gets a lot of white people who come and they all really get on with
one another’. This statement indicates that Fahim wished to continue to have
contact with groups other than her immediate family, kinship and neighbourhood
groups and that she continued to engage in wider, ethnically diverse, networks.
Fahim’s narrative offers a potential example of protection from the ‘cultural
script’ of fear that South Asian Muslim women who grew up in, or lived for many
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years in, Fieldway appeared not to have.
Mostly, South Asian Muslim women, in the investigation, expressed fear for their
safety when they moved beyond the immediate home neighbourhood. Fahim’s
story brings into focus the potential protective features of a cohesive ethnically
mixed neighbourhood, suggesting a form of psychological protection from the
fear of Islamophobic assault. Fahim’s experience is important because it offers
a different, and less corrosive, example of fear generated by hijab wearing.
Fahim was interviewed in June 2013, just one month after the murder of soldier
Lee Rigby in May 2013. At the time of the interview, anti-Muslim hate crime in
the UK soared in all parts of the country, as illustrated by statistics from London
that showed a 147.5% increase in anti-Muslim hate crime from the previous year
(Copsey, 2013). This appears not to have been the case in Northend, where
reported hate crime appeared to have been less steep, although figures for the
region indicate that hate crime had more than doubled (Wright, December
2013). As indicated by Ali, the neighbourhood constable, local police were out
and about in Fieldway immediately after Lee Rigby was murdered to reassure
the public, and to prevent retaliatory hate (see Chapter Five, 5.4). However,
Shahid (the known contact) questioned local hate crime data for Northend
suggesting that the figures were higher than those published. He said:
it [anti-Muslim hate crime] went through the roof, but I think it was being
played down nationally, and locally; how that had caused increased
concerns and tensions among Muslim communities was being played
down; it’s not so much of a big problem kind of thing. So Tell MAMA,
which was this national [project] measuring anti-Muslim attacks, they
came up with, I think three days after the attack, they came up with 200
reports and that was both physical, verbal, and on-line, and the on-line
kind of stuff was almost dismissed. (Shahid, known contact)
Neither Fahim, nor other women participants, indicated an increase in fear of
assault in Northend at this time; most commented positively on increased police
presence in Fieldway. This should not down play the effects of hate crime
nationally or regionally, nor on-going anti-Muslim hate crime that has remained
largely consistent since 9/11 (Copsey, 2012; Hussain, 2012; Lambert, 2011).
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It may, at this point, be useful to try to get a sense of when, South Asian Muslim
women involved in this research, started to wear hijab; the questions being, was
it before, or after 9/11? Was hijab wearing affected by events that increased
assaults and fear? The following extracts from conversations with women offer
some insights; the quotes from focus group 3 participants, were framed in
discussion about the effects of 9/11. Participants in this focus group are coded,
as in the previous chapter:
I didn’t used to wear a headscarf [hijab] that much before, and
now I do have my head scarf, and certain people do, you know,
it’s the people who make you feel uncomfortable…but then you
think “ah whatever” and you just get on with it….’ (participant A2).
It’s the way they look at you’… (participant A5). ‘Yeah, do you
know the expressions that come across to you like you got to
change your image, yeah?’ (participant A2, Focus group 3,
Bangladeshi centre)
This discussion suggests that participants A2 and A5, started to wear hijab after
9/11, as participant A2 said she didn’t use to wear hijab then (9/11). Both
participants A2 and A5 voiced the discomfort they felt from the expressions of
non-Muslims. A2 stated that she felt she was being summoned, by the way
people looked at her, to ‘change [her] image’; presumably to renounce hijab.
These quotes locate women’s decision to wear hijab in the frame of post -9/11
Britain; these participants described that their decisions to wear hijab were
based on issues that go beyond being made to feel uncomfortable; their
decisions took into consideration uncertainty about how, and if, they would be
accepted. However, what is clear is that they chose to continue to wear hijab.
Read in terms of Goffman’s studies into stranger interaction, in which non-verbal
signals of intent, are relayed through eye contact and body language; the
experiences of women in focus group 3 indicate the presence of, what Goffman
terms, the ‘hate stare’ (Giddens, 1990: 80). This is important to understanding
the resilience of focus group 3 participants, who continued to wear hijab, as the
symbol of their Muslim identity, in the face of uncertainty, discomfort and hate.
These South Asian Muslim women were resisting the hatred of Muslims directed
towards them and, in the process, demonstrating resilience as resistance. Under
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the lens of temporality and hegemony, the crucial point is that, the ‘hate stare’
arises out of, and is constituted in, centuries of struggle for colonial domination.
In this frame the ‘hate stare’ is continuing a process of humiliating South Asian
Muslim women (see Chapter Three).
It was also the case that Fathema, quoted in the previous chapter, started to
wear hijab after 9/11. Fathema’s story is different to that of focus group 3
participants; it is also different to Fahim’s, quoted in the text box, at the start of
this section. Fathema stated that her decision to wear hijab was a direct
response to 9/11. Fathema’s disclosure of her decision, to wear hijab, was made
in the context of Fathema talking about conspiracy theories and her awareness
of Islamophobic hatred towards Muslim’s after 9/11. This is important as it places
Fathema’s decision to wear hijab in the context of known hatred towards
Muslims. Fathema said:
No, no, I wasn’t wearing hijab at that time; it was something that
I wanted to do, but I didn’t - it was in October, one month after
[9/11 that I started to wear hijab]. It was when I was at the
women’s centre (Fathema, Bangladeshi women’s centre).
9/11 was clearly the trigger, the motivation, for Fathema to start wearing hijab.
Rather than drive Fathema away from Islam; Islamophobic hatred had the
opposite effect, it drew her into Islam. Fathema’s experience clearly indicates
that, for her, hijab was a symbol of solidarity with her faith and her people, at a
time of their vilification. Fathema’s words: ‘when I was at the women’s centre’
(in italics) provides a clue to the social mechanism that gave her the confidence
to wear hijab; this was not something she did on her own. This suggests the
centrality of the women’s centre, and social networks in her decision to wear
hijab; this point is picked up later in this chapter. Fathema’s solidarity with Islam
and expression of her religiosity became clear as the interview progressed,
Fathema said:
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what changed for me [after 9/11 and 7/7], was for me to understand my
religion a bit more as well, and I’m doing that. Anyway, I was doing groups
and I think it got me to think about things. How can I change people’s
perception about Muslims? (Fathema, Interview Bangladeshi women’s
centre)
9/11 and 7/7 led Fathema to become more interested in learning about her faith;
she attended classes at the women’s centre. The knowledge she gained helped
her to understand the significance of hijab in the Qur’an, and, appeared to have
generated faith capital that may have contributed to her ability to demonstrate
resistance to the hatred of Muslims that she perceived in society. Fathema was
aware of the Islamophobic hate that would be directed to her as a Muslim, and
that hijab wearing would leave her vulnerable to assault, despite these fears she
chose to wear hijab at a time of heightened anxiety and increased Islamophobia.
Fathema made more than one reference to the anxiety, her choice to wear hijab,
caused her family. In one such statement she said:
when I went out and about and stuff, because I was wearing a
hijab, my parents were really, really, worried, because there may
be attacks [on me]; there was a real fear. (Fathema, interview
Bangladeshi women’s centre)
As a second generation Muslim woman from Bangladesh, Fathema was
different to her mother who dressed in traditional South Asian salwar kameez,
and, did not wear hijab. A few months after the field investigation had ended
Fathema got in touch with the researcher, to share the story of an Islamophobic
attack that she and her sister had been subject to. The two women were
shopping, on a Sunday, in a supermarket in Northend when they were
assaulted. The police were called and there was some confusion about whether
or not the assault of the two women was caught on camera, as it occurred
outside the supermarket, in the car park when they were leaving. Statements
were taken from Fathema and her sister by the police, but Fathema was
uncertain about what further action would be taken, if any, against the men who
pushed these women, shouted abuse at them and pulled their hijabs in an
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attempt to remove them. Fathema and her sister were unhurt physically, but they
were both psychologically shaken by the incident. We can only imagine that the
violence perpetrated against these sisters would become a further part of the
already-existing cultural script of fear that was already widespread in Fieldway.
So what do women’s narratives about wearing hijab tell us about contestation?
First, this research offers a significantly different view, to the dominant narrative,
of South Asian Muslim women as oppressed in hyper-patriarchal Islam. The
women in this research were self-determined; they made choices to wear hijab.
Women, like Fathema, challenged the wishes of their families with regard to
wearing hijab. These were not acts of submission to patriarchs; husbands,
fathers and brothers, instead hijab wearing was a challenge. This finding
challenges the construction of South Asian Muslim women as hyper oppressed
under a hyper-patriarchal system. Additionally, women chose to present
themselves as emblematic of Islam, in a society in which they knew hatred and
hostility to Islam was present; they were made to feel uncomfortable and were
attacked but continued to wear hijab. This does not suggest passivity, wearing
hijab in these conditions, suggests South Asian Muslim women were enacting
resilience as resistance. Here, there is nothing neutral about the resilience of
these women; it places their resilience in the context of the struggle for
hegemony – a highly political field of relations of power.
Secondly, the intolerable identity ascribed to South Asian Muslim women
portrays them as malleable, for example to the UK government’s project to
moderate Islam. Aside from the day to day behaviours of Muslim women proudly
proclaiming that they are Muslim, there is also evidence, from feminist scholars
(Lewicki, 2016), that some Muslim women’s groups, actively challenge the
dominant identity ascribed to Muslim women (see Chapter Three, 3.5). Feminist
scholars have identified ways in which Muslim women’s groups have
appropriated Prevent funding, to challenge these perceptions within their
communities and in institutions of the state (Ibid.). Women’s choice to wear
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hijab, in the face of violence against them, and against the wishes of their family,
clearly indicates their self-determination rather than malleability.
In negotiating the boundaries of dress, women exercised judgement on a daily
basis, about how to represent themselves. Tazeem for example (see 5.3.2),
determined that Western dress was preferable to clothing that identified her as
Muslim. For the majority of women, who participated in this investigation, hijab
was the limit of their wish to signal their religiosity to a hostile secular society.
Women’s appropriation of the hijab has been explored as a pattern that identifies
women’s re-formulation of identity; securing new identity positions required
South Asian Muslim women, in Fieldway, to negotiate, or re-negotiate, social
relations in their families and in wider society. Women’s re-formulation of identity
is explored in 6.4 as expressing hybrid identities. In making the claim that, hijab
has been appropriated as a symbol of South Asian Muslim women’s liberation,
this investigation adds to a small, but growing, body of literature that recognises
hijab wearing as a form of resistance. For example Afshar (2005) argues that:
Far from an indication of submission or docility the decision to wear the
hijab makes a public statement that places the mohajabehs in the full
light of the public gaze; something the parents and kin groups do not
necessarily wish to see. It may even be seen as a clear indication of their
new radical interpretation of the faith that they define as liberating rather
than constraining. (p. 277)
6.2.2 Formulating counter narratives
The formulation of ‘the counter narrative’ follows a similar logic to other forms of
resistance; counter-narratives exist as a response to inequality in the frame of
the ‘master’ or ‘dominant’ narrative that they challenge (Bamberg, 2004; Stanley,
2007). Counter narratives are discursive responses that run counter to
hegemonic discourses (Bamberg, 2004). Actions and behaviours that contest
dominant narratives are rooted in counter narratives; discourses that take place
in resister groups. In everyday resistance theory, all forms of contestation are
formed in such networks; safe spaces are required for the generation of the sub-
culture that challenges the dominant culture (Scott, 1990). The focus of this
section is on women’s discursive narratives that counter the dominant narrative
in the ‘War on Terror’. In this frame the dominant narrative views Islam as a
threat to Western liberal democracy and engenders terrorist activity (Jackson,
2005). This was expressed clearly by participant A0, in focus group 3, when A0
said: ‘Islam is the latest hated religion’40 and Fathema questioned: ‘why would
the media have this campaign target Muslims as well; and they don’t even
understand the religion’. These views are also evident in the data presented in
the previous chapter and in wider literature (Briggs, 2010; Lambert, 2011).
The dominant narrative was not acceptable to, nor did it reflect women’s reality,
knowledge and experience of Islam or of the Muslims they knew. Women’s
counter narratives, therefore, were based in their subjective experience of
themselves and members of their communities; the image presented in the
dominant narrative was intolerable to them. For some women loss of trust in
government was central to their re-framing. For most the experience of every-
day life was no different to that of any other group, as expressed by Shafia who
is of Bangladeshi origin and 36 years of age. Shafia was born and grew up in
Fieldway. In the quote (in the text box below), Shafia was sharing an experience
of being questioned by colleagues, in 2001 immediately after the destruction of
the twin towers:
40 Th‘my colleagues and stuff ermm, they were asking questions [after
9/11] because they knew I was Muslim and stuff, and there was
somebody else in the organisation who was also Muslim, another
lady as well. She was kind of ermm, really horrified as well. She said
things, we would have discussion about you know ermm, Islam for
example, is it a peaceful religion, and there was few other people
within work who felt that religion was the cause of all evil.
(embarrassed laugh) That’s what they used to say, and I’m like, well
no it isn’t! We’ve lived in this country peacefully and there’s other
people who kind of have these things themselves. They’re not
Muslim and not practicing you know, not many go to church’ (Shafia,
interview, Bangladeshi women’s centre).198
e full quote can be found in Chapter Five, 5.3.1
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The master narrative in this instance: ‘that religion is the cause of all evil’. (italic
removed) does not reflect the reality of the subordinate narrative; as Shafia
points out, her Islam is not the root of all evil and it is ‘other people’, who are not
Muslim, as she understands Islam, who do these things. The quote
demonstrates that Shafia did not recognise the statement relating to the religion,
or the people, she knew. Secondly, Shafia actively counters the master narrative
in presenting an alternative view to the dominant narrative, in insisting that Islam
is a peaceful religion. In the aftermath of 9/11, there appeared to be, an almost
universal disbelief, expressed by participants, that Muslims could have been
involved in the destruction of the twin towers. Disbelief led women to reframe
the dominant narrative to include the complicity of others, including the American
government.
Aisha, a thirty-three year old interviewee of Pakistani origin, was one of many
women who talked about the prevalence of conspiracy theories within her
networks. Aisha associated these theories to a political environment of ‘a lot of
hatred towards us even before 9/11’. Aisha’s reframing of the al Qaida attack is
located in her knowledge of the history of hatred towards Muslims that she
recalled in media reports of 9/11. These reports appeared to have led Aisha to
be ‘very sceptical about it all’. Aisha added that, she and her friends ‘didn’t really
believe what we were being told’. When asked how she felt the ‘War on Terror’
had affected her life Aisha said:
I continue to do what I want to do; I have been to University and
got my degree. I am very sceptical though, even the events of
last week; Lee Rigby murder in Woolwich – I wonder what’s
behind it, what caused it to happen? There is a lot of hatred
towards Muslims. I am very worried about the American
government; hence I don’t trust any of the governments. (Aisha,
interviewed at Ashiana)
Aisha managed to get on with life despite the rise in Islamophobia and a sense
of being in a world in which she wasn’t welcome. Her response was to counter
the dominant narrative, not necessarily with a ready-made counter story, but
with her scepticism. She just didn’t trust ‘them’, and so, whatever ‘they’ said she
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would not trust. In the quote, Aisha appears to link hatred of Muslims to anxieties
about government, and a deep distrust in the state and its intent to protect all
citizens. As described in Chapter Two, loss of trust in government has huge
implications for social cohesion, the generation of trust capital and resilience.
This suggests that, the individual or community affected, views the state as
failing to protect them, or their people, from adversity (see Figure 2.2). From
Aisha’s point of view, mutual respect was lacking, leaving a vacuum in the
relationship of Muslim women with government. Whilst Aisha was unusual in
expressing little doubt or uncertainty in her scepticism, the statement also
suggests, that in wanting to understand ‘what’s behind’ these events, there
might be an indication of ambivalence; ambivalence that was apparent in the
narratives of other participants.
Shafia (quoted earlier), for example, also found it difficult to believe media
reports of 9/11. However, Shafia’s position changed over the course of the
interview; starting from the position of negating government and official
explanations of Muslims as the perpetrators of 9/11, Shafia changed her
position. Conspiracy theories initially enabled Shafia to believe that, the master
narrative presented about Muslims; her people were false. Shafia said that in
her networks:
we were watching it on the news someone said, I think it was
someone from work, said it was the Israeli’s. I don’t know why
he said it, someone had blowed up, it was a terrorist attack and
I thought America as well. America’s not know for something
like that kind of - well you know there’s been other attacks and
I was thinking is it really? You would hear conspiracy theories
and listen to other news and stuff. So I wanted strong evidence,
not just the media saying there’s a Qur’an in their car you know
– that evidence isn’t in itself enough….people were saying it
wasn’t al-Qaeda but someone internally [to the American
government] who did it and they were saying it was al-Qaeda’.
(Shafia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)
In Shafia’s networks, both in her Saturday job and social networks, there
appears to have been a search for an explanation; any explanation to exact
responsibility elsewhere. To view the attack as possibly perpetrated by the
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Israeli’s or possibly the American government, in some unspecified way, shifts
the focus from other Muslims. What is clear is that, Shafia did not believe the
master narrative, for her, the Qur’an in the car was insufficient evidence of a link
to Muslim perpetrators. Shafia went on to say that it was when:
al-Qaeda themselves said they done it as well so then we realised that
actually it’s Muslims that done it…..when there was more evidence that
al-Qaeda did it then it isn’t disputable.
Thus, on the one hand, Shafia appeared to have shifted her position from
negating official reports, to one of accepting them, whilst, on the other hand, at
the same time, she appeared still to be connected to conspiracy theories. It is
noticeable that Shafia, for example, did not say that the conspiracy theorists
were wrong, nor did she challenge the counter theories. This omission suggests
that, she remained uncertain and confused about what to believe and who to
believe.
A different view was presented by Ishmael, who had come to Fieldway from
Mirpur in Kashmiri; having grown up in Mirpur, Ishmael had a different view of
government. She voiced disappointment with the British Government and
although Ishmael didn’t indicate that she thought that 9/11 was orchestrated or
influenced by the American Government, she simply could not believe that the
atrocities were perpetrated by Muslims; she said ‘I still don’t believe a Muslim
did it. I still don’t’. Instead, Ishmael talked of feeling let down by the British
Government in terms of foreign policy, adding that, when she arrived in the UK
from Pakistan she:
thought this country was like perfect, but when they went for
Iraq war, after 9/11 happened, I thought this country [is] not that
perfect; you can’t trust them [politicians]; they do their own
thing, they don’t listen, and that [is] not right. (Ishmael, interview
Ashiana)
Ishmael had high expectations of the British government; nonetheless, her faith
in democratic government had been shattered, by the realisation that she
expressed as: ‘you can’t trust them’ and ‘they don’t listen’. The narrative that
Ishmael countered was the narrative (and for her the reality) that Muslim’s were
responsible for the atrocities of 9/11 and 7/7. Ishmael’s counter-narrative is
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strongly based in her sense of Islam and Muslims being different to the dominant
narrative in the ‘War on Terror’; a narrative that she did not trust and therefore
did not believe.
It is also noteworthy, that there was a marked difference amongst women
participants, in how they viewed the role of the American and British
governments in relation to the atrocities of 9/11 and 7/7. No participant
suggested that the British government was involved in the London bombings in
2005, despite a delay of six days in the names of three of the bombers being
released. This is surprising as findings from a survey conducted by Channel 4
News in 2007 (GfK, 2007), found that 24% of Muslims, who participated in the
survey, said that they believed that the British government was involved in some
way in the London bombings. It is difficult to know why this group of Muslim
women, at the time this investigation was conducted in 2013, felt differently. It is
also difficult from these data, to state with certainty, that women felt differently;
whilst no woman categorically stated that she believed the British government
was directly involved, or implicated, in the London bombings, women indicated
loss of trust or ambivalence and uncertainty in government. Women talked about
indirect responsibility; the British government’s failure, for example, to recognise
the impact of foreign policies on Muslims in Britain, was not only stated by
Ishmael, but also by other women. Shafia for example said that in her opinion
7/7:
brought to our attention that these Muslims, you know, that they
may have been influenced by other people, who have hatred to
certain things. A lot of people don’t like what’s happened with
Palestine and the Israeli’s. (Shafia, interview Bangladeshi
women’s centre)
Shafia’s statement suggests that Muslims, feel hatred as a result of Israel’s
occupation of Palestine. This perspective shifts responsibility for the bombings
in London, to the grievances of the bombers. In this logic, the ultimate
responsibility lies with the governments’ that support Israel’s occupation of
Palestine. It is not the intention of this investigation to engage in debate about
the probity of this sentiment, only to note that it is used in defence of the
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perpetrators. Global solidarity, with other Muslims and with the situation of
Muslims in Palestine, was also raised by Fathema who specifically pointed to
the position of Palestinians as a real worry that she linked to conspiracy theories.
Fathema said:
I think some people, well I know a lot of people, don’t like what’s
happened with Palestine and Israeli’s as well. It’s always here in the news
and so, because these young people, what they hear on the news, it
might be a third article, or a fifth article headline and we get that a lot.
Young people feel that there are other Muslim people who are being
supressed, or seen as second class citizens, and they want to do
something, which was what, I think that what they did was wrong, clearly
it was totally wrong. (Fathema, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)
One could add the word, ’but’, to the end of Fathema’s sentence (in italics), ‘I
think that what they did was wrong, clearly it was totally wrong…but…? This is
not entirely speculative; Fathema clearly felt that violence is wrong, but also
alluded to understanding why ‘young people’, as she put it, might be driven to
such actions. In this frame, it is possible to see how the counter-narrative might
come about as a response to feeling wronged. It is important to stress that, this
point of view was not stated by any participant; the more general issue of Muslim
grievance of UK foreign policy was, as in Ishmael’s statement (mentioned
earlier) about Iraq.
In relation to the British government’s domestic counter-terrorism strategy
participants, in focus group 3, were unanimous (see Chapter Three, 3.4.1 for
details of the strategy). Many women in this group felt that the introduction of the
‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ strategy, after the London bombings, was
unhelpful, leading women in the group to voice high levels of distrust in the
motives of the British government. This group, were of the view, that the strategy
was designed to pitch Muslim against Muslim, and that the only effect of the
policy would be, to erode trust between Muslims as described by participant A1:
that trust that you build within yourself and with your
communities that you live in; certain policies [prevent] are
entering into issues and gonna make you question who can you
trust? [adding that prevent] wasn’t helpful coming in and then
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asking people to spy on each other. (participant A1, focus group
3, Bangladeshi women’s centre)
Alongside hostility towards Prevent, there was also uncertainty voiced in this
group; women’s ambivalence was crystalized in a statement that appeared to
lessen government’s responsibility with regard to domestic counter-terrorism
policy. Participant A0 voiced the view (with which others in the group agreed)
that ‘Prevent [was] not anti-Muslim; it’s more misguided against us’.
This statement shifted the discussion from one of essentialised, anti-Muslim
intent from government, to a less absolute and abrasive view of government
policy; as misguidedly adopting the wrong approach. The implication appeared
to be, that it is perhaps a forgivable misjudgement. However, participant A0 also
retained the view that the misguided strategy was ‘against us’. Thus, it could be
argued that, for this group there was an acceptance that Prevent, as part of the
policy landscape of the ‘War on Terror’, was against Muslims, even if it was
misguided, rather than intentionally anti-Muslim.
The range of views identified in these quotes can be seen as the confused and,
at times, defensive positions adopted by women, but fundamentally, they depict
a separation from the dominant narrative. For some women the refusal to accept
the reality of the actions of terrorists, who are also Muslim, can be seen as
women defending their community, through denial and thereby disassociating
themselves from acts of terrorism, as would any people in any community.
Refusal to accept the dominant narrative, can be viewed as the start of a,
resilience as resistance, process in which women (along with other Muslims)
build counter-narratives, that serve to negate the effects unleashed by the acts
of violence in the form of state, media and civil society responses; responses
that have given licence to Islamophobia (Lambert, 2011), increasing violence
against Muslim women, and generating fear amongst them. It is however, also
possible that, when viewed through the prism of resistance, counter-narratives,
become forms of defiance to the narrative presented by the dominant group.
These forms of resilience as resistance are neither singular nor static; they are
multiple and dynamic; women simultaneously expressed mistrust of the British
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state and hope that government policies were ‘misguided’ rather than
calculatedly targeted at them. Ambiguity and doubt emerged in these dialogues,
making it possible to speculate that it is possible for cynicism and hope to
coexist. What was clear was that the dominant narrative did not reflect women’s
reality. These counter-narratives are a clear indication of women’s struggle in
hegemony.
The counter-narrative exists in those places where it is safe for it to be voiced;
in those spaces, in which dissident conversations can be voiced (Scott, 1990).
We can imagine that, by exempting their people from association with hideous
acts of terrorism, South Asian Muslim women (in the world of negation) were
exempting their people from being singled out, separated, and targeted by the
state. Thus, it is possible to construe that the counter narrative as a mechanism
of resilience as resistance to neutralise the caustic psychological effects of
adversity (Scott, 1990). Denial that Muslim’s enacted atrocity enabled the
production of a different rhetoric, to position Muslims away from terrorism.
However, this strategy alone appeared to have been insufficient; South Asian
Muslim women also spoke of the actions, they engage in, to protect themselves
physically, through considering how they dressed (see 6.2.2), the size of the bag
they carried (as emerged in interview and focus groups), in not using buses (as
stated by Tazeem (5.3.2)) or staying in the neighbourhood as much as possible
(see 5.3.2). South Asian Muslim women also described how they kept in touch
with one another, through texting and phoning, if one of them had to travel
beyond the immediate home neighbourhood.
The dissident spaces, away from the places of the master narrative that Scott
(1990) theorised, are formed in different ways, in relation, to different master
narratives. The two forms of challenge, described this far, by women in
Fieldway, respond to dominant narratives imposed on South Asian Muslim
women from the state and through public discourse. The next example of
resilience as resistance through contestation, by women is different, because
women were contesting the hegemony of gender inequality within their
communities. Contestation and dissidence, in this part of the research, are
framed within Islamic orthodoxy in Muslim community settings.
6.2.3 Creating spaces for faith capital
The previous chapter (5.5) identified the exclusionary gender codes of local
Mosques in Fieldway as limiting women’s access to faith networks and capital.
Exclusionary practices run counter to women’s expression of Islam, and their
intent to know, and to represent, Islam. Despite the barriers of exclusion, women
in the Fieldway investigation, demonstrated their determination to search for
what one participant (Nazreen, quoted towards the end of this section) termed
‘their Islam’; to identify theological learning and practice to enable Muslim
women to take their place in Islam. This section begins with a quote from
Fathema (quoted earlier) about women’s exclusion and how women have
responded to exclusion in finding their place in Islam. Fathema said:
The quo
text box
position
Fathema
Mosque‘I think with the Mosque itself, ermm, there are different
Mosques and they have different religions in different
Mosques. So in that Mosque [next door to Fathema’s house]
they don’t have the capacity, but just a few streets away the
Mosque does have space for women, so they [women] can.
That’s where I get to go to do prayers in the Mosques. I know
some of my friends have gone to the XXX Mosque because
they have much more dialogue with the Sheik as well, and he
gives the Q & A with them as well. My friends they would go
and even have places where they can have children in there
as well. Sometimes when we find that one Mosque doesn’t
have that facility then we can go to another Mosque as well,
to have, to get, some more participation as well’ (Fathema,
interview Bangladeshi women’s centre).206
te from Fathema, in the box above, is a continuation of the quote in the
in Chapter Five, 5.5, in which Fathema appeared to be working out her
in relation to exclusion from her local Mosque. In this part of her story,
appears to be clearer that if there isn’t a facility for women in one
, she and her friends go to another Mosque. The statement appears to
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offer a simple and pragmatic solution, but one, that, on closer consideration,
raises a number of questions. Fathema was breaking the female exclusionary
code accepted by her father and brothers, raising questions about, their views
of this challenge. In addition, it raises questions about the negotiations, around
contestation, which Fathema and her family must have been engaged in, for
Fathema to be able to attend a different Mosque. This would also be true in
relation to breaking the tradition, accepted by her mother, of women praying in
the home. The research is aware of these differences, because Fathema invited
the researcher into her home at a time when her mother was preparing for
prayer. These questions suggest that, behind Fathema’s apparently, straight-
forward and pragmatic statement, there lays the possibility of a complex set of
negotiations undertaken in the family. The investigation did not secure answers
to these questions; however, these examples demonstrate South Asian Muslim
women making choices that involve contestation and demonstrate a
determination that exclusion from one faith facility did not deter women from
finding space for their faith elsewhere. As Fathema put it, if she and her friends
can’t go to one Mosque they go to another. This comment rebuts the idea of the
Muslim family as hyper-patriarchal; Fathema did not suggest any form of
struggle between herself and male members of her family. Again, it is not
possible to state, with certainty, that there had been no struggle at any time.
However, at the time of the investigation Fathema appeared relaxed about her
decision to attend a different mosque, which appeared, at the time of interview,
as a part of Fathema’s daily routine.
For many participants, the starting point of finding their faith was to understand
the Qur’an and Islamic texts. Fathema for example made this clear when she
said that 9/11 presented:
an opportunity for us to build our knowledge, so that we can kind
of answer other people’s questions. It got me to think that I can
help people understand [Islam]; it’s like our duty to try and
educate them. (Fathema, interview Bangladeshi women’s
centre)
208
Fathema, like a number of women, formed a determination to know their religion
and to realise their place in Islam after 9/11. Fathema, like other women sought
out those places where she was able to be educated about Islam. The search
to find Islam by women is intrinsically linked to their public proclamations of faith
and religiosity, such as choosing to wear hijab and the wish to be good Muslims
(see 6.2). Women set about to find interpretations of the Qur’an by, for instance,
attending the ‘dars’ circles and Quranic discussion groups, set up in both
women’s centres engaged in the Fieldway investigation. On Fridays, in
particular, while men were in the Mosque for Friday prayer, women gathered in
the centre’s to read the Qur’an and to discuss its texts. Ashiana also used
Prevent funding to run a series of workshops on women’s empowerment and
women’s role in Islam. These networks signal women’s attempts to understand,
and re-interpret, the texts of their faith This reflects studies by other scholars
such as Brown (2006) who found that ‘young Muslim women are often better
educated about Islam than their parents, and are battling against a cultural type
of Islam…the desire to manage faith and culture suggests the beginning of
positions which may accommodate new forms of discourse, identity and rights’
(p. 419). Fathema, for example, said that she was engaged in faith related
discussions in various ways:
[with] younger groups we would have a discussion about, young ladies
as well, about their views about certain things like hurting others and what
Islam says about hurting another human being even Muslim and non-
Muslims as well and why their actions was wrong. Sometimes even XXX
[the Bangladeshi women’s centre] they used to have discussions,
sometimes they talk about religion and the Qur’an. They used to have
discussions, sometimes they talk about religion and sometimes they talk
about other things as well so those groups they try to get you involved.
Sometimes people who are knowledgeable as well, so not like
conferences, but have a session on death and what happens when you
die and what the Muslim perspective is. (Fathema, interviewee
Bangladeshi women’s centre)
Brown’s (2006) statement is reflected in other narratives told by women in
Fieldway; Shafia, for example, talked of attending evening classed at a
mainstream learning institution and its effects on her and her friends. She said:
209
I did a course at XXX, it was called women in Islam, so I started getting
into learning a little more about my religion and learnt about the benefits
of wearing hijab and why we wear it, so I thought oh, I’ll start wearing it
so that’s when it started……I think that with my friends it got us to talk
about it and want to make sense of it; help each other to make sense of
our religion and how it fits and it got us to think about how we can educate
other people and try and help them to understand that Islam is not like
the religion in the media…It was an opportunity for us to build our
knowledge. (Shafia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)
Women’s attempts to find ‘their Islam’ were not only undertaken individually; as
already stated; women met in groups, went to the Mosque together and joined
classes. Where these activities were based in known centres, and in existing
networks, such as in women’s centres and through friendship networks, they will
have had the effect of strengthening bonds between women and strengthening
social capital assets such as trust and reciprocity (Coleman, 1988).
When women attended formal classes outside their neighbourhoods, they
engaged in new networks of like-minded individuals, to generate other forms of
social capital, such as bridging capital. Additionally, these networks offered
women the opportunity to share their views and to develop shared norms of faith
solidarity (such as wearing hijab), as well as personal spirituality that could be
described as spaces for a dissident sub-culture (Scott, 1990). This is different to
the traditional situation for Muslim women praying at home without theological
guidance. According to Coleman (1988), all social relations and structures
facilitate some form of social benefit (see Chapter Two, 2.2.2). In this frame,
where ever women met in groups, they generated social capital; either bonding
(personal support), bridging (resource opportunities), or faith (spiritual) capital.
All forms of social capital are important to social cohesion and resilience.
For second generation Muslim women in this research, the spotlight placed on
their faith by the ‘War on Terror’, appears to have led them to become more
absorbed in their faith than they were before. For some women in the
investigation, faith literacy led them to question Mullah’s and Mosque
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committee’s interpretations of Islamic texts. Nazreen, the manager of Ashiana,
for example alluded to orthodox interpretation of Islam, by Mosque leaders,
needing to be rethought when she said:
there are issues about understanding Islam itself and how that’s
portrayed and perceived [by the Mullah’s]. I think women need to take
hold of their own role and sort of understand their Islam. (Nazreen,
interview Ashiana)
This statement is a call to Muslim women to develop a gendered interpretation
of their faith; it draws together the various ways in which women described their
attempts to find ‘their Islam’. This was apparent in Ishmael’s defiance when she
said: ‘women are told, and they accept, what’s not always right. I’ve often been
told to cover my head’, and she went on to say that she did not believe that
covering her head would make her a better Muslim. Ishmael wears traditional
South Asian dress and dupatta (thus covering her head would not be difficult);
keeping her head uncovered signalled defiance to the accepted orthodoxy.
These statements are expressions of women’s movement from acceptance to
challenge in their everyday thinking and actions; resilience as resistance in
hegemony.
In the context of women’s exclusion from local Mosques, expressions of South
Asian Muslim women’s intent, to find spaces and places to explore and
understand their faith, take on a political meaning. They cannot be viewed as
individual forms of agency; they demonstrate women engaging in wider
networks, or movements, to change traditional thinking and actions. In doing this
they are disrupting the existing order and traditional patterns; replacing them
with new orders and patterns. The implication here is that the transformations
caused by the disruption of resilience as resistance (by these South Asian
Muslim women) irrevocably alter states of equilibrium. This problematizes the
notion of ‘bounce back’ in resilience theory.
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6.3 Resilience, relationships and social assets
In the absence of material resources to insulate South Asian Muslim women in
Fieldway from adversity it was clear that women generated strength (social
assets) through relationships and (faith assets) through religiosity. These forms
of capital are inter-connected strengthening each other. However, women in the
study particularly emphasised family and neighbourhood networks as important
to their sense of wellbeing. Any group’s capacity to demonstrate resistance is
aided by positive family relations to family member’s ability to cope with, or adapt
in, adverse conditions. Studies of child development in particular, direct the
study of resilience to consider the importance of family as nurturing and
cohesive unit’s (Masten, 2001, see also Chapter Two, 2.1.3). The following
paragraphs draw on learning from the empirical research that articulate the role
of cohesive social networks. It starts with women’s claims of the importance of
family and neighbourhood networks. The following section incorporates wider
networks in the form of women’s centres as important sites for forming relational
social capital assets.
6.3.1 Resilience – family and neighbourhood networks
Women portrayed a largely positive picture of family, and friendships with other
Muslim women, as sources of support and comfort. These networks appeared
to offer women valuable insulation or protection from the negative effects of
adversity. Relational assets within Fieldway communities can be viewed as
offering protection developed through social connection as in the faith networks
already mentioned (6.2.4). In interview and focus group discussions women
shared their narratives about the networks they trusted and would turn to for
support in times of hardship. These discussions exposed that women would
(generally) not turn to either local state institutions or their local Mosques (see
Chapter Five, 5.4 and 5.5); instead women profiled trust in family and friends.
The sense of ‘family first’ (Shafia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre) was
confirmed by other women as well as male community leader Hakeem. Hakeem,
a 40 year old community leader of Bangladeshi origin said:
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on of family first was repeated often by women, underscoring the
laced on family, as women’s primary locus of support. However,
anager of Ashiana, and Shazia, manager of the Bangladeshi
tre suggested that family relations may be more complex for some
the narratives offered to this research suggest. Taking both
into account the following text begins with reflecting positive
of family. Shafia’s story is unequivocal in relation to the importance
friendship networks. Shafia said:
first, always my family - my friends are like
s….beyond family women’s community centre….[I would
for support] within our family itself because I live with my
ts I know that if I have any issues then they’re always
….so I kind of relax. (Shafia, interview Bangladeshi
n’s centre)
zaleeth who was older than Shafia (over 60 years old), and who
ith her husband and extended family, shared similar views.
id:
mily is central – I live with my husband and children, my
and her husband and her children and my grandchildren;
are twelve of us in the house. I feel very lucky that god
ed me with a good husband; I don’t need to go outside,
times I go to the doctor. (Fazaleeth, interview Ashiana)
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The interview with Fazaleeth was a short interview and it was noticeable that
she did not mention friendship networks at Ashiana. Over the period of the field
study (and regular visits to Ashiana by the researcher) Fazaleeth was usually at
the centre talking to, and laughing with, women or in sewing classes. Fazaleeth
appeared to be embedded in networks with other women and staff at the centre.
The omission might have been an oversight, or that Fazaleeth had taken for
granted that the research would know the importance of Ashiana, or it may have
been the result of language barriers as Fazaleeth was bi-lingual but not
confidently so in English. It might also have been a combination of all, or none,
of these factors. This observation is made as testament the barriers and
imperfections of cross-cultural and bi-lingual research.
Fazaleeth said that she came to the UK in 1979 to marry her husband; that he
taught her English and that he took care of her. This interview in particular,
served as a reminder of the journey made by women centuries earlier from India
to Britain as ayahs (see Chapter Three. 3.3.2); they shared with Fazaleeth, the
vulnerability of the unknown new cultural context they were entering. Fazaleeth,
as she put it, was ‘blessed’ to have the support of her husband and this was not
the case for many ayahs. This point is raised to highlight the importance of
family, other social networks and external support mechanisms such as Ashiana
for first generation women migrants. Tazeem, for example had a good
relationship with her mother-in-law who was a member of her extended family.
Tazeem shared that:
when I first came from Pakistan my mother-in-law, she used to run a
shop. She knows that English is really important so she took me to XXX
women’s centre [now closed]. I try to avoid family, I don’t tell anything to
my mum [in Mirpur] because she get upset, so I don’t talk to her’.
(Tazeem, interview Ashiana)
These narratives extenuate the importance of social networks for building
women’s capacity to cope and thrive in their new home country. Later in the
interview Tazeem went on to say that she was frustrated because her husband
and children (aged 12, 10, 7 and 6 years), don’t listen to her, she said: ‘they just
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play games all the time’. This frustration is likely to be shared with many parents
however, in the new cultural context of Britain Tazeem appeared a confident and
independent but lonely figure within the family. It is also important to note that
Tazeem had the support of her family in undertaking activities to develop her
skills. Her deepest wish was to go to University and graduate. It is possible to
see in Tazeem’s story that while she chose not to contact her mother (in Mirpur)
for emotional support and comfort she was offered opportunities in her marital
family to pursue her ambitions.
These quotes are included because they offer a sense of the complexity of family
life as it was described by women. However, the overriding sense was one of
support and wellbeing as in the quote from Shafia at the beginning of this section
and Aisha’s story when she said that amid her scepticism of government that: ‘I
feel very lucky I have a lot of support from my family and from friends…my family
thinks education is very important’ (interview Ashiana). Overall women painted
a picture of family as nurturing, supportive and offering a sense of security.
Narratives of close knit family ties are reminiscent of Coleman’s (1988) work on
networks ‘with closure’ (see Chapter Two, 2.2.2). The effect of closed networks,
Coleman suggests, is the creation of social controls, norms and social order.
From the perspective of the women involved in this study family networks offered
women the support and security denied to them by civic institutions or generic
civil society institutions but they also enabled women to bridge to other networks.
These data suggest that Coleman’s thesis of networks with closure (Figure 2.1)
is inadequate for explaining the situation of women in the study; women
described supportive and close family ties and also other relations that
influenced their social and faith norms. The point is that family and friendship
networks were rated high for support and trust capital by women who were also
influenced by other networks as described in 6.2.4. The narratives shared with
this study suggest that Coleman’s networks with closure might be viewed as
porous rather than tightly closed as illustrated in Figure 6.1 on the following
page.
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Figure 6.1 Closed networks with porous boundary; wider influences
Faith Women’s centres
Friends
Figure 6.1 illustrates a porous (broken-line) boundary around family networks.
From this perspective family remains important but is not the singular influence
on women’s capacity to generate norms, to build social capital and overcome
adversity. Other influences, namely faith, friends, and women’s centres
influenced women’s thinking and their creation of social norms and assets.
Whilst family was described by women as positive a different picture emerged
from the female community leaders; Rizwana and Shazia. Family, from this
perspective, inculcated inequality in gender relations and risk for some women;
it added to the exclusion of women, at the community or neighbourhood level,
as explored in the previous chapter (5.5). In relation to family, Shazia explained
a complex reality, as in other ethnic and faith communities. Shazia said:
[there are] certain things embedded within the community, that
are so deep that we have to work on [them]…I’ll give you an
example; one is domestic violence, so women are subordinate.
You know all the men in the family have seen these norms [they
think] “if my father can do it, I can do it”. (Shazia, interview
Bangladeshi women’s centre)
Shazia’s words highlight the ‘dark side’ of bonding social capital within some
family networks exposing the tensions between family as protection and family
as risk in which women are subject to gender hegemony; inequality is accepted
as a normative position. Thus whilst women spoke of the subjective experience
of family and neighbourhood as protective from the adversity of Islamophobia,
Family
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women community leaders presented family as potential environments of risk
to gender hegemony. Gender hegemony questions if the social good generated
in networks with close ties are beneficial to all network members. Or do unequal
positions within a network restrict the subordinate group, women’s, access to
positive benefits?
Families exist within home neighbourhood boundaries (Forrest, 2001); members
are affected by, and affect, the norms prevalent in these geographies. These
norms are also the case for male family members who participated in the
exclusion of women from local Mosques. This link is important to demonstrate
the interconnection of family and neighbourhood norms. This is also the case for
women who attended women’s centre activities that increased their
independence and empowerment. The interconnection of the individual, family
and neighbourhood makes it necessary to understand the role of neighbourhood
in Fieldway.
6.3.2 Resilience - the question of neighbourhood
Forrest et al., (2001) work on the potential for neighbourhoods to generate social
capital benefits is helpful in understanding the role of neighbourhood in creating
spaces that influence family and that also have the capacity to ‘circle the
wagons’ to create defensible spaces (Hall, 2010). Fahim’s story, for example
(6.2.1), offers the potential for positive effects when neighbourhood is cohesive
and offers support in times of hardship. Forrest et al., identify the importance of
a ‘sense of belonging’ and ‘trust and reciprocity’ as important mechanisms for
building social capital (see Table 2.1). It leads this study to question how, and if
some, or all, of these qualities were apparent in Fieldway. In articulating fear of
Islamophobia women cited neighbourhood as engendering feelings of security.
Shafia expressed that the home neighbourhood offered a sense of safety and
feeling protected from external harm when she said:
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works late as well and gets the bus back about half-
past eight or nine o’clock and when she gets to our
street, or where the XXX bank used to be, she has to
walk a straight road and she feels safe because she
knows that there are other people about and they see
her and they are supportive as well” (Shafia, interview,
Bangladeshi women’s centre)217
the ‘supportive’ neighbours to the bus journey is highly suggestive
journey being anything but comfortable and supportive as was
n Shafia describes her sister’s relief at being back in home territory
elt safe from Islamophobic attack. Participants also suggested that
n were not able to overcome their fear of the world outside their
eir neighbourhood and had stayed at home for some time after the
bombings. As participant AA in focus group 3 put it women stayed
their own families, they were just protected in their own families’.
expressed similar views; amongst the families’ in her networks; she
at some people at the time believed that women should stay at home
ety because their ‘parents were thinking about [them] not going out
nd asked them to stay at home as much as they could’ (Shafia,
ngladeshi women’s centre).
y of women who participated in the study lived in streets that were
y other Asian Muslim families. As focus group 3 participant, A4, put
end to live together’ and indeed few women in this study lived in
d or predominately white neighbourhoods other than the women’s
gers; neither of whom were residents of Fieldway. Women’s focus
icro level, immediate (family) networks, (with ‘people like us’) brings
am’s (1993) notion of bonding social capital. Bonding social capital
nt in the emphasis women placed on relations that engendered a
fety in the neighbourhood. The presence of other’s who women
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viewed as ‘our people’ appeared to have a positive effect on women’s sense of
wellbeing as participant A2, in focus group 3, put it:
‘when I’m here I feel comfortable, I can walk out in a salwar
kameez and its bright red or green or orange and it’s all right, but
like in XXX if I walk out in a salwar kameez and its bright red or
orange it’s like “whatever?” and because you do feel more
uncomfortable and it’s like about respect’ (participant A2, focus
group 3, Bangladeshi women’s centre).
Participant A2 alludes to feeling that she was not respected if she wore clothes
of her choice in neighbourhoods other than Fieldway. In Fieldway she could be
who she wants to be (at least in terms of her choice of dress); she describes
feeling comfortable and accepted. Participant A2 went on to say: ‘[there’s a]
great feeling of belonging….one community, one part of a whole’. Shafia echoed
these views when she said: ‘where I live and stuff everyone just kind of knows
everyone and if you come home at different times [someone notices]’ (Shafia,
interview Bangladeshi women’s centre).
The extracts from women’s narratives presented above suggest neighbourhood
relations rich in social capital; assets generated between individuals in relations
of mutual respect and trust in which social norms are shared and support is
reciprocated as in Forrest et al., (2001) neighbourhood domains of social capital.
We are also reminded of Granovetter’s (1973) analysis of the limitations of
strong social bonds. In this frame women’s positive sense of security in the
neighbourhood remains limited by lack of access to wider networks in other
neighbourhoods. As discussed in Chapter Five, neighbourhood resources were
not equally shared between men and women, in Fieldway. Rizwana, the
manager of Ashiana, explained women’s position in Pakistani Muslim
communities in Fieldway. She said:
women from Muslim community don’t tend to progress as quickly; for
example ladies from India they’re a bit more ehhh confident, a bit more
ready to go. They’re a bit more educated from back home, they’re more
geared towards the working life and when they come here they want to
further their education, go straight into work and studying – a bit more
family support I think. Mind-set is more so in that way than Muslim
community. With Muslim they tend to be a little bit more protected and a
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little bit of honour comes in - you won’t want to get your wife into work
immediately and this and that. Women are protected by their husband,
by their father, by their brothers, by the family…that’s why we [women’s
centres’] have a massive role to play in the community and especially for
women. (Rizwana, interview Ashiana)
In talking about families ‘protecting’ women from the outside world two issues
come to mind. The first is protection from Islamophobia and the second, as
alluded to by Rizwana is the family failing to prepare women for life outside the
family and community. Specifically in reference to work and education Rizwana
suggests that ‘ladies from India they’re a bit more confident, a bit more ready to
go’ adding that they have more family support. This sentence suggests support
for women’s independence from family was a social norm for ladies from India
but less so for the Pakistani women who use the services of Ashiana.
Shazia, manager of the Bangladeshi women’s centre, expressed women’s
normative position in the communities she worked with in Fieldway differently.
She said:
women are oppressed across the board, when I talk to Hindu women she
will say the same and Muslim women because it’s cultural more cultural
because we share the same culture from India and Bangladesh, even Sri
Lanka and Malaysia. So women are subordinate so therefore some of the
domestic violence takes place. We’re talking [at the women’s centre]
about behavioural change; you need to respect women. These are the
deep rooted problems. (Shazia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)
Shazia’s statement clearly locates all women, regardless of ethnic or faith origin
in positions of subordination to men. She also clearly states that, in her view,
women’s subordination leads to lack of respect for them and the risk of domestic
violence. The point here is that both centre managers describe, differently, the
normative position of women in both ethnic communities. Together these
responses suggest that family and community norms support each other either
in their intent to protect women from eternal (Islamophobic) harm, and also
accept women’s subordination in family and community.
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Rizwana and Shazia’s statements link normative behaviours in family with
normative behaviour in community as processes of hegemony and control.
Nevertheless, for women neighbourhood offered security and protection from
Islamophobic assault. These findings echo Granovetter and Putnam’s argument
that strong personal relations (embeddedness) generate trust, establish
expectations and create and enforce positive or negative social norms. Putnam
also made the case that social capital increases social benefit beyond
individuals for others; this appears to have been the case for South Asian Muslim
women if feeling secure is viewed as a collective benefit. Social capital and
resilience literature offers few observations of the distribution of social benefits
in the context of unequal power relations. The Fieldway study indicates that the
benefit of feeling safe and sharing identity had positive effects on women as did
safety from the threat of Islamophobia. At the same time women’s exclusion
from community facilities may also have restricted women’s access to resource
opportunities available through wider networks within the neighbourhood.
6.3.3 The role of women’s centres in generating social capital
This far analysis has identified positive and negative effects in women’s strong
ties in family, friendship and neighbourhood networks. It has also identified that
the reality was more complex than theories of networks with closure (Coleman,
1988) might indicate. Women in this study had access to wider networks,
created spaces for the generation of social and faith capital and engaged in
wider educational and learning networks. However, women’s centres appeared
to be particularly important structures and social mechanisms for women’s
wellbeing.
Women’s empowerment workshops, mentioned in Chapter Four (4.4.1), and in
women’s search for answers to questions of faith (6.2.4), are useful examples
of the role played by the centres to bridge their users to expert knowledge. The
empowerment workshops sought to build women’s confidence through
increased knowledge of their role in Islam, and in the Muslim family, through
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interpretations of Qur’anic texts. In the context of traditional and exclusionary
forms of Islam, the workshops were spaces for the generation of dissidence, to
traditional interpretations of the Qur’an. In the language of everyday resistance
they formed the spaces in which the subaltern group was able to respond to the
indignities of exclusion. For women at Ashiana the workshops offered the
opportunity to gain knowledge, exchange views and develop networks. Formal
evaluation of the workshops noted the view of one participant who was quoted
as saying: ‘If I knew this information ten years ago when my children were
teenagers, I would have taught them about the issues raised in this course. This
is the first time I’ve been educated on such a crucial and important topic’ (Inspire
Women, 2013: 29).
It is highly unlikely that women would have had access to the knowledge that
was shared, and the discussion that took place, without Ashiana providing the
opportunity. It is also interesting to note that a few months after the
empowerment workshops, in discussion with Rizwana, the centre’s relationship
with the local Mosque was raised. Rizwana said: ‘it’s the women thing, they [the
Mosque elders], think we’re empowering women to sort of be independent and
perhaps that not seen in the best light by the older people in the Mosque’. The
statement confirms that, to the dominant male group, in the local Mosque
discourse that challenged their perspective of women’s role in Islam was not
welcome confirming the notion of dissidence outlined above. Through the lens
of hegemony the workshops constituted counter-hegemonic actions. The
workshops increased women’s knowledge of Islamic texts and challenged
women’s subordinate role in forms of traditional Islam. They can be seen to
extend opportunities to women to build knowledge as well as networks of faith
capital.
Workshops, such as the empowerment workshops, were not the day-to-day
routine of the centres’. Daily work involved women dropping in, networking,
seeking advice and advocacy support from centre workers or attending sewing,
language or computer classes. The daily routine at Ashiana was largely built
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around confidence and skill building; human and social capital. The types of
activities that generate trust capital between women at the centre, as well as
between women and centre workers, creating opportunities for women to
engage in a range of networks. Rita, a 50 year old, White British, worker at
Ashiana described women who were not regular users of the centre hiring space
during the holy month of Ramadhan for Qur’anic reading circles. The women
organisers were known as the ‘dars wallah’s’ indicating that this was an
important role for these women and the wider sphere of influence of the centre.
As women developed skills and confidence the centres encouraged women to
move on to work experience placements, in mainstream organisations, with
access to networks beyond the immediate community. These forms of bridging
capital were predicated on women’s confidence to engage in wider networks.
The accumulation of sufficient human and bonding social capital were essential
precursors to moving out from trusted women’s networks to wider networks. In
this sense the role of women’s centres’ was markedly different to the role of
‘protective’ families, described earlier, in which protecting women could also be
seen as constraining women. Rizwana, the manager of Ashiana, described first
generation migrant women users of the centre as ‘just not ready’ to use
mainstream services. When pressed to explain what she meant by this she said:
In the sense of [low] self-esteem, confidence, language barriers,
child care – everything. Even when they have been in the country
for a number of years they still tend not to go into the mainstream;
they [women] want something that’s more linked to their
communities. (Rizwana, interview Ashiana)
Rizwana added that when women had completed various courses and were
more confident the centre:
used to send our ladies out to work placements in the hospitals
and they would get employment within these other statutory
agencies…one lady has been working there [in a school] for 15
years. Another lady is still working in school setting and while
they were in the school setting they clearly got staff development
and got further training…so not only did they get employment,
and long-term employment, but they also got further training and
higher qualifications. (Rizwana, interview Ashiana)
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Through access to wider networks women’s centres opened opportunities for
women resident’s to accrue forms of social capital that they would otherwise be
unlikely to access. Trust was evident in the centres in the willingness of women
to accept, and cooperate with, this research on the recommendation of centre
staff. Reciprocity was also evident during the research in bi-lingual women
translating for non-English speakers without being asked to do so, and with the
intent of including less confident women, in group discussion. As far as it has
been possible for this study to ascertain there appeared to be a genuine wiliness
from women to support each other. This sense of interdependence between
women and the centre was reinforced by the incident (raised in 5.2.1), during a
return visit to Ashiana, when centre staff were called to deal with a woman who
was in considerable emotional distress. The incident reinforced the importance
of the centre as a physical place, and emotional space, to which women felt able
to turn at times of deep pain and sense of personal harm. The incident indicates
the presence of a high level of trust associated with bonding social capital.
The instances described suggest that strong (internal) bonds do not have to be
constraining; strong bonds can act as the precursor to bridging social capital;
linking women to other networks and opportunities outside their immediate
communities. The presence of multiple forms of social capital, generated
through the women’s centres, suggests a tension in social network analysis
theory. Granovetter’s important (1973) theory ‘the strength of weak ties’ (see
Chapter Two 2.2.2) posits that weak, rather than strong, network ties are helpful
to increased resource opportunities, remains important knowledge. However,
the work of the women’s centres suggests that, for women from marginalised
groups to benefit from resource opportunities (bridging social capital), bonding
social capital and confidence building are important first steps.
The experience of women’s centres in this study exposes a more complex
relationship between strong internal ties and bridging social capital. The centres
engendered strong bonds amongst women and also links to other networks; the
‘social glue’ function of bonding social capital (Crawford, 2006) appeared to be
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essential in these contexts for building women’s confidence sufficiently for them
to bridge to other networks outside their strongly bonded and trusted networks.
It is possible therefore to suggest, from these findings, that networks of strong
social bonds do not necessarily constrain members, if the network has the
capacity to adopt inward (bonding), and outward (bridging), orientations
simultaneously. This should not be seen to imply that all members of a network
are collectively able to engage in both strong internal bonding and outward
facing orientations at the same time. Rather it suggests that bonding social
capital is required before women are able to engage in bridging activities.
Additionally, the interpretation offered here is that the family provided a layer of
protection from adversity, as did relations within the wider community in
Fieldway; the former in relation to emotional wellbeing (protection) although this
may not be the case in all families (as stated by Shazia; family was also identified
as a site of inequality and suppression), and in relation to identity security for the
latter (also a protective feature). Both therefore have a role to play in women’s
sense of wellbeing and the generation of the social assets that support women
to adapt in times of hardship. It is however also important to note that social
capital refers to the potential for action as identified, not least through networks
generated in women’s centres. The next section widens the research focus from
the generation of forms of social capital that insulate or protect women from
adversity to address the issue of women’s adaptation to prolonged harm.
6.4 Resilience - adapting in conditions of prolonged adversity and
retaining fundamental characteristics
This section draws on information presented so far; on resilience literature, on
the roots of Islamophobia in imperial history, and on the empirical investigation.
It draws on resilience thinking, in the frame of hegemony, and it deploys
Bhabha’s (1994) theory of cultural hybridity to interpret/analyse South Asian
Muslim women’s resistant behaviours and adaptation. It begins with a reminder
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of the prolonged nature of the ‘War on Terror’, that is itself rooted in a longer
history of adversity as evidenced in Chapter Three.
The ‘War on Terror’, was initiated in response to the al-Qaeda attacks on
mainland America in 2001, it is now (at the time of writing) in its sixteenth year
of enactment, and it is highly unlikely that it will end in the near future (Jackson,
2005). Scholars have made the case that the ‘War on Terror’ has played a
pivotal role in increasing anti-Muslim hate and Islamophobia (Lambert, 2011).
Academic studies, have identified that South Asian Muslim women are affected
by counter-terrorism policy (see Chapter Three, 3.5), and, the empirical
investigation conducted for this thesis, found that South Asian Muslim women in
Britain experienced heightened levels of fear of assault after 9/11 and 7/7. Fear,
has debilitating effects on the lives of the fearful, influencing their sense of
vulnerability, as Furedi (1997) suggests in writing about the culture of fear. Fear
and assault, was evidenced as multiple intersecting adversity by women, in the
research conducted for this thesis, making it possible to state with certainty, that
the women involved in this investigation experienced prolonged multiple
intersecting adversity. These insights raise two important questions: firstly, what
are the social mechanisms that enabled women to adapt in conditions of
prolonged adversity, and, secondly, do women’s adaptation compromise
fundamental aspects of their Islamic identity?
6.4.1 Resilience in conditions of prolonged adversity
The adaptation of social groups in conditions of prolonged harm has received
little academic attention (Hardy, 2015). It is apparent from this research that the
primary sources of protection, or support for women to overcome prolonged
adversity; to be resilient, lay in the strength of their relationships. Family, and
friendships networks, and wider network support from women’s centres,
provided protection to South Asian Muslim women.
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Evidence of the strength of women’s friendships, is interspersed in the text
already presented; Shafia’s comment that ‘my friends are like sisters’ (6.3.1).
The majority of Muslim women, in the Fieldway investigation, spoke of having
contact with non-Asian Muslim women, but described their primary friendships
with other Asian Muslim women. Tazeem expressed this when asked if she had
non -Asian-Muslim friends, Tazeem said:
I go to the pictures with my girlfriends, where ever I go, we go to college,
or wherever I go I talk to people, but no, I don’t have English friends, all
Asian ‘cause I don’t know any English girls and we have our differences
as well. I don’t know. We have our differences. (Tazeem, interview
Ashiana)
This was not an unusual statement from women in the investigation. It indicates
that, South Asian Muslim women, trust other South Asian Muslim women,
confide in them and turn to them to repair the damage/harm caused by adversity.
These relationships are particularly important for resilience in conditions of
protracted adversity. This finding locates resilience in the social capital assets
generated in trusted networks because they enabled women, in this study, to
engage in discussion, cooperation, (reciprocity) and joint action.
Social capital theory, indicates that cooperation and support amongst women,
generates the ‘social glue’ (Crawford, 2006) that contributes to resilience.
Building on this theoretical knowledge, it is possible to view collective
contestation, agency and resistance as outcomes of social capital. As explained
in Chapter Two (2.4), resistance redefines resilience from a power neutral
concept, to one that places resilience in the context of inequality, struggle, and
hegemony; prolonged adversity. It is the on-going struggle of South Asian
Muslim women in Britain to contest the identity ascribed to them, in counter-
terrorism, and to assert their place in Islam, that leads this research to the
question of processes of transmutation in adaptation to prolonged adversity in
hegemony. Under the lens of temporality, the processes of transmutation in
prolonged adversity are enduring, situated in the dynamic of the past in the
present, and the present in the past. The processes of transmutation for the
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South Asian Muslim women in this study, demonstrate irrevocable change in
terms of their identity and cultural script, triggered by 9/11; an example of which
is in relation to their faith. The question of the longer term impacts of processes
of transmutation focuses attention on future possibilities; that these women are
laying the foundations of change for future generations of Muslim people,
communities, and in particular, for Muslim women.
Bhabha’s (1994), theory of hybridity, offers a useful frame in which to position
women in prolonged adversity; the ‘third space’ offers a way to consider if
adaptation enables the retention of fundamental, pre-trauma characteristics. For
South Asian Muslim women, the fundamental pre-trauma characteristic is
equated to their religiosity; belief in Islam. It may be helpful to explain why
Bhabha’s theory of hybridity is useful to the search to understand adaptation. In
describing how colonised people have resisted power, Bhabha’s theory offers
the possibility of a new dynamic; a ‘third position’ or ‘third space’. The third
position, is not located in historic subjugation, or in co-option into the dominant
narrative; it is a different cultural position ‘in-between the designations of identity’
(1994: 4). For South Asian Muslim women, the hybrid position, in the third space,
lies in the intersection of Islamic and Western identities. In this frame, South
Asian Muslim women have inhabited a ‘third space’ that contests their historic
subjugation in dominant representations, and exclusion in faith; evident in
women’s search for resistant identities, and ‘their Islam’.
In their rejection, of counter-terrorism’s construction of Muslim women (see
Chapter Three, 3.5 and 6.2.1), and in their re-articulation of Islam, women in the
Fieldway investigation, generated new identity positions. At one level this is
evident in women’s choice of dress; wearing hijab, or wearing hijab with jeans
and shirts can be seen as a physical manifestation of hybridity. The women who
wore hijab and also jeans were neither buying into Western ideology, nor into
traditional Islam; they had created a new, independent, identity. They were
neither the daughters/wives of orthodox Islam, nor had they become the
Western image of woman; they had adopted new positions. Their new positions
228
contest the boundaries of both South Asian tradition and Western hegemony.
However it remains unclear if women who embraced hybridity retained pre-
trauma characteristics or if in the process of transformation they changed
unrecognisably. The question of loss of pre-trauma religiosity is the focus of the
following section.
6.4.2 Did adaptation compromise fundamental aspects of women’s
Islamic identity?
The empirical investigation identified that, far from denouncing Islam and having
no faith or taking another faith, South Asian Muslim women’s interest in Islam
increased as a result of the ‘War on Terror’. This was evident in women’s choice
to wear hijab, as symbolic of their religiosity, and in their search to find ‘their
Islam’ (see 6.2.1 and 6.2.3 in this chapter). Secondly, ‘third space’ theory and,
in particular, the concept of hybridity (Bhabha, 1994), suggests that hybridity
embodies both former positions, whilst representing neither, in the creation of
the new and different (hybrid) position. In the frame of ‘the third space’ women
had not rejected Islam; they had positioned themselves differently to, and in,
Islam. The important point for this investigation is in women’s re-articulation of
their position in Islam, as opposed to, a rejection of Islam (see 6.2.3). Data, from
the empirical investigation, indicate that adaptation and transformation, in
conditions of prolonged adversity, led women not only to retain, but also to,
strengthen pre-trauma religious characteristics.
Women who adopted hybrid positions strengthened, rather than relinquished,
pre-trauma faith characteristics despite hegemonic pressures to conform to the
dominant ideology. Hatred of Muslims in wider society was not sufficient, for the
women in the Fieldway study, to be hegemonized. In retaining, and
strengthening, religiosity, South Asian Muslim women demonstrated resistance
in resilience to the dominant narrative and to hegemonic pressure. In resisting
dominant narratives South Asian Muslim women were/are modelling a new ‘third
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way’, a refusal to accept the binary of ‘Muslim’ or ‘Western’. This process of
transmutation is hugely important as they were asserting their rights in both.
South Asian Muslim women’s new positions challenged orthodox Islam, in terms
of women’s identity and in terms of women’s position; it involved them in
complex negotiations and interactions with family, community and society as
indicated by Fathema (quoted in 6.2.3) and her friends, in their challenge to the
formal code of the local Mosque, by attending different Mosques. Women’s
adaptive strategies of attending other Mosques required them to engage in
negotiations that caused disruptions in the existing order; the new order
appeared to have been accepted by family members and became part of the
daily routines of South Asian Muslim women. The disruption was also felt by
traditional Mosque leaders. Rizwana, for example noted that women’s new
‘independent’ positions were not welcomed by some Mosque elders who did not
see them ‘in the best light’. These examples demonstrate that women’s
adaptation, in lived hegemony, were themselves creating disruptions to
established orders and systems.
The complexity of hybridity, for South Asian Muslim women, is in the loss of
certainty; certainty provided by tradition, even dynamic tradition. In subverting
and reforming, re-formulating and transmuting meanings, in hybrid positions,
women created alliances in new networks; in social and faith networks and in
new ways of thinking. For South Asian Muslim women in Fieldway, this included
families accepting that women’s rejection of traditional South Asian dress was
not a rejection of South Asian tradition and values such as faith. Hybridity is
constituted of ambivalence; negotiating new ways of understanding women’s
new place in old and new social orders.
This investigation suggests that South Asian Muslim women who adopted hybrid
positions affirmed rather than diminished their affiliation to Islam; this does not
suggest that they changed beyond recognition from the women they were to
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new Muslim women. In terms of the pre- trauma characteristic of Islamic
religiosity, their processes of adaptation lead to change but not change beyond
recognition. Many women engaged in Islam in ways that they had not prior to
the ‘War on Terror’, disrupting the dominant narrative, by rejecting it. Women
also rejected the binary of either traditional South Asian OR Western dress. This
rejection, played out in dress code, symbolizing women’s rejection of the binary
of either Muslim or Western. In these rejections South Asian Muslim women
disrupted the equilibrium of family, community and societal order, pre -9/11.
Hybridity, enabled women to select, aspects of both ideologies, rather than
totally reject or total accept either. The fundamentally important point to make,
in relation to resilience, is that in these processes of change there was no place
to ‘bounce back’ to. The trajectory is one of movement in which there is no
equilibrium.
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Part IV
Conclusion: Extending knowledge
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion – extending knowledge
7.1 Introduction
This research set out to trouble the ‘deafening silence’ (Khan, 2013) surrounding
Muslim women’s experience of adversity in the ‘War on Terror’. It set two
overarching aims and a series of sub aims to guide the thesis in this task. The
aims and sub aims focused attention on the application of new approaches to
understanding the ‘War on Terror’ as a new invocation of struggle for hegemony
rooted in empire. Salter (2002), in making the case that the terms ‘barbarian’
and ‘civilized’ have been resurrected in the ‘War on Terror’, exposes that the
violence associated with the ‘barbarian’ ‘is open to the violence of the
“civilized”’(p. 163). The imagery used by Salter, in describing forms of national
violence and violation in Afghanistan and Iraq, can be used to describe the
violence and abuse of South Asian and other Muslim women on the streets of
Britain by the so-called ‘civilized’ minority who abuse Muslim women.
This thesis has argued that the indignities of fear and violence experienced by
South Asian Muslim women is directly linked to the rhetoric and actions of the
‘War on Terror’ and counter-terrorism. Yet it has also been difficult to find
evidence to indicate that national and local governments are aware of,
understand or respond to, the collateral damage caused to women, by
government setting in train specific protective measures. Indeed the opposite
was found to be the case; local state institutions were unaware of South Asian
Muslim women’s fear, of Islamophobic abuse, in this empirical study. This is a
huge indictment of democratic processes that purport to protect all citizens
equally. It is in the context, of failure by the state, to put in place specific
measures to support South Asian, and other, Muslim women that this thesis
concludes. New knowledge unearthed in this thesis provides imperatives for
urgent policy reform. Learning from this thesis is grouped under four heading
that are considered separately in the following text. The chapter concludes with
returning to Fieldway to provide an update of the work of the Ashiana centre that
was largely used by Pakistani women, during the field research.
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7.2 New frames or ways of thinking about the ‘War on Terror’, adversity
and resilience
This thesis offers a new approach to the study of the ‘War on Terror’ and the
concept ‘resilience’ under the lenses of hegemony and temporality. In addition,
feminist, Black feminist and anti-imperialist epistemological frames were crucial
in terms of the intersectionality of sexism, racism and colonization. Placing the
‘War on Terror’ and resilience under these analytic lenses exposed present
manifestation of adversity as already existing and rooted in a colonial past. This
view opened up new ways of approaching the study of resilience; as prolonged
and continuous, the ‘war of position’ (Gramsci, 1971: 108). In this reading, the
experiences of adversity in the ‘War on Terror’ for South Asian Muslim women
in Britain, are rooted in a long history of struggle against co-option into a master
narrative that presents Islam as uncivilized and Muslim women as subject to
extreme/hyper patriarchal oppression (Brown, 2016). Yet this thesis has
evidenced resistance to state and civil society hegemony by South Asian Muslim
women in Britain. The notion of resistance as ongoing struggle for power and
domination problematizes accepted definitions of resilience; there is no pre-
trauma state of equilibrium for South Asian Muslim women in Britain to ‘bounce
back’ to. The dynamic of hegemony and temporality are always in transition.
Under the lens of hegemony and temporality the shape or structure of adversity
and resilience are changed; there is an insistence that adversity and resilience
cannot remain politically neutral. The lenses of hegemony and temporality
sharpen the focus on time in adversity to expose the presence of prolonged
adversity. The lenses of hegemony and temporality sharpen the focus on
resistance in resilience to expose the presence of resistance to domination.
These foci bring in the political dynamic to make visible individual, group and
collective resilience as resistance to conditions of prolonged adversity in the
struggle for ideological power.
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7.3 New knowledge
Secondly, this thesis offers new knowledge. Most importantly it has evidenced
a high level of fear amongst South Asian Muslim women in Britain for their safety
that can be directly linked to the ‘War on Terror’, 9/11 and 7/7. In doing this the
thesis moves beyond general ideas of Muslims as the new ‘suspect community’
(Pantazis, 2009; Spalek, 2010) and presumptions of adversity; it identified the
presence of specific multiple, intersecting prolonged forms of adversity and
consequent harms endured by South Asian Muslim women in Britain. It has
uncovered fear, and the spread of fear, amongst Muslim communities. These
are important findings academically as they drill down into the nuanced and
specific ways in which South Asian Muslim women in Britain are affected by the
‘War on Terror’. The empirical research findings offers a new knowledge, on the
‘lived hegemony’ of South Asian Muslim women in Britain (Williams, 1977:112,
cited in Stoddart, 2007:202) that expose short comings in social justice for
Muslim women at local and national policy41 levels.
In providing new data/information about South Asian Muslim women’s
experience of adversity and, importantly, their everyday strategies of resistance
in the ‘War on Terror’; this thesis provides a counter-balance to the ‘deafening
silence’ noted by Khan (2013) at the beginning of this thesis. In articulating South
Asian Muslim women’s everyday resistances and their adaptation in building
hybrid ‘resistant identities’; this thesis highlights South Asian Muslim women’s
agency and courage in the ‘War on Terror’. Women’s resistant identities are a
rejection of dominant representations of themselves as ‘intolerable’ (Bottrell,
2009) to them and identifies women’s on-going search for an identity that meets
their needs and more accurately represents them.
The thesis also identified that strong social bonds and bonding capital was an
important pre-requisite for women to engage in bridging activities; joining or
41 This point is picked up in relation to policy learning in 7.4 of this chapter.
235
engaging with other networks. In this regard, and through the lens of hegemony,
the thesis asks if Granovetter’s (1973) important work on the ‘strength of weak
ties’ is different for different groups. The work in Fieldway indicated that South
Asian Muslim women (a marginalised group) required the confidence of bonding
social capital, in networks with strong ties, before they were able to engage in
bridging activities that require weak network ties.
Additionally, this thesis exposes the deafness, failure, or inability, of the local
state in Britain, to hear, understand, or respond to, South Asian Muslim women’s
experiences of fear/adversity. In the Fieldway study, for example, it was
apparent in the interviews with local state representatives that they just did not
know that South Asian Muslim women lived with fear; therefore they were unable
to offer specific responses to reduce women’s fear. This finding adds weight to
the isolation of South Asian, and other, Muslim women that was also identified
in national policy. Feminist and human rights studies (Huckerby, 2012; Nì Aolàni,
2013) identify that Muslim women remain in the margin of national counter-
terrorism policy; this thesis found that South Asian Muslim women in Fieldway
were not even in the margin of local policy; they were invisible, their issues were
unknown and unheard by local state institutions. This raises serious concerns
for policy related to social cohesion and for the social justice and human rights
of South Asian Muslim women in Britain.
This thesis identified the central role of relationships and bonding social capital
in enabling, the collective resilience as resistance, of South Asian Muslim
women in Britain. In doing so, this thesis adds to resilience literature, by
articulating the ways in which social networks play an important part in building
social capital. Resilience itself is a form of social capital in this frame; bonding
relationships generate the trust and reciprocity (Coleman, 1988; Putnam; 1996;
2000) that enable resistance in conditions of prolonged adversity characterized
by fear. However, this thesis also questions Coleman’s (1988) work on closed
network structures. The empirical investigation conducted for this thesis found
that South Asian Muslim women’s family networks were ‘close’ rather than
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‘closed’ leading this thesis to question if Coleman’s networks with closure are in
fact porous (see Chapter Six, 6.3.1, Figure 6.1). The Fieldway study found that
influences on South Asian Muslim women’s social norms were wider than family
alone and, at times, led these women to contest norms within their family such
as wearing hijab against the expressed wishes of elders in the family.
Finally, in relation to neighbourhood as the place in which the work to ‘repair’
(Forrest, 2001) the harmful effects of prolonged adversity is carried out; this
thesis observed that ethnically mixed and cohesive neighbourhood structures
have the potential to insulate South Asian Muslim women in Britain, from the
harmful adversity of fear of Islamophobic assault by white males. It is not
possible from the findings of this thesis to state with certainty that this is the
case. However, this finding raises the issue of the need for further study to
ascertain if there are protective values, in relation to adversity and resilience, of
mixed ethnic and faith neighbourhoods and the characteristics required for
social cohesion.
7.4 Gaps in existing knowledge; further study
Thirdly, this thesis identified gaps in existing knowledge raising the potential for
future study. Most importantly, and urgently, further study is required to
understand adversity and resilience in conditions of prolonged trauma or
disruption. The experience of South Asian Muslim women in Britain, in the ‘War
on Terror’, provides an example of processes of adaptation, yet adaptation is
understudied in resilience. An important gap in existing knowledge in this regard
concerns the question of whether adaptation and change lead to the loss of
fundamental pre-trauma/disruption characteristics.42
42 The idea of adaptation in conditions of prolonged harm builds on the definition of resilience
at the beginning of Chapter Two frames by Hardy (2015).
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The adaptation of the South Asian Muslim women, in this thesis, suggests not,
but the thesis did not set out to test processes of adaptation in conditions of
prolonged harm. This thesis did, however, uncover that processes of adaptation
and change create further disturbance in the system, leading to questions about
the effects of change, caused by adaptation itself, to the system. For example,
in creating resilient identities and in finding their Islam, women in the Fieldway
study, disrupted existing codes of behaviour and meaning. Hybridity required
women to renegotiate all the parameters of all social relations, negotiate new
behaviours, meanings and new forms of knowing. New positions raise question
about further disruption in the system/s that require academic attention. In the
case of South Asian Muslim women the answer was no, adaptation did not lead
to fundamental change in women themselves, but the unanswered question
remains, do women’s resistances lead to fundamental disruptions/changes in
the community (or system) as a whole?
This thesis also found that, for South Asian Muslim women in the field
investigation, the home neighbourhood area provided benefits and was the
place in which the work to ‘repair’ (Forrest, 2001) the damage inflicted by
adversity was carried out. However, it also found that, for one participant,
growing up in a neighbourhood that was ethnically mixed and appeared to be
cohesive, may have reduced the participant’s fear of Islamophobia. Whist cause
and effect could not be determined in this thesis; the experience raises
questions about the role of neighbourhood as protector from adversity or
exacerbating adversity through, for example, the spread of fear. A study of
neighbourhood effects might build on the work of Forrest et al., (2001) to provide
greater detail of the effects of a cohesive neighbourhood on South Asian Muslim
women’s fear of Islamophobic assault.
7.5 Policy implications for Muslim women’s human rights
The greatest social policy concern identified in this thesis was the dislocation
between Muslim women and national and local policy, and dislocation between
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women and local state actors. At the national level feminist scholars suggest
that Muslim women remain in the margin of security policy and peripheral to the
institutional settings of policy (Nì Aolàni, 2013, see Chapter Three, 3.5).
However, where Muslim women are mentioned, as in the Casey review into
opportunity and integration (2016), Muslim women’s specific needs are lost;
despite the stated aim of the report to consider ‘what divides communities and
gives rise to anxiety, prejudice, alienation and a sense of grievance’ (p. 5).
Despite the report acknowledging anti-Muslim violence experienced by women,
its recommendation for stronger community cohesion, that this thesis supports,
is reduced in terms of ethnic minority (and Muslim) women to the promotion of
English language and the ‘emancipation of marginalised groups of women’ (p.
167). This thesis takes issue with generalised recommendations such as these
because the issue of violence against Muslim women, is now know and well
document, but not addressed. The findings from this thesis argue that there is a
clear and urgent need to establish specific programmes aimed at building
relations between Muslim women and local state institutions. This is particularly
urgent and important given the on-going indignity and injustice experienced by
visibly identifiable Muslim women.
At the level of the local state, this thesis identified an alarming lack of knowledge
by local state representatives of South Asian Muslim women’s fear. There may
be reasons for this that were unknown to the research, however the total silence
of representatives of the state indicates a further silencing or invisibilising of
South Asian Muslim women’s reality. This was perhaps most evident in the ways
in which representatives of the local state who participated in the study were
silent about, and thereby invisibilized, the harm inflicted by the ‘War on Terror’
on South Asian Muslim women. The articulations of these local state
representatives re-inscribed gender and faith stereotypes such as Muslim’s
women’s experience of domestic violence within in Muslim communities in
Fieldway (as described in Chapter Five, 5,4). Failures at national and local state
levels to engage with, and understand, Muslim women’s lived experience
indicate fissures between state institutions and Muslim women. Viewed from the
perspective of Halpern’s multi-level social capital diagram (Chapter Two, 2.2.2
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Figure 2.3) these failures indicate a lack of protection for South Asian Muslim
women at both levels. In terms of resilience theory related to risk and protective
factors, the failure of the local state reflects its inability to adopt a protective
counter-balance to risk based national counter-terrorism policy. The issue of the
dislocation of South Asian Muslim women, from local and national state, raises
questions about the rights of Muslim women to live free of intimidation and fear
and their rights to religious freedom as citizens in democratic British society. The
recommendation from this finding must stress the urgent need for local state
institutions to actively engage with South Asian Muslim women in Britain, to build
sufficient trust with them for them to make their concerns know to local state
actors43.
Additionally, this thesis suggests, in relation to local policy, that it is essential for
the local state to work towards women’s equal use of local facilities as one way
of demonstrating concern for women and to help build trust between local state
institutions and South Asian Muslim women. This is particularly the case in
relation to buildings that are owned by local state institutions and managed by
male civil society groups. This may involve long and complex negotiations;
however it would send a clear signal to South Asian women’s groups, such as
Ashiana, that the local state was concerned about issues that are pertinent to
them. The Fieldway investigation found, for example, that some representatives
of the local authority were aware of, and concerned about, South Asian Muslim
women’s unequal access, but there appeared to be difficulty in addressing the
problem (see Chapter Five, 5.4). This is worrying as exclusion denied South
Asian Muslim women access to limited public space in Fieldway, and resilience
literature identifies that material resources, such as access to meeting places is
important for building social networks, social capital and resilience.
43 This finding reflects the findings of Spalek related to the importance of trust building between
Muslim communities and institutions of the state, such as the police, in counter-terrorism
(Spalek, 2010; 2013).
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7.6 Conclusion
This thesis set out to trouble the unacceptable ‘deafening’ silence surrounding
adversity experienced by South Asian Muslim women in Britain. It has done this
by tracing current struggles for hegemony to British imperialism. This approach
has illuminated the deep roots of the ‘War on Terror’ in British imperial history.
In this frame, Islamophobia is a manifestation of prolonged adversity, in the ‘war
of position’ embedded in the historical, intergenerational collective
consciousness of colonial British/South Asian Muslim relations. Historical
amnesia, as an aspect of consent and coercion in hegemony, must not only be
named but also resisted.
On a finishing note the importance of breaking the silence surrounding the
indignity experienced by South Asian Muslim women, in the ‘War on Terror’
cannot be under estimated. It is essential to achieving their right to live a life free
of fear and also to clearly articulate that the women in this study were not passive
victims. The courage and strength of women in the face of incredible fear is a
story that requires to be told repeatedly to dispel the construction of South Asian
Muslim women in Britain as inactive, oppressed and malleable.
In women’s everyday resistance and in their adoption of hybrid positions South
Asian Muslim women in Britain are adopting a long tradition of challenge;
challenge to the binary of power and subjugation, enacted, ironically, by white
men when they converted to Islam three hundred years ago44. 18th century
British state and population were unable to accept hybridity, as it was seen to
pose a challenge to the superiority of the dominant ideology, it would seem that
this remains the case in 21st century Britain, for Muslim women, who symbolise
hybrid identities. South Asian Muslim women, who represent hybrid identities,
face anger and hatred on the streets of Britain; the failure of the state to offer
44 Known as the ‘White Moghuls’ powerful representatives of the East India Company converted
to Islam and adopted Indian life styles (Dalrymple, 2003). They were hated by the contemporary
British public and state and pejoratively called the ‘nabobs’ (See Chapter Three, 3.2.1)
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them specific protection from this vilification might also be viewed as the
dominant group’s failure to accept hybridity. Importantly, in refusing to accept
the binary of ‘Muslim’ or ‘British’ South Asian Muslim women in Britain are
engaged in generating creative alternatives; identities of resistance constituted
of, and within, hybridity. There is an urgent need for public policy to hear,
understand, learn from, and incorporate these South Asian Muslim women’s
creativity to their adversity. Public policy, this thesis suggests, could be improved
if it engaged the notion of plurality and hybridity.
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Appendix 1
Flexible framework for focus groups and interviews with women
Research aims and
objectives - themes
Focus group/interview process
1. Introduction
Adversity - Introduction to research project
- Introduction to focus group/interview
process – 2 parts:
1st part looking back/remembering
2nd part about social assets
3rd part hopes for the future
Part 1 – looking back – feeling secure/insecure?
2. Resilience
“it is especially after Sep: 11 it
has got worse....everywhere
you go people are
disrespecting us.....I was
scared....I have heard that
people have pulled girls’
scarves off....I didn’t tend to go
out alone & I remember I went
to town a few weeks after it
had happened people were just
giving me mucky looks....”
Shabnam Ishaq (aged 21)
(Bagguley & Hussain 2005:
218)
Resilience to what? Identifying
adversity?
- This is what ‘Shabnam’ said about Sep:
11 2001. Can you remember how you felt
when you heard about the Al-Qaeda
attack in America or the 7/7/2005 London
bombings?
Prompts
o Where were you?
o Who told you/how did you find
out?
o What were your first thoughts?
- Which of these events do you
remember most Sep: 11 or 7/7?
Can you explain why you remember one
more than the other?
- Did either of these events make any
difference to the things you did or how
you felt?
Prompts
o About going out
o About your parents?
o About your children?
o About your non-Muslim
neighbours?
3. Social networks/social
capital/trust and
reciprocity
Who did you turn to/share your thoughts
and feeling with?
Prompts
o Family & friends?
o Community group?
o Mosque?
o Local Councillors?
o Someone else?
Why?
Prompts
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o Trust?
o Sharing – they talked to me?
o Access – they were around?
Part 2 – NOW – what has changed?
4. Social capital bridging
and linking
Can you tell me what has changed for
you and for your community since you
first heard about these atrocities?
Prompts
o Less/more able to move
around and talk to people in
Harehills?
o Less/more able to travel
around and talk to people in
the city?
o Talk to fewer/more non-
Muslim people?
o Nothing has changed?
Part 3 – the future
5. Hopes and realities -
transformation
What are your hopes for yourself for the
future?
What are your hopes for your community
in the future?
How is this different to your hopes 13
years ago (2001) or 8 years ago (2005)?
6. The role of social
networks/social capital
Can you describe the ONE
thing/person/group that has helped most
in making this change?
7. nishing off/closure - Summary of key points
- Reassure participants of confidentiality
and anonymity
- There will be a chance to read the
transcript if wished
- Thank you for your time and for speaking
to me
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Appendix 2
Flexible framework for interviews with professionals
Introduction
This research is interested in taking a closer look at the look at the role of social
and political networks in generating adaptive community resilience. Adaptive
resilience is a term that I use to describe the capacity of a ‘community’ (or group
of people who share common spaces, issues, or bonds) to rise above on-going
adversity.
I differentiate adaptive resilience from recovery resilience in as much as
recovery is often used to describe how a community returns to ‘normal function’
after a disaster. Adaptive resilience is about how a community adapts over time
to on-going problems and issues.
Research aim and objectives
The aim of this investigation is to better understand the social dynamics that
make communities resilient to on-going adversity. The research assumes that
social mechanisms and civil society infrastructure play a part in ‘protecting’
group members to thrive under negative conditions.
I am particularly interested in talking to you about your views and perspectives,
as a professional working in this neighbourhood with people who identify as
Muslim or are part of one or many communities of Muslims living in this area.
I would like to begin by asking a few questions about your professional
relationship with the neighbourhood.
The professional relationship
 How long have you worked with Muslim residents in this area?
 Is it your view or understanding that this group of people live with specific
pressures/issues/stresses?
o If yes, can you describe the pressures?
o ……and what about women?
PART 1.
I am particularly interested in understanding how Muslim people who live in this
neighbourhood cope with the stigma of ‘terrorism’ post 9/11/2001 and the
London bombings on 7/7/2005.
If appropriate:
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 Looking back at these events are you able to recall any anxieties in this
group?
Can you describe how these anxieties were played out?
 Can you recall the role of the profession you represent in addressing
anxieties?
If required – for example relationship building between community
members and your profession, special services, additional support?
 Can you recall if any changes (positive or negative) that occurred as a
result? These might be within the community or between the community
and the profession you represent
 Were you aware of anything that happened within the local Muslim
community to address anxieties?
If required – can you describe these?
 Can you recall responses to anxiety in the community from your
profession?
If required – can you describe these?
Thank you – I know it’s difficult to recall the past, and especially such a long time
ago so let’s move to the present.
PART 2.
 As you think about this neighbourhood and this group of people today
what would you say has been the most significant change?
If required – more/less inward looking?
More/less contact with your, and/or other formal agencies?
 Might you describe any of these changes as transformative?
If required – For individuals or for a wider group?
Expand on the nature of the changes and the group affected
 What about the question of trust between members of this community
and formal agencies – how do you see this?
If required – why?
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 Are you able to describe any positive or negative impacts of the recent
brutal murder of the soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich?
If required – how were the implications of this tragedy for social cohesion
handled?
Thank you, I would now like to turn to the last part of the interview – the future
PART 3.
 Do members of this group of people have hopes and aspirations for the
future?
If required – please describe these, and explain what makes you think
that?
Before finishing I would like to ask you if you think there are other professionals
or people in the community who you think it may be useful for me to speak to.
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Appendix 3
Resilience enhancing resources in Fieldway
This appendix provides contextual information related to the resources available
to Muslim women in Fieldway. It is generally accepted that material resources
can serve to insulate individuals and communities from adversity (Zautra, 2010;
O’Sullivan, 2012) making it important to determine the extent to which the
investigation community in Fieldway had access to insulating factors.
It may be useful to begin with understanding the ethnic and faith demographic
of Fieldway and the electoral ward in which it is located:
- At ward level the single largest group is ‘White British’ at 37%, followed
by Pakistani at 22%, African at 8% and Bangladeshi at 17% of the
population (West Yorkshire Observatory, 2012)
- at the neighbourhood level the ‘White British’ population falls to 25%, and
African to 1%
- at the neighbourhood level the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations
increase to 32% and 17% respectively (West Yorkahire Observatory,
20102)
- neighbourhood data demonstrate a concentration of South Asian
Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in Fieldway representing 49% of
the total neighbourhood population
- at the ward level Christian is closely followed by Islam as the faith of the
populations at 39% and 33% respectively
- at the neighbourhood level Islam represents 52% and Christianity 26% of
the faith of the populations (Northend City Council, 2012 ward data and
West Yorkshire Observatory, 2012 for neighbourhood data).
Fieldway; structural challenges
- Fieldway is ranked amongst the 10% most deprived neighbourhoods
nationally against all indices of deprivation
- low income and environmental quality are the worst45
- health and housing also rank amongst the worst nationally
Note – data relate to total ward or neighbouhood populations and are not
separated by religion or ethnic group. These data indicate that Muslims share
high levels of poverty with other population groups.
45 The count for low income in the neighbourhood stands at -60% and -50% for quality of environment of
the average count for the city in 2012
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Economic activity
The ward had the highest unemployment count in city/town and the
second highest Job Seekers Allowance claimant count (JSA In 2012).
- benefit claimants data (as a proxy for unemployment as well as low wage)
indicate both high levels of unemployment and high levels of in-work
poverty (JSNA 2012)
- twice as many children in Fieldway live in homes in which no adult is
working with the attendant effects for child development, educational
attainment and inter-generational social mobility (Hirsch, 2007).
- unemployment level in Fieldway are 2.5 times higher than the city/town
average (Northend City Council, 2014)
- low income levels are 3 times higher than city/town averages (Northend
City Council, 2010)
- resident on forms of welfare benefit is also double city/town averages
standing at 22.05% (Nothend City Council, 2010)
Crime and community safety
- Has the highest levels for burglary in the regional Police Force area
(Northend City Council, 2013 (a))
- youth nuisance and burglary are the top community safety priorities by
residents (Northend City Council, 2014)
- 25% of reported crime and anti-social behaviour related to young people
- drug dealing is highlighted in the Council’s 2013 survey
- the need to improve relationships between young people and the police
highlighted in the Council’s 2013 survey
- the Council’s neighbourhood improvement plans for 2013/14 and
2014/15 make reference to the need to improve community confidence
in the police
- Fieldway has among the lowest levels of confidence in the police in the
city/town.
Fieldway; the physical environment
- Has a population of 7,400 people who live in 2,605 properties (Council
tax listing 2011)
- population density comprises 74.2 people per hectare compared to an
average of 13.6 people in the city/town (Northend City Council, 2012)
- 31.7% of housing in the electoral ward is deemed to be over-occupied
(re’new, 2010)
- ‘entrenched “homeless sub-culture”’ with high numbers of young people
on housing waiting lists with little chance of needs being met in the
neighbourhood (re’new, 2010)
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- 70% of housing stock comprises smaller back-to-back and small terraced
houses with no or small gardens (re’new, 2010)
- 90% of housing is classified in Council tax band ‘A’
- streets and almost all houses are poorly maintained with broken paving
slabs and weed-ridden gutters
- 2 primary schools, and no high schools
- 4 established Mosques
- 2 community centres (one Pakistani and one Bangladeshi); a
Bangladeshi women’s centre, and a privately run enterprise centre
- 2 lively main road shopping streets
- 1 small-ish park for green space with a few very small pocket parks where
houses have been demolished
- a number of households shared an external space for storing rubbish
bins; called bin yards
- litter, street cleanliness, graffiti, fly tipping, bin yards and dog fouling have
been raised by residents as issues of concern (Northend City Council,
2014).
Mental health effects of gender and race - beyond Fieldway
Being female and South Asian make a difference to health and life opportunities
that are not apparent at neighbourhood level. While the socio-economic
implications of poverty are grave for all women (Moosa, 2009), the combination
of (female) gender and (South Asian) race increase the risk of poor mental
health. Women from these ethnic groups have the lowest income of any group
of women experiencing the largest ‘employment penalty’ as Muslims (Bagguley,
2007: 1; Moosa, 2009: 14).
The World Health Organisation (WHO) states that the world’s most ruthless killer
and the greatest cause of suffering on earth is extreme poverty (1995). While
BME communities in the UK cannot be deemed to experience extreme poverty
they can be deemed to experience high levels of relative poverty with its
associated distress and suffering. Poverty can have a direct or indirect effect
on emotional, behavioural and psychiatric health and a profound impact on an
individual’s ability to cope with day-to-day problems.
- Poverty more than doubles the chance of experiencing depression and
generalised anxiety disorder (Muarli, 2004:3, Anand, 2005:205,
Rowlingson, 2011:16)
- national studies indicate a higher prevalence of mental health problems
among South Asian women (defined as Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi,
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- and Sri Lankan) in terms of depression, suicide, deliberate self-ham and
eating disorders (Anand, 2005: 196)
- Pakistani Muslim women are particularly vulnerable to depression and
anxiety (Sonuga-Barke, 2000)
- Pakistani and white women who are in employment have lower anxiety
and depression scores than those who were house bound
- suicide rate of young Asian women is more than double that of their white
counterparts (Anand, 2005; Kumari, 2004; Soni, 1990).
Despite the danger of over-simplifying causal effects these data offer additional
information about the mental health wellbeing of women in Fieldway. Along-side
data generated by women community leaders during the field investigation these
data suggest that levels of mental health distress may be considerably higher in
this population than is recognised in official data for the neighbourhood.
In relation to resilience enhancing resources this brief overview of some
conditions in Fieldway indicate that Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim women
who live in Fieldway have few material resources to insulate them from
adversity.
Note - data sources that are attributed to Northend and Fieldway are from
anonymised sources. A coding log of actual/anonymised references has been
retained and is available on request.
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Appendix 4
Stage 4 Analysis
Interpretive selection of key issues - adversity and resilience
Adversity Resilience
Context – structural issues:
- poverty
- racism
- Islamophobia (including gendered
stereotypes of Muslim women)
- 9/11 and 7/7 spotlight Muslims.
1 Theme: fear and spread of fear
- hatred of Muslims; escalation
of attacks visibly identifiable
Muslim women following an
Islamist related incident
(including 7/7)
- effects of hard counter-
terrorism
Resistant identities – behaviours
and actions
- contesting ascribed identity
- formulating counter narratives
- creating spaces for faith
capital
1a Sub theme: the failure of civic
institutions to recognise women’s
vulnerabilities:
- confusion, lack of
preparedness for 9/11
included lack of specific
support for Muslim women
- failure of local state
institutions to recognise the
heightened level of women’s
fear particularly after 7/7
Resilience, relationships and
social assets
- complexity of family and
neighbourhood networks
- women’s friendship networks
- women’s centres, social
capital
1b Sub theme: failure of civil
society institutions to recognise
women’s vulnerabilities:
- mosques in particular
- also generic community
centres
Resilience - adapting in conditions of
prolonged adversity and retaining
fundamental characteristics
- hybrid identities and new
positions
